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Abstract
As organizations are experimenting with new approaches and structures which cut across 
national borders, the free movement of human resources has come to be regarded as 
necessary to achieve competitive advantage. Yet the process of international integration is 
limited by a major stumbling block; national managerial differences. There is little sense in 
harmonizing accounting systems in all the different subsidiaries of multinational companies 
or developing global products when the people involved in these projects perceive them 
differently and therefore are unable to work effectively together.
Many researchers and academics, especially in the 1970s and early 80s, demonstrated the 
endurance and strength of different national managerial characteristics. These were 
attributed primarily to their different cultures and backgrounds. Most of the evidence 
provided, as far as most Western European countries were concerned, served to confirm 
established national stereotypes. According to this “culturalist” thesis, the British 
encourage delegation, the Italians are very autocratic, and so on.
The aim of the thesis is to challenge such assumptions about different managerial cultures 
by putting the culturalist thesis to empirical test. The principal hypothesis is that these 
national managerial differences are less relevant than was previously thought, and, above 
all, remain quite difficult to identify.
The research focuses primarily on Italian managers, and compares them to UK managers. 
While the Italians are described in the literature as autocratic, paternalistic and politically 
oriented, the UK managers are said to rely on logic, encourage delegation and value 
adaptability.
The research was carried out with a questionnaire distributed in 2 multinational companies’ 
Italian and UK operations (Unilever and Electrolux/Zanussi) and two business schools 
(Ashridge and Bocconi). The questionnaire elicited opinions on work-related values and 
perceptions of practices on questions such as superior/subordinate relationships, career
I
progression and decision-making. A set of interviews was carried out with a sample of 
managers from each of the 4 companies in order to obtain qualitative data on the above 
issues.
The results of this research provide few ‘national’ managerial differences. Managers from 
Italy and the UK seem to have more in common than previously thought. When the 
research focuses on the organizational level, these ‘national’ differences are also not 
confirmed. The two organizations from Italy provide significantly different results. 
Managers in each organization of this study in fact display individual characteristics, which 
may be related to the organizations’ history, geographical location, product area, business 
environment, and so on. What emerges from this research is that the organizational as well 
as the national environment in which managers operate is a variable which must be looked 
at closely. Failure to analyze the data at the organizational level may result in the 
perpetuation of national managerial profiles which do not conform to reality.
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Introduction
In 1983 Theodore Levitt heralded a trend towards the globalization o f (some) products and 
markets with the claim that uthe world*s needs and desires have been inexorably 
homogenized**. Corporate structures are also*going global*; today, the location o f 
headquarters is no longer very important, and Research and Development is carried out. in 
global webs (high added-value activities are located with almost total disregard to the 
company headquarters nation.) [Reich, 1990]. Reich implies that almost all Western MNCs 
are following this * global * route, and Japan has only to adapt. Reich *s argument is based 
on a number o f observations: cheap computing and telecommunications, the fa ll o f barriers 
against foreign investment and capital raising, the spread o f tastes and standards across 
frontiers, have pushed more and more firms to compete on a world market rather than on 
national ones. Top managers around the world stress the importance o f their organizations 
becoming leading actors on a worldwide stage. The old 1960s model o f the multinational, 
with a dominant parent company and an array o f stand-alone clones in each overseas 
market, has been superseded by one in which firms locate production wherever the costs 
are lowest, and organize on a more equal, global scale. [Bartlett and Goshal, 1989]
But the paths to globalism do not come easy - let alone an adequate understanding o f the 
internationalization process o f complex institutions. Globalization is a double-edged 
sword. Companies assume more risk as a result o f globalization. In order to operate in 
different countries, companies face the difficult task o f collecting enough information 
about that country to make the right decisions on where and how to allocate necessary 
resources. The centralized decision control system can become ineffective once the 
activities are spread all over the world. Consequently, companies can become worse o ff 
than when they operated only within a few  countries; many may have to change their entire 
management structure to cope with this widespread operation. [Rydz, 1990]
As organizations develop on a global level and grow more complex, the process o f 
integrating managers from  different nationalities becomes a pressing reality. Human 
resource planning and career development are increasingly important elements in the total 
planning o f the organization. Managers must come to terms with issues such as foreign 
culture awareness, multinational working groups, or the development o f an international 
cadre o f managers. [Vineall, 1988] This process o f international understanding and 
integration is made more difficult by a perceived major stumbling block; national 
managerial differences. There seems to be little sense in harmonizing accounting systems 
in all the different subsidiaries or developing global products when the people involved in
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these projects perceive them differently and consequently do not work effectively together. 
I f  the global revolution is about to start, it should be first firmly grounded in the minds o f 
those who will have to ride the wave o f change. [Reich, 1990]
In their book, In Search of Excellence, [1982] Peters and Waterman made a strong case 
for the argument that a common denominator underlying the best-run companies in the 
U.S. was the emphasis that those firms placed on Human Resource Management. The idea 
followed Drucker’s argument [1954] that the function of management is to combine human 
power, capital and technology to attain a desired level of performance in the organization. 
Tung [1988] contends that human resource planning is pivotal to the successful operation 
of a multinational corporation because the capital and know-how could not be effectively 
and efficiently utilized nor transferred from corporate headquarters to the various 
worldwide subsidiaries without using human power. Any attempt at economic 
restructuring, industrial revitalization, or industrial targeting is destined to fail if adequate 
attention is not given to the planning, management, and deployment of human resources 
required in these efforts. [Tung, 1988]
In the past, these issues seemed less relevant; managers of subsidiaries in far-flung parts 
of the world talked about daily calls from headquarters requesting detailed numbers about 
cost, orders, and, shipments. The same managers were required to obtain permission for 
the smallest expenditures. In the words of one manager: “ Every morning at eight o’clock I 
reported to headquarters only numbers: costs, production schedules, things like that. 
Corporate strategy or where our plant fit into it all-no, that was never on the agenda.” 
[Beer et al., 1990 p. 16]
Today it is argued [Doz, 1989] that this approach is no longer suitable. Intense global 
competition and deregulation have created much higher uncertainty for firms in virtually 
every industry. The new competitive environment requires a flexible and adaptive 
organization, as well as different patterns of work behaviour. Managers must respond
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rapidly and efficiently to changing customer demands and meet lower cost and higher 
quality requirements. They are aware that in order to meet successfully this challenge they 
must improve international coordination and teamwork. Manufacturing costs are 
influenced by R&D’s product design, just as R&D’s understanding of the value it is 
designing into the product or service is influenced by marketing’s communication about the 
customer. [Beer et al., 1990] Many of these activities can take place simultaneously in 
different countries. Management must be able to draw from all these resources and quickly 
introduce a successful international, or global strategy. Without commitment and a 
cooperative spirit, vertical international coordination among management, employees, and 
unions is difficult, particularly given their different interests. One of the biggest challenges 
today is how to develop global corporations that demand of employees and instill in them 
the capacity for internal and external coordination and teamwork, as well as the 
commitment and competence it requires.[Tyngz,1990] An inability to integrate the 
international workforce effectively may cause a company's global operations to stagnate or, 
worse, loose its market share to competitors. [Evans and Doz,1989]
Most processes of international integration or global expansion have yet to deal with a 
perceived major stumbling block: national culture. Companies willing to acquire new 
operations or thinking of integrating loose foreign units are today aware that local 
management is likely to retain its own peculiar modus operandi derived from many years of 
local experience. The parent company or headquarters, on the other hand, may try to 
impose its own view on how best to approach and control the business.[Evans, 1992] The 
foreign operations may also have developed throughout their history an organizational 
culture which may differ substantially from that of the parent company. So long as the 
foreign units operate at an autonomous level, these 'cultural1 differences may be 
overlooked. However, when headquarters tries to incorporate the foreign unit into a more
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structured framework, the mix of the different organizational cultures may eventually lead 
to conflict As a result, the process of integration may come to a standstill. [Ronen, 1985] 
U.S. industry, for example, had a number of problems with its foreign units in the past. 
Many American companies were predominant in their markets in the post - World War II 
era because of the ravaged state of economies in Japan and Western Europe. Also, thanks 
to natural resources and technology, American corporations enjoyed a competitive edge 
well into the 1970s. This competitive advantage was however achieved at a relatively high 
human cost American companies usually sent a group of top managers to head the newly 
acquired or recently built foreign operation. The rate of failure of these managers, (failure 
as the inability of an expatriate to perform effectively in a foreign country) has been 
estimated at around 30% [Adams and Kobashy 1969, Henry 1965, Seward 1975]. Many 
of these managers had great difficulties in adjusting to the way of doing things locally and 
could not replicate successfully the lessons learned while at headquarters. This led to 
incomprehension, frustration, and, eventually, failure.
This experience outlined the strength of national cultures, and companies have capitalized 
on this knowledge. In a survey carried out in 1984, Tung reported that most of the U.S. 
and European multinationals in the sample observed used host-country nationals to a much 
greater extent at all levels of management in developed regions of the world than in the less- 
developed countries. In contrast, the Japanese MNCs used parent country nationals more 
extensively in their top and middle management positions in all their foreign operations. 
He attributes this finding to several reasons: first of all, Japanese multinationals are in an 
early stage of evolution, and therefore rely on parent-country nationals to establish the 
business abroad. Consultation and interaction with headquarters, essential for Japanese 
managers, is easier among fellow Japanese nationals. Language barriers, control 
mechanisms and lifetime employment among the Japanese also seems to justify the 
reluctance of Japanese companies to hire foreigners for management positions.
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However, Tung acknowledges that the Japanese are beginning to see advantages in using 
host-country nationals, and many of their manufacturing companies have established 
localization policies. Tung concludes that problems still remain in implementing such 
policies, many of which arise from the difficulty of incorporating local nationals into the 
Japanese industrial system [Matsuno and Stoever 1982; Tung 1984] While Japanese 
companies are now trying to increase their ’local managerial content* many Western 
companies have already scaled down on the number of expatriates, relying increasingly on 
local management skills. This trend has been reinforced by a number of factors such as 
costs, skills involved, and the notion that national culture is a major factor to be accounted 
for in the successful management of foreign operations.
The perceived importance of national culture is not a simple impressionistic notion derived 
from past managerial experience. There is ample empirical evidence which tends to support 
the notion of the distinctiveness and relevance of local culture. A number of academics, 
especially in the 1970s and early 1980s, through statistical evidence were able to show, 
with some degree of success, the endurance and strength of different national managerial 
characteristics. These differences were attributed primarily to their different culture and 
background. Most of the evidence provided, as far as most Western European countries 
are concerned, went to confirm established national stereotypes. The British were 
delegative, the French autocratic, the Italians heavily politicized, and so on [Laurent, 
1985], The fact that most of these findings have gone since unchallenged may be explained 
by the fact that the national stereotypes which emerged from the research were, in fact, 
nothing new. They confirmed with empirical evidence what international managers have 
been saying, or thinking, for some time. For example, the human resource managers in the 
Multinational companies covered in the present study have been relying heavily on these 
“culturalist” works for their training courses.[Vineall, 1987] The statistical evidence on
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national managerial differences has been supported with managers’ own experiences, 
anecdotes and international case studies on the difficulties of breaking into new markets and 
adapting to local culture. As a result, while many large companies are, at least 
theoretically, becoming global, their management is constantly reminded of their national 
cultural differences. Companies try to bridge this ’national cultural gap’ with cultural 
awareness courses, language training and so on, while anthropologists are called in to 
unveil and dissect the culture of the companies themselves.
As it will be seen later, there are a number of conceptual and methodological weaknesses in 
the culturalist approach. Nonetheless, there seems to be broad agreement today among 
managers [Vineall, 1987] and a group of academics [Hofstede, 1991] that culture is a 
dominant and critical issue in international business. Laurent at the end of his culturalist 
work argues that “It may very well be that the management process in these ten Western 
countries is as much culture bound as their cooking, and that international management has 
to avoid the trap of international cuisine. National cultures may still offer some genuine 
recipes.”[Laurent, 1981, p. 54]
The aim of this thesis is to challenge these assumptions of different managerial cultures by 
putting the culturalist thesis to empirical test The research will focus on Italian managers 
and uses UK ones as a control group, described in the existing literature as displaying 
considerably different managerial characteristics. The main hypothesis is that these national 
managerial differences are less relevant than previously thought, and, above all, quite 
difficult to identify. Therefore, an “Italian managerial profile” can not be clearly identified. 
The research will try to show that, while looking at ‘national’ samples may provide some 
meaningful managerial differences, when the research focuses also at the organizational 
level, these ‘national’ differences may not be confirmed. Every organization in fact
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displays characteristics of its own, which are related to its history, product area, business 
environment, and so on. For example, Italian managers working for a foreign-owned 
consumer goods multinational company based in the north of Italy are likely to display 
managerial characteristics quite different from those of their peers working for a state-owned 
steel company in the south of Italy. If the research sample is collected from both 
organizations, the results are likely to draw a ‘national* profile which does not represent 
either organization. Failure to analyze the data at the organizational level may result in 
national managerial profiles which do not conform to reality. The arguments in favour of 
this thesis will be exposed in the following pages. Chapter 1 will contain a critical review 
of the literature on cross national management, with particular reference to Italian 
management. The second chapter will outline in detail the aims of the thesis and the research 
hypothesis. The organizations involved in this study will be described in detail in Chapter 
3. The first section of the chapter will analyze the history and present status of these 
organizations, while the second section will discuss the issue of Italian management. 
Chapter 4 will test existing evidence on Italian management with the new data collected for 
this research. Chapter 5 and 6 will describe the results of a series of statistical analyses on 
the evidence collected for this research. In particular, the tests will focus on managerial 
values, perceptions of practice and satisfaction with career progression for Italian managers. 
Chapter 6 will also include the results of the interview programme. The concluding chapter 
will discuss the main research question set out at the beginning of the inquiry in light of the 
evidence gathered and highlight new areas of research. The conclusions will argue the main 
research hypothesis has been confirmed: national managerial differences are not very marked 
and very difficult to categorize. The data on Italian managers in fact does not reflect the 
previously identified “Italian managerial profile”. Another outcome of the research is that 
these mangerial differences must be viewed in their organizational context. Organisational 
affiliation is a variable which must be included in most new research projects.
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CHAPTER 1
This chapter provides a critical review o f the literature on cross-national management. It is 
divided into two main sections, to be called Typology o f Research and Research 
Methodology. Under each o f these two labels, a number o f relevant works are discussed 
with reference to the perceived problems detected in them. It is also worth pointing out at 
this stage that in most o f the evidence presented here the dependent variables which are 
being examined tend to differ, and are not always comparable. Some studies look at 
managerial styles and practices, others at behaviour, leadership beliefs, or managerial 
processes, and so on. Ronen has attempted a categorization but the results are not definitive. 
It is therefore very difficult to classify these results according to their dependent variable. 
As a result, in this chapter the terminology may tend to vary, as no clear research patterns 
can be identified.
Introduction
“The principal aim o f these articles has been to relate the analysis o f formal organizations ” 
more closely than is customary to some categorizations available in general sociological 
review.... The results seem to justify the hope that carrying such analysis further will help 
to codify our knowledge o f organizations more closely with knowledge o f other types o f 
social systems and o f the social environment within which formal organizations must 
operate in a society like our own. ” Talcott Parsons, 1956
Parsons’ call for more attention to the ‘institutional’ and ‘cultural’ perspectives on 
organizations was quickly answered: during the sixties and seventies there has been a 
burgeoning interest in so-called cross-cultural studies of management. Though unified by 
their interest in the impact of culture on management, it is possible to divide such studies 
into two broad categories on the basis of their level of concern with respect to the notion of 
‘management’. First, there are those macro studies of a sociological orientation which
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have sought to examine the relationship between culture and the structuring of organizations. 
Such studies have their origin in the convergence/divergence debate of the sixties'*1 and are 
fundamentally concerned with assessing the different impact on structure of culture and of 
other factors (principally level of industrialization) [Dunning and Hopper, 1966; Harbison 
and Myers, 1959; Kerr et al., I960]. Though there is still no consensus regarding these 
matters, there is substantial evidence pointing to an improved understanding of the 
interrelationships between the variables [Lammers and Hickson, 1979]. Secondly, a great 
many micro studies have investigated similarities and differences in the attitudes of managers 
of different cultural backgrounds. Though it is impossible to generalize from their diverse 
findings, there is some evidence that the attitudes of such managers cluster according to 
definable cultural groupings. For example, Haire et al.[1966] established distinct Nordic, 
Latin, Anglo-American, Developing and Japanese cultural clusters.
As far as the organizations themselves are concerned, Child [1981], like other reviewers of 
the literature, found that the first subset of articles, macro-studies of a sociological 
orientation, concluded that the tendency was toward 'convergence' among organizations in 
different cultures whereas the second subset of articles, concerned with micro-studies of 
managerial attitudes, concluded that the tendency was toward 'divergence'. The 
convergence argument expressed the view that organizations were becoming more and more 
similar across cultures and that it would therefore be appropriate to look for and apply 
“universal” theories and approaches to management becoming more and more
1 According to the convergence theory, the universal industrialization process in the contemporary world 
will force the occupational structure of different cultures to become more similar. By gradually shaping a society’s 
occupational structure, and consequently society itself, a universal technology could become a convergent force 
acting on disparate national cultures. [Harbison and Myers, 1959; Kerr et al., 1960]
The divergence theory instead is concerned with the possible stresses in society in the early stages of development- 
stresses that might result from the introduction of modem technology. As a result, the resistance of cultures to 
change will probably slow down any existing forces of convergence. [Webber, 1969; Vozikis and Mescon, 1981]
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homogeneous. On closer examination, Child discovered a second pattern. The majority of 
the “ convergence” studies focused on macro-level issues - for example, the structure and 
technology used by organizations across cultures. The majority of the w divergence” 
studies focused on micro-level issues - on the behaviour of people within organizations. 
Child’s conclusion was that organizations in different countries around the world are 
becoming more and more alike, but that the behaviour of people within those organizations 
is maintaining its cultural specificity. For instance, whereas the technology used by 
organizations in Italy and Britain is becoming more similar, the way Italians and British 
managers behave within those organizations is different, and that difference is being 
maintained.
Both the macro and micro cross-cultural management studies identified above have been 
associated with important conceptual and methodological problems. In particular, most are 
open to the criticism that they have failed to outline and characterize a model of culture which 
may be relevant to the organization [Evan, 1977] Typically, culture has been treated as a 
residual variable, that which explains everything left unexplained by variables that are easier 
to define operationally. Moreover, previous studies have tackled their particular research 
question in a variety of ways. For example, the Haire [1966] study examined 3641 
managers of various organizational levels from various types of firms across 14 countries; 
Hofstede [1980], on the other hand, used as the sample for his research, managers of 
similar organizational level from the forty subsidiaries of one multinational corporation. 
Like a number of other studies [Haire et al. , 1966; Harbison and Myers, 1959] the data 
employed by Hofstede, collected in the second half of the 1960s, is today quite outdated. 
The statistical analyses applied have also been criticized; the reliance of some researchers on 
ecological factor analysis [Hofstede,1976,1980; Laurent, 1983,1985] is increasingly being 
questioned. [Robinson, 1982]. Most of these works also tend to rely solely on
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questionnaire results. The analysis is usually based on questionnaires originating in one 
country and distributed in different ones. Few researchers have carried out interviews or 
visited the companies in the countries involved. There is also no evidence on the type of 
companies surveyed and the environment in which these companies and their managers 
operate, nor is there any description of their historical background, which could help to 
interpret some of the results. Individuals are treated as completely independent agents from 
the environment in which they act, yet their various differences are usually explained by 
their different national and cultural background. Also, because of the cross-national aspect 
of the research, some notions considered in the literature which might be significant for 
some national managers (for example, in Italy paternalism and clientelism) have not been 
analyzed in detail. Finally, the dependent variable is often different Many studies look at a 
mix of variables such as values, behaviour, attitudes, practices, etc. [Ronen, 1985] with 
different methodologies, yet the results are often collapsed in a common framework. As a 
result, it is exceedingly difficult to make comparisons between studies [Jaeger, 1986]
These criticisms notwithstanding, while today the “ convergence” studies are seldom 
mentioned, the a divergence” works, concerned with the behaviour of people within 
organizations, have been generally accepted and used by academics and practitioners alike. 
[Tung, 1989; Barham,1990] Harbison and Myers’ Convergence Perspective has given way 
to Hofstede’s Culturalist Perspective. This school of thought argues that national cultural 
differences among managers do exist and are identifiable. [Ronen & Shenkar, 1985; 
Hofstede, 1980; Schneider, 1989; Laurent, 1983] Different national managers have distinct 
managerial styles and practices because of their various national or cultural backgrounds. 
For example, managers from France and Italy tend to respond similarly when compared 
with English and American managers. In general terms, the Latin European cluster is 
characterized by little autonomy, paternalism, strong hierarchy and little management
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satisfaction. On the other hand, in the Anglo-American cluster, managers are relatively 
independent, willing to take risks, individualistic, and consider performance and results 
generally very important. [Hofstede, 1980] This chapter will detail why these conclusions 
are less than satisfactorily; there are a number of problems with the existing literature which 
challenge the validity of these results. The main studies discussed in this review are Haire, 
Ghiselli and Porter [1966], Sirota and Greenwood [1971], Redding[1976], Ronen and 
Kraut [1977], Badaway [1979], Hofstede [1976,1980], Maurice et al. [1980], Griffeth, 
Home, Deavis and Kirchener [1980] and Ronen [1985]. The criticisms of existing literature 
will be exposed under the Typology or Research and Research Methodology headings.
Typology or Research
Time of Research
The time o f collected evidence spans from the mid 50s to the early 80s. As a result, a lot o f 
this evidence is now outdated; in the last thirty years countries such as Argentina and 
Germany have undergone considerable social and economic change, albeit in opposite 
directions. Hofstede’s data was collected between 1968 and 1972; twenty years later, his 
conclusions need to be paired with new evidence.
The early studies of international management were not concerned solely with culture. The 
bulk of comparative studies of management until the 1960s had been done primarily by 
labour economists. They tended to find economic explanations for observed differences in 
managerial styles and strategies. As a result, there is a strong suggestion - though it is 
seldom explicitly stated - that these differences are primarily associated with differences in 
the level of industrialization. A descriptive study by Harbison and Burgess [1954] 
compared U.S. with ’European’ management. Their European sample consisted however 
only of France, Belgium, and Italy - three countries considered similar in many respects. 
They concluded that:
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Workers in European plants seldom talk back to their bosses. Upward communication is 
neither expected nor encouraged... In these countries, the paternalistic employer appears to 
develop in the working forces a feeling o f  gratitude and dependence mingled with 
resentment. Socially irresponsible management creates active opposition and outright hatred 
[1954, p. 19]
Harbison and Burgess gave an insightful description of the large ‘power distance 
syndrome’, but their extrapolation to ’’Europe’ seems to some [Hofstede, 1981] as not 
justified. In a latter study by Harbison and Myers [1959] which collected qualitative 
evidence on management processes in 12 countries, European countries were no longer 
placed in one category. In fact, Harbison and Myers, concerned with variation in leadership 
beliefs, from authoritarian to participatory in countries with different degrees of 
industrialization [1959] introduced a dimension from paternalism to pluralism: they put 
Japan, Italy and France on the paternalistic side: Sweden, England and the United States on 
the pluralist side.
The use of the level of industrialization as an explanatory factor for managerial differences 
was first criticized in one of the earliest, best known and largest cross-national studies of 
managerial attitudes [Haire et al. 1966]. The study assembled samples from 14 countries; 
the groupings of countries that emerge from these data fit remarkably poorly with any 
hypothesis flowing from the level of industrialization. It first appeared that countries/nations 
could be clustered according to similarities on certain cultural dimensions. These 
dimensions typically measure work goals, values, needs, and job attitudes. The 
discriminant validity of these variables appeared to be supported by the resulting clusters 
consistently discriminating on the basis of language, religion and geography. The cluster of 
Spain, France, Belgium, and Italy, for example, or that of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
Germany, provide a mix in terms of industrialization, but an understandable homogeneity in
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cultural strain. The authors argue therefore that managerial strategy and practices are 
inextricably linked with general cultural values. They grouped their results into four 
clusters: (i) Nordic European (Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden), (ii) Latin European 
(Belgium, France, Italy, Spain), (iii) Anglo-American (England and USA) and (iv) 
Developing countries (Argentina, Chile, India). These pattern of clusters will be confirmed 
by many of the following studies. For example Haire et al, find that the Latin European 
cluster is characterized by little autonomy and a strong sense of hierarchy. Twenty years 
later Laurent [1985] came to similar conclusions.
Most of the above evidence is today outdated. The Latin countries in particular have 
undergone in the last twenty years considerable economic and social changes. [Priore and 
Sabel, 1984 Porter, 1990] It is therefore important to see whether these economic and social 
changes are reflected in managerial attitudes. New data is needed to test established 
assumptions.
Research Samples
The samples o f managers studied are almost invariably collected from self-completed 
questionnaires distributed in international', or multinational companies and business schools. 
From statistical evidence conclusions are drawn on national or cultural attributes. There is 
no attempt to corroborate empirical findings with interviews and other data, such as 
company affiliation, company history and structure.
The studies mentioned at the beginning of the chapter are derived from different research 
samples. The samples reviewed vary from 248 employees in Six Middle Eastern Countries 
[Badawy,1979] to 88,000 in 66 countries [Hofstede, 1980]. The studies also include, 
different sample size, response rate, organizational level and size, industry, departmental 
affiliation and education. In some of the studies the samples seem too small to represent the 
worker population of the countries involved. Differences in sample size can have an
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important impact on cluster membership. Sirota and Greenwood [1971] and Ronen and 
Kraut [1977] re-analysis found Israel to be an independent cluster. Only Badawy reported 
the rate of response from his sample, which may influence the representativeness of the 
sample. Haire et al. in fact point out that those who were inclined to cooperate and answer 
may do so because impressed by modem human relations management.
Researchers tended to link the fact that different studies provided different results to the 
different research samples used in these studies. In one of his early works, Hofstede 
[1976], studied three hundred seventy-two middle-level managers from 40 nationalities who 
attended courses at IMEDE. They scored their espoused values on two paper-and-pencil 
values tests: Gordon’s English version of the Surveys of Personal and of Interpersonal 
Values. All used the English language form; all but 3 out of the 372 were male. For the 15 
nationalities represented by at least 7 respondents, a Q analysis of the scores per nationality 
group was carried out, which sorted the 15 nationalities into five clusters: Nordic, 
Germanic, Anglo, Latin, and Asian. Differences between clusters show significant 
agreement with differences between student samples from the same countries, obtained with 
translated versions of the instruments. The cluster composition can be explained by both 
linguistic and other cultural reasons. [Hofstede, 1976] Gordon [1975, 1976] has reported 
data form student samples for the SIV in 9 out of the 14 countries in this study. The data in 
non-English speaking countries, however, were obtained with translated version of the 
instrument. Hofstede observes how a comparison between the manager’s cluster profiles 
and the student profiles on SIV shows that for the Nordic cluster 5 out of 6 plus or minus 
signs agree, for the Germanic cluster 4 out of 6; for the Anglo cluster all sign agree; for the 
Latin cluster only 1 out of 6 agrees; for the Asian cluster again 5 out of 6 agree. All in all, 
21 out of 30 signs agree, which according to the sign test has a 5% probability to occur by 
chance, so that he can conclude that Gordon’s student profiles for SIV (in spite of the
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translations) show significant agreement with the IMEDE manager profiles. The lack of 
agreement for the Latin cluster can be understood because Gordon’s data is for Brazil and 
Italy only, whereas in the IMEDE cluster 40 out of the 65 respondents are from French- 
speaking Switzerland and from France. [Hofstede, 1976]
Hofstede has extended his early research into a much larger project. On a rather grandiose 
scale, Hofstede [1980] covered 40 countries within a single multinational corporation, and 
found clusters not dissimilar to the other researches. His data cover 88,000 responses from 
employees of a single (American-owned) business corporation, drawing on sub-samples in 
sixty-six countries both developed and on-the way to development.
Child [1981] raises a number of issues about Hofstede’s research. The multinational firm, 
code-named,’HERMES’ in which Hofstede carried out his research, is well known (IBM). 
But the author does not write enough about the special characteristics of this company 
especially its particular penchant for conformity by it employees and its lack of enthusiasm 
for unionization and unions. Moreover, the survey, large and impressive though it is, was 
originally designed for purposes other than those Hofstede aspires to in the book (and 
articles that have previously appeared). The scales used, for example to measure power- 
distance, are less than satisfactory and would surely have been more elaborate if a full­
blown academic research project had been originally intended. On the other hand, Child 
argues that it is a tribute to Hofstede’s originality that a fascinating and substantial book has 
been developed out of the data and analysis. He also notes that “ It seems that it is too early 
to draw firm conclusions in relation to the culture-free versus the culture-based thesis, but 
this does not prevent us from obtaining theoretically, as well as empirically, interesting ideas 
from comparative research.” [Child, 1981]
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Contextual Background
The researches often fa il to question why differences do exist, and how they can be 
accounted for, and what can be learned from them. When they do, their arguments tend to 
be outdated and reflect stereotypical managerial notions.
The peculiar characteristics of Latin management are often compared to the Anglo-Saxon 
ones. Warner [1981] argues that there might very well be a differential international 
distribution of two types of bureaucracy - the ’’classic’ versus the ’’flexible’ variant - the 
first one more prevalent in southern European, the other one in north-west European 
countries and in North-America. The theory devises two culture clusters categories, 
dividing bureaucratic values into a Latin and an Anglo-Saxon type. The Latin bureaucracy is 
characterized by centralization, a large number of hierarchical levels, rigid stratification, high 
bureaucratic control, low power distribution, low morale, low cooperativeness, and a 
preference for routine rather than innovative decisions. The Anglo-Saxon bureaucracy is 
pictured as having the reverse of these characteristics.
In the perceived Latin bureaucracy hierarchy seems to be a fairly important component. 
Part of the studies by Maurice and his colleagues [Brossard and Maurice, 1976; Maurice, 
Sellier and Silvestre, 1979; Maurice, Sorge and Warner, 1980] have been concerned to 
examine the distribution of jobs, professional skills and qualifications within the structure of 
matched firms located in France and Germany (and more recently in Britain). It was found 
that there is a systematic difference between the French and German firms in the distribution 
and valuations of groups of functions and qualifications. In French firms there was greater 
hierarchical differentiation between groups of jobs compared to that in their German 
counterparts. The French firms also had more hierarchical levels and a relatively larger
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managerial component. These differences were not associated with technological or scale 
contingencies. It is concluded that systematic nation-related differences of this kind “appear 
not only to be explained in terms of structural factors internal to the firm but also with 
reference to external factors that are peculiar to the social whole of which they are a part” 
[Brossard and Maurice, 1976, p. 30]. Subsequent research [Maurice et al. 1980] designed 
to investigate these external factors, similarly to Hofstede, points strongly to national 
training and education patterns and social mobility which have a bearing upon the extent to 
which there is differentiation between technical, supervisory and production operative tasks, 
between production and maintenance, and between line management and specialist 
’expertise’. [Child, 1981]
Child argues that in countries such as France and Italy, where managers report a stronger 
perception of their political role in society, they also emphasize the importance of power 
motivation within the organization and report a fairly hazy notion of organizational structure. 
Danish and British managers, on the other hand, express a significant lower political 
orientation, both within and outside the organization, and a clearer notion of organizational 
structure. The political orientation of Italian and French managers appears also much 
stronger than the political orientation of Danish and British managers.
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The second area of concern with existing evidence is 
Research Methodology
The studies reviewed used primarily questionnaires to look at several variables: work goal 
importance; managerial styles and practices, management processes, job satisfaction, 
managerial and organizational cultures, work role and interpersonal orientation, and so on. 
The question is how can the data be systematically compared when researchers measure 
different variables? Furthermore, different researchers frequently measured the same 
variables using different instruments.
Most of the research data in the studies reviewed here has been gathered through the use of 
self-completion questionnaires (a technique employed by Hofstede himself). However, he 
is ready to admit that all paper-and-pencil personality measurement instruments share, the 
same methodological limitations:
1. they are based on self-description by respondents, that is to say his/her espoused values 
which may differ from those that could be inferred from other behaviour. [Argyris & 
Schon, 1974].
2. they are ethnocentric, that is, designed by researchers coming from one particular cultural 
environment
3. They are language bound. For uses in other cultural areas, they usually have to be 
translated [Hofstede, 1976]
The limitation of these findings is also that the value profiles found still represent espoused 
values, based on self-description by respondents and not necessarily the same as their values 
in use [Argyris & Schon, 1974]. The extremely low score for ” conformity* among U.S. 
respondents may be a case in point - it could reflect the fashion on nonconformist expressed
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by” Why can’t you be a nonconformist like everybody else? “. Hofstede would therefore 
argue that it would be very desirable that other kinds of measurements of cultural differences 
be developed, not based on self-descriptions; they could serve to validate the findings of this 
and similar studies.
Ronen [1985] designed a map of country clustering based on their dependent variables, 
emerging from his previous work with Shenkar [1985] & Kraut [1977]. Eight cluster 
studies emerged from their literature search. They include the studies by Haire, Ghiselli and 
Porter [1966], Sirota and Greenwood [1971], Ronen and Kraut [1977] Hofstede [1976], 
Griffeth, Horn, Deavis and Kirchener [1980], Hofstede [1980], Redding [1976] and 
Badawy [1979]. Two of these studies examined one world region each. Redding [1976] 
studied eight countries in Southeast Asia, and Badawy [1979] six countries in the Middle 
East. Although these studies did not perform any clustering of countries, Ronen has still 
included them in the review. The Arab region because it did not appear in any other study 
and Redding’s work because it includes Indonesia and Malaya which have not been 
included in other studies.
These studies reviewed several variables: work goal importance, need deficiency, fulfilment, 
and job satisfaction; managerial and organizational variables; and work role and 
interpersonal orientation. Since many of the scales employed in these works are a modified 
list of Maslow’s categories, there appears to be a solid basis for comparison. Five of the 
studies referred to work goal importance: [Haire, Redding, Sirota and Greenwood, Ronen 
and Kraut, Hofstede]. Five surveyed need deficiency, fulfilment, and job satisfaction. 
[Hofstede, Ronen and Kraut, Badawy, Haire et all., Griffeth et all.]. Four other studies 
include managerial or organizational variables [Haire et all, 1986; Badawy, 1979; Hofstede, 
1980, Griffeth et al., 1980], and three examined work role and interpersonal orientation 
[Haire et all, 1986; Redding, 1976; Hofstede, 1986] These are the most sophisticated
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efforts in clustering work attitude by nations and the variables examined in the studies 
overlap.
Ronen, looking at these previous studies and drawing from the similarities of results across 
the reviewed studies, has created a synthesis of the eight studies. The result is a map using 
per capita GNP as a general guideline for the concentric distances from the centre of the 
maps, [an idea derived from the early work of labour economist such as Harbison & Myers, 
1959] That is, the nearer to the centre a particular country is placed in comparison to other 
countries, the higher its GNP per capita is compared to those other countries. The most 
highly developed countries are close to the centre, indicating the effect of the level of 
development on the countries’ values and attitudes. Three main clusters emerge from the 
chart; they almost always identify Anglo, Germanic Nordic, and Latin European groupings 
respectively. In Latin Europe its more consistent members were France and Belgium; when 
Spain, Italy and Portugal were included in a study, they also fell into this group; Spain was 
usually closer to Italy, while France to Belgium.
It appears from previous research that countries can be clustered according to similarities on 
certain cultural dimensions. They are work goal values, needs and job attitudes. The 
discriminant validity of these variables is supported by the fact that the resulting clusters 
consistently discriminate on the basis of language, religion and geography. Ronen argues 
that it seems certain that the cluster approach to mapping cultural differences provides an 
indispensable tool for international managers. Cluster studies offer a substantive method for 
assessing other cultures. In the process, Ronen groups the methodologies employed in a 
number of earlier studies. The universalist stance of labour economists, which appeared to 
link managerial attitudes to the level of industrialization is paired with different currents of 
thought, such as the ’culturalist’ wave of the 1970s; mixing the two approaches may not
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lead to useful classifications.
Finally, previous studies have limited themselves to the analysis of managerial values, that 
is, what kind of management system managers would like to work under. They have not 
explored the kind of management system manager are actually working for. In other 
words, there has been almost no attempt to link the value statements of managers with how 
they actually perceive their company to be working. For example, is there a relationship 
between how managers would like to see career progression and management development 
programmes to operate and what they perceive to be the actual practices of the organization 
in these areas?
Research Tools
Little is know on the research tools employed, the quality and the amount o f the field work; 
the results are often presented without describing how they were collected.One o f the major 
drawbacks o f many comparative studies is that they do not provide a sample o f the 
questions used for their analysis.
Due to the lack of information from previous research, one is left to conjecture about the 
structure and methods of the research, while it would be important to look at the research 
instruments employed for a better interpretation of the results. Quite often a set of 
interesting results cannot be thoroughly studied since there is almost no information on how 
the data was gathered. Seldom there is information on the content of the research 
instruments (usually questionnaires) and how the data was gathered (mailed questionnaires, 
face to face interviews, etc.)
It is known, for example, that the Haire et al [1966] research used deliberately broad 
questions, for instance: “The average human being prefers to be directed, wishes to avoid 
responsibility and has relatively little ambition. Do you agree?” Hofstede’s power distance
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also consists of three fairly broad questions, one of which asks subordinates whether 
employees in general are afraid to disagree with superiors’.
The way researchers get to their conclusions is difficult to assess when little information is 
provided on the research instruments and methodology employed. It is hard to take much 
of the research evidence at its face value. A significant example of this is provided by 
Lammers and Hickson [1979]; in a book on comparative organizational study, they put 
forward a theoretical argument based on a division into two main country clusters and 
supported by evidence of a variety of studies, including Hofstede’s. Some of the results are 
quite interesting, the most relevant to this study being the clear identification of the 
difference between the Latin and the Anglo Saxon types, which originate, as usual, mostly 
from a French/British/German contrast. Yet, once again, there is no research material 
available to explore and justify how and why these results emerged.
For example, if one looks at the ’average’ Latin European cluster, France is usually the 
most common country analyzed and is often used to classify other Latin management styles. 
France however does not represent Latin management as a whole (if indeed such a concept 
really exists). In particular, the methodology used to assess France’s ’managerial culture’ 
may not be appropriate for Spanish or Italian management Their different educational and 
industry system may have generated very different and unique ‘managerial cultures’. Clark 
and Crozier [1972] mention in France characteristics such as centralization, a rather rigid 
stratification, while in Britain bureaucratic rules are applied in a more flexible way. In the 
British case, there is not so much conflict and the firm’s capacity for change seems to be 
greater. Is this sufficient evidence to categorize Latin management as different from the 
Anglo-Saxon one?
At first glance, it would appear so, since most of the other research is on the same lines.
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Aiken and Bacharach contrast the Walloon and Flemish local administrations; they mention 
the resemblance between the typical Walloon bureaucracy and the French and wonder if in 
the description given by Crozier of French bureaucracy one could recognize a southern 
European, Latin type of bureaucracy. Likewise, Kuty [1976] finds what he calls a 
’hierarchical structure’ in two of the French and Belgian (Walloon) kidney units he studies, 
which again show characteristics in tune with the ’classic’ model of bureaucracy. The 
sketch Maurice offers of French firms fits quite well with the pictures painted by Clark 
(Crozier) and Kuty as far as centralization and the rather rigid system of stratification go. 
Some other features pointed to by Maurice - many hierarchical levels, a high supervisory 
ratio and sharp inequality between grades and remuneration - do not occur in the other 
descriptions of the Latin type, “ but could be very well be bound up with pronounced 
stratification. Moreover, Granick’s data on the reward system in French industry agree 
with those of Maurice.” [Lammers and Hickson, 1979]
Clustering vs. non-Clustering
The debate on the relative values o f culture cluster studies versus non-cluster studies is still 
open. Although researchers in the 1970s in particular [Ronen, Review o f studies, 1986] 
argued in favour o f clustering cultures, other researchers feel that cluster studies exaggerate 
the differences between countries.
Hofstede’s research [1976, 1977, 1980] provided solid back-up to the culture clustering 
argument. Hofstede provides four basic benchmarks against which each country can be 
measured. First, the Power Distance Index (PDI); second, the Uncertainty Avoidance Index 
(UAI); third, the Individualism Index (IDV); and last, the Masculinity Index (MASQ; these 
should tell us how far managers in a given country accommodate to authority (or not), avoid 
uncertainty (or not), pursue an individualistic course (or not), or exemplify male chauvinistic 
values (or not). The empirical basis for Hofstede’s generalizations is ample indeed. His
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ranking of countries on the PDI index can also be arranged into two broad clusters not very 
different from the Haire et al. [1966] clusters described above. Hofstede’s first group 
includes: Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Norway, Finland), Germanic countries 
(Austria, Switzerland, Germany, Netherlands) and Anglo-American countries (New 
Zealand, Ireland, UK, Australia, Canada and USA). The second broad cluster is made up 
of Latin European and Mediterranean countries (Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal, Belgium, 
Turkey and France).
Culture clustering is however not supported by all researchers. A few researchers take a 
different view, feeling that cluster studies greatly exaggerate the differences between 
countries. [England & Negandhi, 1979; Schaupp & Kraut,1975; Griffeth et al.,1980]. 
Ronen [1979] rated fourteen work goals by employees of the national affiliates of a 
multinational electronic company in five different industrialized countries. According to the 
study’s results, the structures of work-related values systems are similar, regardless of 
employees’ nationality and their work setting. Across countries, certain needs and goals 
tend to cluster together and to be relatively distant from others. The research also highlights 
the nature of the distinction between self-esteem and self-actualization. Hickson et al. 
[1974] proved from research in three countries that the culture-free hypothesis was sound 
by demonstrating that many relationships are stable across societies. In an eight-country 
comparative study of managerial attitudes and decision making behaviour, Heller and 
Wilpert [1979, 1981] find a variety of significant country differences but no consistent 
culture pattern. They included France, Holland, Sweden, Israel, Spain, Sweden, The 
United Kingdom, the United States and West Germany. A number of statistical methods 
were used to test for country effects. Neither the two Latin nor the Anglo-German countries 
show characteristic profiles on leadership style or on attitude to their jobs, skills, 
environmental pressures or job satisfaction. Nevertheless, interesting differences between
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countries were found on most of these variables, for instance on the extent of centralized 
versus decentralized decision styles. Contrary to the culture cluster thesis, French as well as 
Swedish top managers used decentralised styles, while British and American managers used 
more centralised methods [Heller and Wilpert 1979]. The authors believed that the 
judgement skills of those who are managed is of crucial importance as a predictor of 
managerial competence rather than just the skills themselves. American top managers score 
highly here: British managers much less so. Indeed the latter do not come out too well in 
the international comparisons. Organization structure, technology (depending on the sector), 
national differences and environmental uncertainty loom large as determinants of managers’ 
behaviour. Thus, they argue, there is a clearly articulated contingency theory of managerial 
competence and power which will have a major impact on future research in the field.
Heller and Wilpert do not accept any facile views concerning culture as contingent. They 
argue that their findings suggest that any proposition exclusively expounding the culture-free 
or the culture bound theorizing of management behaviour should be viewed with great 
caution. “This holds also for sweeping generalisations about ’cultural clusters’; that appear 
to conform to readily available preconceived notions of cultural affinity between countries or 
those encompassing simplistic world views“ [Heller and Wilpert 1979, p.50] It would 
seem to take issue with the approach offered by Hofstede. Their approach is more eclectic 
and complex. They argue that only: “ ... by linking all three aspects, societal contexts, 
normative frameworks, and the microstructural facets of task and skill patterns can we hope 
to comprehend more thoroughly the dynamics and social consequences of one of the main 
organizational problems of our time, participation* [p. 115]
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Other studies also tend to give ’cultural literature’ lighter significance. The IDE 
(International Research Group) [1981] first tested the simpler and more rigorous hypothesis 
that coherent country clusters or profiles do exist. Two approaches were chosen, ’blind’ 
methods and the testing of previous country clusters identified by other researches, but 
neither yielded very convincing results, although the second approach reproduced some 
support for the Latin versus non-Latin country hypothesis.
Similar non-culture cluster findings are reported from a 12 country study on managerial 
objectives [Bass and Elridge 1973] and from a large cross-national comparison of 
managerial values of over 2500 respondents in 6 countries [England 1975]. In the study of 
values, organizational context seems to be an important predictor, union leaders were quite 
different from managers, company size and career success were important factors. There 
was a surprising similarity in value systems of managers from such different countries as the 
USA, Japan, Korea, India and Australia. [Warner, 1981]
29
Concept of Culture
The terminology employed is general, and, at times, unclear. Concepts such as culture 
(country or organizational) or nation are exploited without consideration o f their wider 
significance. Also, there are no clear definitions o f what is meant by culture and what 
relationship exists between culture and management.
The anecdotal basis of studies of comparative management ensured, at least in the early 
days, that differences could be ascribed to ’culture’ in so far as they could not be put down 
to other common factors present. This is not to say that the ’universalistic’ approach has 
been wholly abandoned, but the role of ‘contingency’ has been increasingly emphasized. If 
’culture’ is put forward as a candidate, the question is what precisely is meant by such a 
term, and whether what it purports to describe is the case. Child [1981] argues that “Cross 
cultural studies, if we may generalize, proliferate in all the social sciences, but they usually 
lack a theory of the key variable: culture itself. Names of countries are usually treated as 
residues of unidentified variance in the phenomena found”.
Child [1981] has put forward a worthwhile attempt to reconcile the existing divergence of 
findings and develop a more eclectic analysis of country differences. Incorporating the data 
and theoretical positions of a variety of approaches, including Lammers and Hickson 
[1979], he argues for a three-pronged attack. He would use a theoretical framework with 
pre-specified variables covering contingencies (i.e size, technology, level, etc.) culture 
(social institutions, labour movements, expectations about norms, etc.) and economic 
system variables (ownership of means of production, economic centralization, etc.) This 
seems, to a certain extent, to fit with Hofstede’s thinking. Hofstede in fact argues that 
people carry ’mental programmes’ which are developed in the family in early childhood and 
reinforced in schools and organizations, and that the self-same programmes contain a 
component on national culture. They are most clearly expressed in the different values that
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predominate among people from different countries.
But what is exactly meant by culture? Anthropologists, who were the first to develop the 
concept, generally view culture as a complex system which is all-embracing of a society’s " 
folkways”. This holistic perspective is consistent with their traditional concentration on 
primitive societies which could be studied as totalities. Tylor’s classic definition exemplifies 
this perspective: Culture ...is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, 
morals, law, custom, and any capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of 
society" [Tylor, 1924, in Child, 1981] Kroeber and Parsons [1958] made a distinction 
between the concept of culture and the concept of social system, a distinction which Parsons 
elaborated more recently [1973]. Kroeber and Parsons suggested that the concept "culture" 
should be confined to "transmitted and created content and pattern of values, ideas and 
other symbolic meaningful systems as factors in the shaping of human behaviour", whereas 
the term " social system is used to designate the specifically relational system of interaction 
among individuals and collectivities" Kroeber and Parsons [1958, in Child, 1981]
Child argues again that culture responses are at least in part a function of the format used for 
the stimulus question. Fairly broad general questions, not relating to specific identifiable 
current behaviour, have tended to predominate in research studies that have found fairly 
clear culture differences. "Questions should be specific and on the aspects of their day-to- 
day behaviour: the more general and broad the question format, it may attract responses that 
are anchored in something analogous to a group’s collective unconscious or to their early 
upbringing and family imbedded values. When the stimulus question refers to identifiable 
and specific situations, familiar to the respondent, the answers will tend to be descriptive of 
that situation and will attract less of the free floating group-determined values and 
preferences.” [Child, 1980, p. 313]
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The distinction between national and organizational culture is also often blurred. In a series 
of papers written in 1983 in the Administrative Science Quarterly Smirchich [1983] 
summarizes the works by saying that There is little here to suggest, as much of the 
popular press coverage on organizational culture does, that a ’strong’ culture will assist in 
adaptation to environment change.” [1983, p. 338] The collection still lacks a broad, 
societal analysis exploring the modem corporation as a cultural form. There is a tendency in 
all of the papers presented to stress the internal, rather than to look to the external, societal, 
cultural context within which organizations are embedded. [1983] Smircich claims that 
different conceptions of culture among organizational analysts generate different research 
questions and interests. “ The differences in approach to the organization-culture 
relationship are derived from differences in the basic assumptions that researchers make 
about both ’organization’ and ’culture’. “ [1983, p. 339] thus the task of evaluating the 
power and limitations of the concept of culture must be conducted within this assumptive 
context. As far as culture in comparative management studies is concerned, Smirchich 
[1983] argues that culture is considered to be a background factor (almost synonymous with 
country), an explanatory variable [Ajiferuke and Boddewyn, 1970] or a broad framework 
[Cummings and Schmidt, 1972] influencing the development and reinforcement of beliefs. 
The literature can be thus segmented into that with a macro focus, examining the relationship 
between culture and organizational structure, and that with a micro focus, investigating the 
similarities and differences in attitudes of managers of different cultures [Everett, Stening, 
and Longton, 1982, in Smirchich, 1983] In practice, however, with the exception of 
Everett, Stening and Longton [1982] most comparative management research leaves the 
concept of culture undeveloped [Bhagat and McQuaid, 1982]
Still, charting differences among cultures, locating clusters of similarities, and drawing
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implications for organizational effectiveness is regarded as very useful. Smirchich [1983] 
argues that the practical utility of such research would be evident for multinational 
companies, and also to the others companies at large due to global interdependence, and 
cites Theory Z [Ouchi, 1981] and The Art of Japanese Management [Pascale and Athos,
1981] as examples of popular successes.
Nonetheless, culture, in comparative research on organisations, is seldom studied on its 
own as a major factor but rather grouped with other, less relevant factors. This problem has 
been analyzed in a seminal article by Roberts [1970] who reviewed 526 publications and 
found that only 54 per cent based their arguments about culture on empirical data. She came 
to the conclusion that, even where data were available, the conceptualization was usually 
descriptive, vague, and ignored the impact of alternative factors like technology or structure 
which probably accounted for a larger percentage variation of the dependent variable. Child 
[1981] has also made similar criticisms and has expanded the debate on the role of culture. 
When the vast literature that later accumulated of a more ’scientific’ type was put to test, as, 
say, by Roberts [1970], it emerged that more questions were left unanswered than were 
satisfied. Warner [1981] argues that since then, further studies have summarized the studies 
at hand [Haire et al. 1966; Heller and Wilpert 1979; IDE Group 1981, etc.] and the degree 
of discontent remains perhaps even higher than previously. Nonetheless, Warner admits 
that it is difficult to approach the topic dispassionately, since “the use of culturalist 
arguments has now become part of ’conventional wisdom’ among many students of 
management” . [Warner, 1981, p.217] Today, in fact, there are probably over a thousand 
empirical studies on management and ’culture’. [Warner, 1981]
Today one of the most common definitions of culture adopted by researchers in 
Organizational Behaviour is given by Schein [1985]. He develops his model of culture on
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three different levels. The first level is made up of artifacts, creations, the visible and audible 
behaviourial manifestations of underlying assumptions. They are easy to see but hard to 
decipher. For example, in one company all the office doors are open. What does it mean? 
One could gather clues from the visible and hearable environment but it rarely provides 
answers. In the second level Schein asks questions in order to elicit values. Asking 
managers why they do what they do can help understand the reasons behind some of the 
behaviours. Doors are always open because the President values communication very 
highly. The values are the manifestations of the culture, but not what could be thought as the 
driving force or essence of the culture. It is only in the third level that some of the "essence* 
of culture can be inferred. The Learned underlying assumptions are, in Schein’s view, what 
really drives or creates the values and overt responses. Culture is therefore the patterns of 
underlying assumptions which are implicit, taken for granted and unconscious, unless they 
are deliberately surfaced by some process of inquiry. Schein’s analysis focuses on the 
company per se, regardless of its origin or the nationality of its employees. It would thus 
seem that these assumptions are the results of the basic understanding of the nature of 
human activity and relationships, the nature of reality and truth mixed with the personal 
experience in one or more organizations. Culturalist researchers [Adler 1983] argue that his 
model can be applied to both corporate and national culture [Schneider 1988, Laurent 1986] 
with the understanding that the influence of national culture is such on the underlying 
assumptions that corporate culture would have little impact on it  [Laurent 1986] Although 
it could be argued that changes in behaviour may in time affect underlying assumptions, the 
unconscious nature of these assumptions makes it improbable [Schein 1985] What really 
seems to matter in Schein’s model is the third level, the learned underlying assumptions. 
These assumptions relate to the nature of human nature, the nature of reality and truth, 
embodying very fundamental conceptual categories about time, space and the nature of 
things. He labels these assumptions rather than values because they tend to be out of
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awareness, taken for granted, viewed as automatically true and non-negotiable. Values are 
debatable and discussible; basic assumptions are not. Schein argues that if he asks why a 
door is always open and he is told that the President wants so, that answer is to be 
considered a value. It is not clear however whether it is one’s absolute perception of the 
world or the surrounding environment or the result of the subtle indoctrination which goes 
on in each company, or perhaps both, and if so, if it is proper to call it a value.
Nevertheless, his approach to culture seems to have been received very favourably among 
academics and practitioners alike. If one takes his definitions at face value, it appears that 
most of the literature reviewed so far had little to do with the real core of culture, the learned 
underlying assumptions. The research methodology and instruments employed so far in fact 
do not appear adequate to tap Schein’s underlying assumptions. Schein operates as a 
clinician, immersed in the operations of the company. Eventually, he may be able to identify 
these assumptions. Most other researchers have not. They have sent out questionnaires and 
analyzed quantitatively the ones which were returned. Their heavy reliance on statistical 
methodology makes their extrapolations on culture unjustified. Schein’s paradigm is a 
constant reminder of the weakness of the articles so far examined. It appears that most of 
the literature so called ’cultural’ has in fact wrongly used the most important variable, 
culture itself. Most studies looked at a mixture of perceptions, behaviours, attitudes and so 
on. In fact they may have looked at what could be called here ’environmentally acquired 
habits’; procedures, external behaviours and attitudes acquired while working for a specific 
company. Whether these habits represent culture, is very hard to say.
Statistical Analysis
The level o f statistical analysis is open to question, in particular with respect to the common 
use o f ecological factor analysis. Individual factor analysis has been identified as more 
appropriate. It appears that individual and ecological factor analysis will yield different
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results from the same data set. [Robinson, 1982]
Haire et al. [1966] used factor analysis to study cognitive descriptions of the managerial role 
through a semantic differential technique. Factor scores were calculated on the bases of the 
factor loadings of the nine scales comprising that part of the study. To create country 
clusters, the authors obtained a correlation matrix on the basis of all three parts of their 
study, each given equal weight. Countries were grouped on the basis of similarity, each 
cluster consisting of countries similar to one another and dissimilar to countries in other 
clusters.
A Q (inverted) factor analysis was used by Sirota and Greenwood [1971] and by Hofstede 
[1981]. In his 1980 study, Hofstede performed factor analysis within and between groups 
(ecological). He acknowledged trying smallest space analysis with very similar results to 
factor analysis. Hofstede [1980] preferred factor analysis because of his greater familiarity 
with this method.
Griffeth et al [1980] used the generalized Pythagorean distance measure (D2) to measure 
profile similarity. Cluster analysis was applied to the D2 scores to create country clusters. 
The authors applied a one-way multivariate analysis of variance to determine the main effect 
of nationality. A multi-group discriminant analysis was performed to interpret the results of 
the analysis. The only use of nonmetric multivariate analysis was by Ronen and Kraut 
[1977], who employed the technique for their own data as well as for their reanalysis of the 
data in Haire et al. [1966] and Sirota and Greenwood [1971]. The consensus among 
researchers that multivariate analysis is vital to the process of clustering raises the question 
of whether metric or nonmetric techniques are preferable. It appears that there are 
advantages and disadvantages to each method. [Roberts, 1982] There is also a general 
consensus that, among all of the evidence, Hofstede’s work stands out as “one of the major 
landmarks of cross-cultural research” [Triandis; 1982, p. 90] and “the standard we will use
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for many years to come” [Korman; 1985, p.243]
Those who have paid closer scrutiny to Hofstede’s methodology, however, take a different 
view [Robinson,1982]. Hofstede did use factor analysis, but only at the very end of the 
analysis process, in order to fit the total picture together. It should be noted in fact that all 
the analysis from Hofstede’s work reflect an “ecological” level of analysis - correlations 
among items in each scale and factor analysis used to define the measures use mean scores 
from respondents aggregated at the national level before being subject to analysis. In other 
words, each item in Hofstede’s questionnaire produced a single data point (the mean score) 
for each country in his analysis. Analysis at the individual level reveal an entirely different 
picture from analysis at the ecological level. For example, correlations among the three 
items measuring Power Distance are significant only at the national level, whereas the 
correlations among items at the individual level of analysis are virtually zero [Hofstede, 
1984, p.76] Researchers have also criticized the domain of items that measure each cultural 
dimension [Robinson, 1982] and labelling of the dimension [Jaeger, 1986; Triandis, 1982] 
They also argue that although Hofstede’s measures and analytical procedures have been 
subjected to criticism, organizational researchers should probably be more concerned with 
the level of analysis issue. The ecological level of analysis severely restrict the 
meaningfiileness and usefulness of the scales for those researchers who operate at the micro 
level of analysis. For instance, Hofstede asserts that the Italian culture is much higher on 
Power Distance than is the United States culture. One implication of this is that traditional 
US management techniques such as MBO may not succeed in Italy. This is due to the 
managers’ reluctance to trust subordinates enough to delegate important work activities in 
addition to the lack of egalitarianism needed to make participative MBO programmes 
succeed. Nevertheless, because the scale taps only Power Distance at the national level, it 
cannot measure individual or company differences and thus does not allow us to identify
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specific individuals, companies or situations where MBO might be effective. From a 
selection and training perspective, an individualized measure of the construct would be 
extremely valuable. Robinson [1982] argues that the use of high intercorrelations (or factor 
loadings) on the ecological level as the basis on which items are selected for inclusion in the 
four indices makes many within-country comparisons (between companies, individuals, 
occupation or sex, for example) impossible, because the items do not form reliable scales 
except on the country level. The Power Distance index does not scale for individuals or 
sexes; the Individualism and Uncertainty Avoidance indices do not scale for individuals, 
occupations, or sexes; and the Masculinity Index does not scale for individuals. This means 
that most within country analysis are effectively precluded by Hofstede’s choice of items. 
For organizational researchers, a measure valid at the individual level would allow to move 
beyond broad generalizations about national cultures. Separate factor analyses in the 40 
countries would have yielded some universal (etic) factors as well as some culture specific 
(emic) factors. The same selection of items should then be used in all the countries, with at 
least four items, loading on each etic factor, included to obtain sufficient reliability. [Triandis
1982] Researchers could better identify and specify relationships among organizational 
variables that are sensitive to certain cultural differences.
Notwithstanding the criticism of Hofstede’s research, Triandis [1982] has noted that the 
four dimensions identified by Hofstede make sense and are important cultural 
characteristics.
The above remarks on the role of statistics in general and the use of ecological vs. individual 
factor analysis in particular have not, in turn, generated new or improved methodological 
techniques. The critiques on ecological factor analysis have not been followed by convincing 
empirical evidence in favour of different or innovative techniques. Most of the new 
evidence [Laurent, 1985] still relies heavily on a mix of statistical analysis with very little
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qualitative data. In fact, the latter is more often based on speculation than on field research.
The Power of Culture
Despite considerable methodological problems, culturalist academics such as Adler [1983] 
still argue that national culture differences have tended to be ignored by many management 
researchers, but recently have been given increasing attention, and should be at the centre o f 
future research [Hofstede 1980, Laurent 1983]
This wave of cross-cultural (as the term itself indicates) research best represents the theory 
of cause and effect; it stresses the importance and influence of cultural differences and their 
role in affecting beliefs, attitudes and behaviour. It accepts a greater degree of determinism 
than does the organization culture concept. Newly hired people bring with them a cultural 
imprint which is more significant than organizational culture. It stresses the indelible 
influence of national culture on adult behaviour. These culturalists, contrary to the image of 
multinational management as being”beyond passport* [Heenan and Perlmutter, 1979], 
see managers and employees fundamentally conditioned by national culture. It seems that 
culture has been rediscovered again, this time by the organizational theorists. Nath [1986] 
reports that a number of conferences had been organized by academic institutions and 
societies. At the 1984 annual meeting of the Academy of Management in Boston there were 
four sessions devoted to this area; the following year the number reached seven.
The last evidence which still favours country clustering is provided by Laurent [1983, 
1985]. In his business school research (very similar to Hofstede’s work at IMEDE), he 
identified the usual European national clusters. The issue then, as he points out, is whether 
similar differences in management and organizational concepts would persist within the 
potentially homogenizing, corporate culture of a single multinational company, or whether 
the multinational company would be sufficiently strong and pervasive to swamp national
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differences. In order to test the above hypothesis, his study carefully matched national 
samples of managers selected from a large, US-based, multinational, chemical firm with 
subsidiaries in France, Germany and Great Britain. Although a few similarities, perhaps 
due to corporate culture - did appear, the results clearly indicate the consistent and pervasive 
effects of national cultures for the three countries involved. A homogenizing effect of a 
large multinational corporation toward standardization of managerial concepts across 
national cultures was not found in these data. If anything, the author suggests, the opposite 
hypothesis could be advanced. "A second analysis with another multinational demonstrated 
once again an intriguing overall stability of the national pattern of managerial ideologies, 
given the very tight conditions of the research design." [Laurent, 1981, p. 563]
Laurent’s research evidence has been welcomed by many. Companies in particular often 
describe his findings as the last word on cross-cultural management. Paradoxically, 
Laurent’s findings, while extremely popular, are also fairly weak. In one of his articles 
[1983] he reports 5 clusters made up of a total of 13 questions in which managers differ 
substantially on the basis of their nationality. The 13 statements reported were part of a 
wider group of 60 general questions distributed to a sample of managers at INSEAD. The 
dangers of using business schools managers as research samples have been described 
before. What is of concern here is the reliability of Laurent’s findings. There is no evidence 
on the remaining 47 statements. Do they fit neatly with the reported clusters, or perhaps, 
they provide contrasting evidence? There is a tendency in cross-national research to focus 
on managerial differences, leaving aside similarities, which are, in fact, equally interesting. 
Researchers appear to be scouring the data looking for ’sensible’ differences which confirm 
pre-designed methodologies or more general stereotypes. Any new research should provide 
samples of all the materials used and description on where each statement fits in the resulting 
evidence.
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At the same time, the IDE group claims that explanations of cross-country difference vary 
and some authors are content to describe the existence of differences without offering 
reasons for them. They argue that, if significant country or societal differences emerge 
repeatedly in different studies, causal explanations should be sought in the form of 
measurable independent variables. Major candidates for such analysis are child-rearing 
practices, educational systems, socio-structural factors like class and religious practices, 
economic factors and legal-political systems. [IDE, 1981] Furthermore, is there such a thing 
as national culture? Is there good research on ’national culture’ as such? The general 
practice to date has been to use the nation state as the unit of analysis. This practice has 
come into increasing question lately, however; several authors have criticized it as potentially 
misleading [Roberts and Snow, 1973; Elder, 1976; Poorting, 1977; Berry, 1979] The 
criticism put forth by these researchers stems from Triandis’ seminal work which coined 
the term ’subjective culture’ and noted that differences in perception of the environment exist 
within a nation.
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Conclusions from Existin2 Evidence
A lot o f the research evidence to date has been accepted and assimilated. [Vineall, 1987; 
Hofstede, 1991] One explanation may be that, as previously mentioned, the evidence and 
statistical data on national differences confirm traditional national managerial stereotypes.
Heller and Wilpert [1979] warned against "sweeping generalisations about ’cultural 
clusters’, that appear to conform to readily available preconceived notions of cultural affinity 
between countries or those encompassing simplistic world views". Yet current evidence 
suggests that these sweeping generalizations are today readily accepted. To argue that a 
Swedish manager is delegative and a Spanish one authoritative is, to a certain extent, almost 
expected. The way in which one derives these conclusions may be of lesser importance 
since these conclusions, as Triandis [1982] has argued, ’make sense’. If instead, one 
argues that Swedish managers are quite autocratic, the research methodology and evidence 
would be likely to be scrutinized since they contradict expected national stereotypes.
In cross-national studies the concept of culture has been generally mis-used or mis­
interpreted. One should give credit to comparative and cross-cultural researchers for 
realizing the importance of culture and the role it plays in explaining economic and especially 
management behaviour. However, these scholars have not developed an operational 
definition of culture which is rigorous and meaningful. In spite of finding some interesting 
differences among nations [Sekran, 1983], cross-cultural management research has failed to 
develop a useful theory or model explaining the role of culture in business or management 
studies. [Nath, 1986]
What should the next research be like? What emerges from the latest research and writing on 
cross-national management is that multi-country, over-quantitative studies are now being 
discouraged. Academics such as Hofstede [1985] and Warner [1981] support the idea of
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researching fewer countries more in depth. A good understanding of these countries and 
their management is critical for any meaningful research. Also, statistical evidence ought to 
be integrated with qualitative data such as company’s history or personal interviews. 
Contextual variables are also seen as very important and instrumental for a better 
understanding of the research data. Unfortunately, there is little evidence to suggest that this 
is happening. The field of cross-national research seems to be in a period of transition and 
little new research has emerged. Davis and Rasool [1988] give a new interpretation to 
England’s data. Other works by Dorfmann and Howell [1988], Enz [1986], Tung [1984], 
Cheng [1989] add little of significance to the debate.
It appears that the field of cross-national managerial research has suffered a setback in the 
mid 1980s. Most of the attention in the period had been paid to the methodologies and 
validity of previous studies. Newcomers to the subject [Nasif et al; 1991] identified with 
analytical rigour the shortcomings of existing knowledge, yet provided little supportive new 
empirical. Most importantly, the debate is still lingering on the choice of the most 
appropriate quantitative techniques, ignoring another important aspect of cross-national 
research, the role of qualitative evidence. Instead of exploring new ways of integrating 
sound and reliable analytical evidence with qualitative data, ever more sophisticated 
techniques were used to re-interpret old statistical data (see Ronen [1977] study on Haire 
[1966])
A number of factors could explain why researchers are reluctant to tackle these research 
issues:
- Time. Cross-national management research requires a considerable amount of time spent 
organizing and collecting the data before even beginning to analyze i t
- Funding. If local interviews are carried out and material is collected, travel and
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accommodation expenses quickly dent a researcher’s budget
- Access. Organizations must agree to the project and at times impose their own limitations 
and timing. Consequently, obtaining matched samples in each organization is quite difficult.
- Recent topic. Only the last 30 years have been dedicated to cross-national managerial 
studies, a topic which is intrinsically subject to constant evolution.
- Methodological difficulties. Cross-national management research contains a number of 
important variables, which, if all taken into account when drawing a research plan, would 
make the plan itself almost impossible to operationalize. Generalizations and simplifications 
are therefore necessary, but will always leave most researchers’ efforts open to criticism.
For those still wishing to embark on a cross-national project, it could be argued that, on the 
strength of previous criticism, new studies should;
- avoid, general, large multi-country studies, and instead focus on particular countries and 
companies.
- require a good understanding of the countries and companies studied, which should 
provide sufficient material to explain and justify the results.
- use values and perceptions, that is how managers would like to see a management system 
operate and what they actually see their own management system as operating.
- avoid, as much as possible, the issue of culture, and not use it as an explanation.
- combine whenever possible statistical evidence (including ecological and individual factor 
analysis) with more in-depth qualitative and documentary data such as interviews and 
company records.
- attempt to provide a justification for the results but avoid looking for pre-set patterns.
- do not take for granted readily available preconceived notions of cultural affinity between 
countries or those encompassing simplistic world views.
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CHAPTER 2
This chapter outlines the aims o f the thesis and the research hypotheses. The main objective 
o f the thesis is to test the validity o f the 4cultural istf argument by subjecting the culturalist 
hypothesis to empirical test. The thesis also explores new areas o f research such as 
managerial work-related values and perceptions o f practice as well as satisfaction with career 
progression. A theoretical discussion o f the type o f companies (Global and Polycentric) 
involved in this study follows. Finally, there is a section on the research design and 
methodology (with a fu ll description o f the managerial values and perceptions o f practice) as 
well as a detailed description o f the instruments used in this research.
In broad terms, comparative and subsequently cultural cross-national management research 
have both argued that different national managers have distinct managerial styles and 
practices because of their various national or cultural backgrounds. Country clusters found 
in previous cross-national managerial research have been recently attributed to similarities in 
national culture [Ronen & Shenkar, 1985; Hofstede, 1980; Schneider, 1989]. For example, 
managers from France and Italy tend to respond similarly when compared with German and 
Dutch managers. Country clusters based on previous research findings usually locate UK 
managers in the Anglo-American group, while the Italians are in the Latin European one 
[Ronen & Shenkar, 1985].
In general terms, the Latin European cluster is characterized by little autonomy, paternalism, 
strong hierarchy and little management satisfaction. On the other hand, in the 
Anglo-American cluster, managers are relatively independent, willing to take risks 
(low-uncertainty), individualistic (willing to have a go), and consider performance and 
results generally very important.
Usually, Latin managers look at the organization as an authority network where the power to 
organize and control the actors stems from their positioning in the hierarchy. They focus on 
the organization as a pyramid of differentiated levels of power to be acquired or dealt with.
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They perceive the ability to manage power relationships effectively and to “work the 
system” as particularly critical to their success.
British managers, on the other hand, hold a more interpersonal and subjective view of the 
organizational world. According to them, the ability to create the right image and to get 
noticed for what they do is essential for career success. They view the organization 
primarily as a network of relationships between individuals who get things done by 
influencing each other through communicating and negotiating.
The Italian characteristics are best summarized by Hofstede [1980]
- Subordinates have strong dependence needs
- Superiors have strong dependence needs toward their superiors
- Superiors expect superiors to act autocratically
- The ideal superior to most is a benevolent autocrat or a paternalist
- Everyone expects superiors to enjoy privileges; laws and rules differ for superiors and 
subordinates
- Status symbols are very important and contribute strongly to the superior’s authority with 
the subordinates
In summary, previous works have developed the view that Italian managers are autocratic 
and paternalistic, while the UK ones delegate more and are less hierarchical. These 
characteristics are usually the result of comparisons with other nations using the same 
variables. [Hofstede, 1980]Nonetheless, the evidence on which most of the analysis is 
based presents a number of limitations, which have been discussed in Chapter 1. This 
research will challenge these assumptions of different national managerial cultures by putting 
the culturalist thesis to empirical test.
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Aim of the thesis
The core objective of the thesis is to test the validity of this ‘culturalist’ assumption, by 
subjecting the culturalist hypothesis to empirical test using a sample of Italian and UK 
managers. The main research question then is the following:
“Is it still possible to detect clear national managerial differences ? ”
Most of the available evidence is outdated, and has not focused on any particular country. 
Child [1980] has noted how most cross-national comparisons have failed to conceptualize 
national attributes so as to incorporate these as variables into their research design. There is 
now sufficient material to assess the existing evidence on each individual country more in 
detail. The focus of the analysis is on Italian and UK managers, since, according to the 
literature, they displayed a number of significant differences. Briefly, Italian managers have 
been described as paternalistic and autocratic,[Ferrarotti, 1959; Hofstede,1980; Boss and 
Mariono, 1988]. They enjoy power and are unwilling to relinquish it. Authority and 
hierarchy are still very important. On the other hand, UK managers hold a more 
interpersonal and subjective view of the organizational world, and they also favour 
delegation and communication. [Hofstede, 1980]
These presumed Italian and UK managerial differences are going to be tested in depth. In 
previous studies, there was little information on where national managers differed, whether 
it was at the level of work-related values, attitudes, perceptions of practice, beliefs, and so 
on. In this study, it will be important to define where national managers differ, if it is on 
values, practices, etc., and whether these differences are consistent both at the national and 
at the organizational level: belonging to one company or another in the same country may in 
fact significantly affect managerial values and practices.
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The distinction between values and practices is significant. A newly recruited engineer may 
possess a set of values about work, the organization, the relationship between superiors and 
subordinates which derive from his education and academic background. These values may 
not be confirmed by the new organizational reality. For example, one may value flat 
organizations, where subordinates have a right to challenge their peers as well as their 
superiors. The perception of practice in the organization may be that the superior should not 
be challenged by the subordinates. The gap between values and perceptions of practice may 
indicate an organizational climate quite different from the values of the individuals involved. 
This research could therefore produce evidence of organizations were most managers would 
like to challenge their superiors and organizations were superiors cannot be challenged.
In summary, this research proposes to contribute to the debate on comparative management 
on three accounts. First, it will test the validity of key aspects of the culturalists’ findings 
on UK and Italian managers, and in addition it will explore whether a number of 
characteristics considered relevant for Italian managers, such as autocracy, paternalism and 
clientelism, are still present. Secondly, it will question whether there are any consistent 
differences between these managers’ work-related values and perceptions of practice on the 
above issues. Thirdly, it will try to assess how organizational affiliation affects the values 
and practices of managers working for different organizations in the same country.
H ypotheses
The main research hypothesis to be tested is that
national managerial differences are less relevant than previously described. These 
differences are also difficult to identify and conceptualize into a set o f different national 
profiles. Therefore concepts such as “Italian management ” or “English management ” are 
descriptive concepts which cannot be confirmed by empirical research.
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The relevant literature argues that Italian and UK managers differ on a number of key 
points. As it has been stated before, Italian managers are likely to be autocratic and 
paternalistic, while the UK ones would tend to delegate more and encourage consultation. 
[Hofstede, 1980] The Italian characteristics should conform to a general autocratic 
management style, that is when a manager defines his plans and gives commands without 
prior consultation with subordinates. It is the opposite to the participative approach which 
provides for consultation with subordinates. The UK managers instead are expected to fit 
closer to the democratic management style, which allows subordinates leeway of thought 
and action, encourages personal initiative, and it also implements the practice of delegation. 
[Laurent, 1985]
The research hypothesis argues that the above concept of “national managerial styles” cannot 
be supported with empirical data. It will test this hypothesis by, among other things, 
exploring the relationship between managerial values and perceptions o f practice. The 
culturalist thesis argues that Italian managers are autocratic and paternalistic. What is not 
clear is whether these characteristics are imbedded in the managers’ mental software (values) 
or if they refer to the environment in which these managers operate (perceptions o f practice), 
or both. The culturalist researchers have not made this distinction. They have labelled this 
research with different captions, but have never looked at the distinction between espoused 
theories and theories in use. It is fair to assume that, in their view, the term management 
encompasses everything. Since the distinction has not been previously made, on the 
strength of current evidence, there should be no significant differences between values and 
perceptions.
The research hypothesis, instead, contends that the values of Italian and UK managers are 
quite similar. Their perceptions of practice, however, may be different, and these
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differences could be attributed to the company they work for. Italian managers may not rate 
autocracy or paternalism any higher than their UK colleagues. On the other hand, they may 
perceive that, in their organization, colleagues and superiors adopt an autocratic and 
paternalistic attitude.
This would cast some doubt on the validity of the ‘culturalist’ findings. If the distinction 
between values and perceptions of practice proves to be correct, the lack of a similar 
categorization in previous culturalist studies may render their results less relevant Also, if 
managerial values and, in particular, perceptions of practice are linked to company 
affiliation, the identification of “national managerial styles” would also be under discussion. 
It would be very difficult to identify and defend the notion of a consistent “Italian 
managerial style”, as opposed to a UK one.
The study does not focus on macro-level issues such as structure or technology but more on 
the attitudes of people in the organization. If the research hypothesis is confirmed, this 
study may add up-to-date, micro-level evidence to support the macro-level notion that 
converging industrial and technological standards across Europe may have contributed to a 
reduction of national managerial differences.
The definition and identification of values is not a simple matter. Gould [1964] states that 
values are an attribute of individuals as well as of collectivities, and that culture presupposes 
a collectivity. He defines a value as “a broad tendency to prefer certain states of affairs over 
others.” This is a simplified version of the more precise anthropological definition by 
Kluckohn [1951]: “a value is a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual 
or characteristic of a group, of the desirable which influences the selection from available 
modes, means and ends of actions.” It is also in line with the definition of Rokeach [1972]: 
“to say that a person ’has a value’ is to say that he has an enduring belief that a specific 
mode of conduct or end-state of existence is personally and socially preferable to alternative
50
modes of conduct or end-states of existence.”
Looking at culture from a broader perspective, Schein [1981] has described its three levels: 
basic assumptions and premises; values and ideology; and artifacts and creations. The first 
level includes such things as the relationship of man to nature, the nature of man’s 
relationship to man, and man’s concept of space and his place in it. These are usually taken 
for granted and are “preconscious.” The middle level contains values and ideology, 
indicating ideals and goals as well as paths for “ getting there.” The third level includes such 
things as language, technology and social organization. Each successive level is, to an 
extent, a manifestation of the one before it, and all the levels thus are interrelated.
Hofstede [1991] summarizes the debate on terminology with a set of detailed observations. 
He argues that cultural differences manifest themselves in several ways. From the many 
terms used to describe the manifestations of culture he identifies the following four to cover 
the total concept: symbols, heroes, rituals and values.
Symbols are words, gestures, pictures or objects that carry a particular meaning which is 
only recognized by those who share the culture. The words in a language or jargon belong 
to this category, as do dress, hairstyles and status symbols.
Heroes are persons, alive or dead, real or imaginary, who possess characteristics which are 
highly prized in a culture, and who thus serve as models for behaviour.
Rituals are collective activities, technically superfluous in reaching desired ends, but which, 
within a culture, are considered as socially essential; they are therefore carried out for their 
own sake. Ways of greeting and paying respect to others, social and religious ceremonies 
are examples.
Symbols, heroes and rituals are subsumed by Hofstede under the term practices. As such, 
they are visible to an outside observer; their cultural meaning, however, is invisible and lies 
precisely and only in the way these practises are interpreted by the insider. [Hofstede, 1980]
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The core of culture is instead founded on values. Values are broad tendencies to prefer 
certain states of affairs over others. Values are feelings with an arrow; they have a plus 
and a minus side.
Hofstede argues that for systematic research on values, inferring them from people’s actions 
is cumbersome and ambiguous. Various paper -and-pencil questionnaires have been 
developed which ask for people’s preferences among alternatives. The answers should not 
be taken literally; in practice, people will not always act as they have scored on the 
questionnaire. Still, the questionnaires provide useful information, because they show 
differences in answers between groups or categories of respondents.
The present study is focused on exploring these managerial values (the individual’s 
normative orientation) and perceptions of practice, (the individual’s conceptions of what the 
work environment is like). In other words, it will ask first how managers would like to see 
an organization operate, and then how they actually see their own company operating. The 
distinction between expectations and reality has not been used extensively in the 
past,(Hofstede et al. [1991] being one of the notable exceptions) and it is not clear altogether 
whether it was even considered as a choice or simply overlooked.
Finally, the data collected in different companies in the same country is likely to present 
some differences. The level of values should be consistent, while the perceptions of practice 
could be related to the markedly different characteristics of the organization studied. In this 
research in particular, the companies analyzed are Unilever (Unilever UK and Unilever 
Italy) and Electrolux (Electrolux UK and Zanussi Italy). The first pair was identified 
[Evans, 1985] as Global, the second as Polycentric.
1. The Global enterprise (Unilever) typically manages its global workforce in a relatively 
centralized, coordinated way. Corporate policy on human resource management tends to be
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quite specific and influential - there are numerous guidelines, procedures, principles, and 
guiding corporate values. Examples of such procedures are worldwide policies regarding 
recruitment and promotion criteria; “single status” policies; a uniform stance toward unions; 
standardized procedures for performance evaluation; global compensation policies; uniform 
monitoring of human resource management through opinion surveys; a code of corporate 
values for the indoctrination of newly hired recruits. Corporate and divisional personnel 
officers typically have powerful roles in global enterprises. Such firms are also seen as 
having “strong” organizational cultures. Individuals are rigorously and selectively recruited 
in national labour markets for careers, not jobs. The early career years are marked by 
indoctrination experiences to test the loyalty of the individual. The young manager is guided 
by a transparent code of corporate values and conduct. Such firms may have relatively high 
turnover rates among their graduate recruits during the first two years of socialization; some 
individuals may discover that their own values and needs do not match those of the firm, 
and they quit - a desirable result for both the firm and the individual.
2. The Polycentric enterprise (Electrolux/Zanussi) decentralizes the management of human 
resources to its subsidiaries. Corporate co-ordination, to the extent that it exists, tends to be 
loose and informal. There are few guidelines, and policies are typically quite vague, and 
there is little specification of desired practice - all of these tasks are left to the subsidiary or 
business unit general manager and his or her personnel staff. The role of the headquarters 
staff is limited to tasks such as executive recruitment and advice on key appointments, and 
the organization of occasional meetings of subsidiary executives to exchange lessons of 
experience. Selection procedure are less rigorous, socialization is neglected, less attention is 
paid to retention management. The external labour market might steal the capable 
individuals at the time in their careers when the firm’s investment in human capital is 
beginning to pay off. The company is saddled with the investment costs of aiming to be 
global but without the benefits. It may then be obliged to recruit local talent into senior
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positions form the outside labour market, individuals who, however technically competent, 
do not necessarily share the values and attitudes of the global corporation. Consistency is 
further compromised since disruptive clashes can break out with these newcomers.
The global organization, with its centralized or coordinated policies and practices, selects 
and retains those people in any given country who most closely fit with its own cultural 
values. It adapts to different local environments by controlling selection; indeed, 
recruitment (complemented by socialization and management development) becomes a core 
function of such a firm. The organization recognizes that values, attitude and conceptions 
of management vary from country to country, and this represents one way of adapting to 
socio-cultural differences. Yet when a globally-oriented company like Unilever is recruiting 
an Italian manager for a career at its plant near Milan, they are not simply seeking any 
technically qualified Italian manager; they are looking for an Italian whose personality 
matches Unilever’s cultural values. Global enterprises adapt through selection. In turn, 
those persons who are promoted into positions of power are individuals who most closely 
conform to these core values (i.e. further internal selection).
Polycentric enterprises, on the other hand, adapt in a more direct way. As pointed out, 
adaptation to local socio-cultural circumstances is the task of the local subsidiary, at best 
loosely circumscribed by corporate guidelines. Thus, the Italian subsidiary is likely to have 
markedly stereotypical Italian properties, the United States subsidiary to have different 
American characteristics, and so on. Socio-cultural adaptation is the task of local 
management, rather than the responsibility of the corporation. Local management of 
Zanussi, [owned by Electrolux] will be likely to recruit managers who fit with their 
espoused views of management, which have been identified as different from those of 
Electrolux. As an immediate reaction to market conditions, this policy might be successful. 
Yet when the company is expected to cooperate with its European partners and create 
international synergies, local management may well clash with the espoused management
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views of Electrolux’s corporate office.
Evans and Lorange, [1985] argue that internal consistency of policy and practice is easier to 
ensure in the polycentric enterprise. It implies slim corporate staff with the limited role of 
assuring executive succession and the cross-fertilization of experience among national 
subsidiaries. Divisional staff may have a co-ordination role, but real power lies in the hands 
of subsidiary line and staff executives. Their decisions have a direct impact on the 
workforce. Conversely, internal consistency is more difficult to attain in the global firm. 
The attention paid to selection has to be complemented by retention policies, by socialization 
and management development practices to build corporate as well as national loyalty. Many 
firms have in fact developed human resource management strategies in the sense that human 
resource management is global and centralized for senior executives and those with such 
potential, though for all other employees the human resource management approach is 
polycentric, decentralized, and country-based. In such firms, the decision to label someone 
as having ’’potential4' constitutes the critical selection decision.
Evans and Lorange’s arguments are based primarily on interviews and talks with personnel 
department staff and senior managers. They conclude by saying that “It is important that 
human resource policies should be guided by two logics: the business logic of products 
and markets and the socio-cultural logic of geographic spheres of operations. These two 
logics are by no means independent. Whereas the dictates of product-market strategy may 
sometimes be consistent with the chosen socio-cultural adaptive strategy, in many instances 
there may be serious friction between the two logics.”
The question of how these “socio-cultural logics of geographic spheres of operations” come 
about is beyond the scope of their investigation. But where do they originate, how are they
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transmitted, and, finally, do they really exist? How can one talk about the interdependence 
of market and socio-cultural factors when the latter have not yet been codified? In other 
words, they argue that local management folklore is a variable in the local operations of an 
organization. Yet their writing is in itself management folklore, since it relies on word of 
mouth, corporate myths, company stories mixed with real life problems and strategies. This 
research will try to identify the significant managerial differences between managers 
working for Unilever and Electrolux/Zanussi.
It can also be argued that managers working for a multinational company do not reflect the 
values and perceptions of practice of a country’s managerial class. The same questionnaire 
was thus distributed to a sample of managers attending development courses at a business 
school in Italy and in the UK to ensure a more balanced anchoring group to the multinational 
companies’ scores. Mostly, these managers work for a wide range of middle-sized 
companies, and would thus be expected to better epitomize national managerial traits (if such 
things do exist). The business school managers in each country, chosen as an anchoring 
group, should confirm the expected national similarities and differences.
Research Design
Since there is a multitude of general results on cross-national management, it is important for 
this research to zero in on a small number of countries, looking in detail at a few 
organizations and topics. The research plan thus includes only the UK and Italy for two 
main reasons: there is a good familiarity with their management on the part of this 
researcher, and managers from these two countries are generally identified in the previous 
literature as having considerably different characteristics.
The organizations chosen for the study are two large-size Northern European consumer
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goods Multinational companies (MNCs) with a modem managerial structure and productive 
units both in the UK and Italy. The structure of these two multinationals is quite different. 
The Global one, Unilever, is heavily centralized and has a uniform management structure in 
all of its subsidiaries. The Polycentric one, Electrolux, is considerably more decentralized 
and imposes little managerial control on its operations abroad. The sample is thus composed 
of 4 different units, two in the UK and two in Italy. Both companies have been established 
in Italy and the UK for a long time, though Electrolux managed this through the acquisition 
of Zanussi in 1985. These companies have a long experience in developing their business 
and management strategies. They are both perceived, in fact, as ‘excellent* companies.
The research has also been extended to two business schools, Bocconi in Italy and Ashridge 
in the UK. They will act primarily as a control group. One of the immediate criticisms to 
the research plan might in fact have been that managers from large private, foreign-owned 
MNCs do not represent the average image of management in the country. The business 
schools in this case will provide an anchoring group. These samples of managers in each of 
the two schools are primarily from medium-sized companies attending short development 
programmes. Their views will first be matched to those of the managers from the larger 
organizations to see whether the organizational responses fit with this different, more 
heterogeneous ‘national’ sample.
The analysis is carried out using a questionnaire, which has been distributed in the British 
and Italian operations of both Multinationals (4 subsidiaries; 2 in the Uk and 2 in Italy), and 
in the two business schools. The questionnaire borrows some ideas and statements from 
previous studies. More precisely, the first 13 questions are taken directly from Laurent’s
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questionnaires [1981,1984]. Other sources were Hofstede [1980], Schein [1985], Haire et 
al [1966], with a large section of questions developed specifically for the project. The 
sample is made up of 365 individuals; the results are substantiated by findings from a set of 
unstructured interviews, (51) carried out with a sample of the respondents in each of the 
four companies. The objective of the interviews is to discuss the numerical data while 
collecting qualitative information which could add a qualitative dimension to the analytical 
results. Copies of the Italian and UK versions of the questionnaire can be found in the 
Appendix section.
The questionnaire copies distributed amounted to 540, of which 365 were returned 
completed. The overall rate of return was satisfactory (67%) and above expectations in 
particular in Italy, where the two organizations returned over 75 percent of the 
questionnaires distributed. The Appendix contains also some personal data on the 
respondents.
Company O. distributed Usable Replies Response Rate
1. Unilever UK 70 47 67%
2. Electrolux UK 70 56 80%
3.Zanussi Ita 100 75 75%
4.Unilever Ita 100 79 79%
5. Bocconi B.S. Ita 100 67 67%
6 Ashridge B.S. UK 100 41 41%
UK 240 144 60%
ITALY 300 221 73%
Total 540 365 67%
58
In order to elicit managers’ implicit work-related values and perceptions of practice, this 
questionnaire was developed proposing 32 different statements concerning the management 
of the organization and the hierarchical and interpersonal relationships. A five point Likert- 
type opinion scale was attached to each statement in order to record the respondent’s degree 
of agreement or disagreement with those statements. The first section of the questionnaire 
contained 14 statements aimed at testing the values of managers, that is what they think 
would be best in general terms. The section following included 14 related statements aimed at 
testing managers’ perceptions on the same issues, that is, what they actually think happens in 
the company. The third section contained four statements which identified four different 
kinds of managers. The fourth section focused on promotion and career satisfaction.
The distinction between values and perceptions of practice has not been made in previous 
cross-national managerial studies, and there were few references that could help assess the 
validity of such a dichotomy. Nevertheless, it was felt that the distinction was a necessary 
step forward in the study of cross-national management.
The aspects of the research being analyzed here attempt to identify managers’ perceptions 
and values on three indices or dimensions emerged from previous research. One of the 
primary objectives of the research was to test empirically the existence of differences across 
national groups, for the following dimensions of organizational systems:
• Autocracy
• Paternalism
• Clientelism
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What follows is a brief summary of their characteristics related to specific items in the 
questionnaire.
Autocracy
Autocracy denotes a structure of power characterized by: (a) clear ascendancy of one person 
at the top of its administrative hierarchy; (b) lack of any laws or customs in virtue of which 
the ruler might be called upon to account for his actions; (c) absence of any customary or 
legal limitations on the exercise of authority by the ruler. In its strictest, political science 
definition, autocracy is almost always linked with totalitarianism. [Gould, 1964]
By autocracy is meant a type of government where one man (called the autocrat) wields 
overwhelming power. It might be advisable to adhere basically to this meaning, while 
making it more precise. As far as the distinction between benevolent and malevolent 
autocracy is concerned, if we link autocracy with paternalism we are clearly looking at 
benevolent autocracy.
Autocracy is a form government in which power is in the hands of a single individual. An 
autocratic management system is in turn a system in which the ruler (the president,the CEO, 
or the superior) wields almost total control over the actions and careers of his subjects 
(managers). Most decisions require his approval; he views his role as vital to the survival of 
the organization. In turn, he is likely to respect higher authorities. He does not share but 
rather impose his views, and does not tolerate dissent. His position must be reinforced by a 
series of status symbols which managers can recognize in his position. He is also likely to 
expect reverence from his managers and be referred to with his official title.
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Paternalism
For paternalism it is meant the managing of individuals or groups in the manner of a father 
with respect to his children. It is a type of behaviour by a superior toward an inferior 
resembling that of a male parent to his child - in most cases, a son.
It appears that paternalistic systems have two main currents. One, stemming from purely 
instrumental institutions and goals with hierarchical structures, moves between exploitative 
and benevolent modes, with the former possibly somewhat more prominent. The other 
stems from the genuine needs of inferiors and superiors in hierarchical social systems for 
mutual support.
The question of trends toward disappearance or persistence of paternalistic relations is 
difficult to answer. The survival or creation of a paternalistic system depends on needs and 
on the existing social organization patterns and traditions. The memories of suitable forms 
of paternalism, and the requisite familial models, may survive indefinitely, even in societies 
with highly rationalized economic and political institutions, and thus be available for use if 
the need arises. [John W. Bennett, 1979]
It is said that there is an inherent incompatibility of paternalism with a national social system 
which stresses individualism and free contract. Again the evidence suggests that paternalistic 
systems will wither once these values become part of the national culture. Paternalism 
endures if its participants believe in it and if they are getting something out of it at a bearable 
price.
In Italy it is often assumed that individualism and free contract are far from reality and a 
paternalistic managerial attitude is likely to persist for some time. Ferrarotti [1959] argued 
that superiors view their role as benevolent fathers, taking subordinates under their own care 
and ensuring constant supervision. Subordinates are likely to show respect and gratitude 
towards their superiors. Most likely they will start with menial jobs before moving to more
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gratifying managerial experience, and promotions are at times passed down almost as acts of 
benevolence. [Derossi, 1982]
Ferrarotti [1959], on the basis of his study, has abstracted three main types of patrimonial 
management to which correspond three types of professional managers. The objective 
criterion for differentiation is the position afforded by the power of the family in the 
managerial structure.
The first type is Feudal or authoritarian paternalism; it occurs where the business enterprise is 
completely family owned, controlled, and operated. The family is the only source of power. 
The second type is Manipulative paternalism; the family still owns and control the enterprise, 
but it is no longer the sole source of personnel. The most important problem is ensuring 
loyalty to the family from persons who hold managerial positions but who do not belong to 
the family.
The third type is democratic or participative paternalism. The enterprise in this case is still 
predominantly family owned but it is no longer family operated. The firm is managed by 
professional managers.
Ferrarotti argued that, at his time, most Italian managers fit the second category. He 
furthermore argued that in Italian industry the manager who feels hurt if anything has been 
done without his direct knowledge and participation was a familiar character. An immediate 
consequence of this highly centralised authority was the lack of precise job definitions and 
classifications. It was rare to find in Italian firms a clear functional and organizational chart. 
When such a chart existed, it was kept secret in order ”to avoid eventual frictions and 
personal rivalries. “
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Clientelism
Sociologist and Political Scientists have long known that people act together on the basis of 
friendship, deference, and informal bonds. When they occur at the elite level, they are often 
called cliques, at the local level they have been variously called “vote banks” patron client 
networks, or local factions.
“The clientelistic relationship is one of personal dependence, unrelated to kinship, which 
links two persons who control unequal resources, the patron and the client, for a reciprocal 
exchange of favours”, writes Jean Francois Medard [ 1976]. This definition stresses three 
fundamental features of clientelism, which indeed implies dependence, reciprocity, and 
personalization.
Clientelism forges a relation between two persons of unequal status, prestige, and influence, 
thus constituting an original factor of vertical stratification. The clientele relationship is 
engendered by an asymmetry in the situations of patron and client.
The reciprocity of exchanges between patron and client is observed everywhere, each one 
expecting to gain an advantage from the other. This means that the established relationship is 
of a contractual nature, even if the “contract” remains totally tacit
Clientelism usually acts in a conservative way, since it pushes the exploited person to reach 
an agreement with the exploiter and enhances the advantage of those who are already in a 
position of strength in the system.
To this we can also add Nepotism, the favouring of family members and friends to obtain 
positions and office.
In the selection of personnel and career progression, it may be expected that those most 
capable of dealing with the current problems of the firm will be appointed; however this is 
by no means certain. Those in power will tend to select people who fit in with their views
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or have strong ’credentials’; people who may or may not be capable. Personal survival and 
support may well be the hidden criteria for selection.
In considering management selection, succession and promotion, it should be remembered 
that organizations are places where people compete for advancement and are rivals for 
organisational rewards, yet at the same time have to cooperate as well as cope with the 
outside environment.
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CHAPTER 3
This chapter describes in detail the organizations involved in this study by analyzing their 
history and present status. The organizations are two European consumer goods 
multinationals with a long history and strong current positions in their respective markets. 
Particular attention will be given to their management policies with respect to recruiting and 
training and development activities. The last section will analyze the issue o f Italian 
management and why it has been considered relevant for the research.
The choice of organizations (Unilever and Electrolux) for this research is not casual. Until
the late 1960s, European International and Multinational companies tended to be organized as
international holding companies. In this format, corporate functions were kept at company
headquarters, with heads of the subsidiary reporting directly to the president or board. This
is what has been described as the mother-daughter structure. Subsidiary managers
established coordination and control, thanks to close personal interrelationships with
colleagues (nationality, call status, company experience). These firms also enjoyed a
relatively stable environment, receptive markets and often had close connections with local
governments. By 1971 this relationship started to decline. The elimination of tariff barriers
from the establishment of the common market has increased external competition. Japanese
companies have entered consumer goods markets with increasing confidence. In this
instance, they are looming on the European food and detergent horizon, which is Unilever’s
heartland. Kibun has set up a Scottish plant making sea-food dishes, the powerful KAO has
bought a West German hair-treatment company, Mitsubishi has bought Prince’s and Trex
brands from Nestle, and Shiseido has bought a French cosmetics company. In the white
goods sector, Electrolux’s core business, the Iberna company is now distributing Sanyo
refrigerators across Italy, and it employs engineers from the Korean Goldstar to plan for a
new European joint venture to produce compressors for refrigeration. South Korean air
conditioners are also threatening established European markets. Under increasing pressure
to streamline their operations, European companies have re-focused their core competence
areas, buying and selling non-related businesses. This phenomenon of cross-border merger
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& acquisitions have brought managers from different nationalities and organizations to work 
together. In order to maximize economies of scale, production and research and 
development have also been streamlined across all national operations; at the same time, 
many managers consider cultural differences the number one barrier to successful alliances 
and partnerships [Moss Kanter; 1991] Recruitment, once limited to choosing among the best, 
has become more competitive, and turnover is also higher. Management education and 
development is now a key feature of any successful company, yet the costs, in particular of 
executive education, are very high.
All of these competitive factors require international companies to reorganize themselves; 
while the strategies they adopt may vary with their size, sector and background, they will all 
have to make sure that their management across national companies will be up to the 
challenges. In the non-durable consumer-goods sector, international firms are predominant 
The likes of Procter & Gamble, Unilever, Nestle, General Foods and BSN dominate a 
large share of their respective markets. In the white goods sector, Electrolux/Zanussi, 
Phillips/Whirlpool, General Electrics and increasingly the Japanese and South Koreans are 
the predominant force. The companies selected for this study, Unilever and Electrolux, are 
leaders in their respective areas, and always strive for the ‘perfect’ organization. In the 
process, they experiment with different ideas and new formats, and are constantly 
undergoing change. They have long been established in their respective markets, are 
unanimously considered market leaders and portray the image of ‘good employers’. This, 
combined with other factors, has allowed them to maintain a leadership position.
Large international companies are usually in the forefront of the management of change 
and innovation. New management trends are usually identified and categorized first in these 
international organizations; once they have been masterminded, the lessons can be passed on 
to other organizations. National companies, especially in Italy, often look upon these
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international corporations as a paradigm and inspiration, from which to draw new ideas, 
structures, as well as skilled managers.
Both companies have a shareholding structure, independent of national governments. It is 
important to verify early in the research design that political pressure is kept to a reasonable 
level, with little interference from civil servants or elected officials in such things as business 
plans, refinancing schemes, acquisitions polices, and so on. Also, selection of both top 
management and white collar in general should be left to the individual companies 
themselves. In Italy, for example, large-size state-owned companies are often used by 
political parties to appoint close associates as top managers, while the companies as a whole 
suffer from a system of clientelism, whereby people are hired and promoted on the strength 
of their personal and family connections. This is not the case in either Unilever or 
Electrolux/Zanussi, companies acknowledged to be independent from government 
interference and with highly meritocratic career structures.
The research plan thus aims at taking into consideration also the organizational structure of 
these companies (a variable which has not been used in the past). Rodgers [1991] analyzed 
breakdowns in negotiations between Anglo-Saxon and French managers and found that 
participants often lacked concrete knowledge about the organizational context from which 
their adversaries came. For example, British interviewees felt the French took too much time 
in negotiations and attributed this to their cultural emphasis on personal relationships. In 
fact, in many French organisations the negotiator is often not the decision maker; he/she 
chats to fill the time until he/she can get to the boss. Moss Kanter [1991] argues that some 
conflicts that supposedly reflect cultural differences are really power struggles. She reports 
how, in one European consortium, the Italian representative succeeded in having a major 
project named after an Italian hero. One British observer thought this was because Italians
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are especially conscious of symbols; however, others suggested it was an example of a 
smaller partner seizing any opportunity to assert its will over larger, more important partners. 
Understanding Italian culture would not have helped in this situation as much as a grasp in 
power dynamics. The same perspective can be applied to organizations; before looking at 
culture, there are more identifiable and useful variables to look at, such as organizational 
history, size and strategy. The strategic and organizational predispositions of these firms are 
in fact shaped by a number of factors: the circumstances of their birth, the leadership style of 
their top management, their past administrative practices, the myths and folklore that have 
endured in the organization, etc. Heenan and Perlmutter [1979] describe four distinct 
predispositions in an international firm:
• Ethnocentrism is a predisposition where all strategic decisions are guided by the values 
and interests of the parent. Such a firm is predominantly concerned with its viability 
worldwide and legitimacy only in its home country.
•Polycentrism is a predisposition where strategic decisions are tailored to suit the cultures of 
the various countries in which the MNC competes. A polycentric company is primarily 
concerned with legitimacy in every country that it operates in, even if that means some loss 
of profits.
• Regiocentrism is a predisposition that tries to blend the interests of the parent with that of 
the subsidiaries at least on a limited regional basis. A regiocentric company tries to balance 
viability and legitimacy at the regional level.
• Geocentrism is a predisposition that seeks to integrate diverse subsidiaries through a 
global systems approach to decision making. A geocentric firm tries to balance viability and
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legitimacy through a global networking of its businesses. On occasion, these networks may 
even include the firm’s stakeholders and competitors.
Heenan and Perlmutter argued that the above predispositions are seldom found in their pure 
form. An ethnocentric or polycentric profile is very common [Perlmutter, 1969], while a 
regiocentric or geocentric profile is relatively rare.
Recently Evan and Lawrence’s research [1988], has refined the concepts, drawing a 
distinction between Global (ethnocentric) and Polycentric companies. The characteristics of 
the two different groups have been described in the previous chapter and can now be applied 
to the companies used in this research:
1. Unilever, is the Global enterprise: typically, it manages its global workforce in a 
relatively centralized, coordinated way.
2. Electrolux/Zanussi, is the Polycentric enterprise: it decentralizes the management of 
human resources to its subsidiaries. Corporate coordination, to the extent that it exists, tends 
to be loose and informal.
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UNILEVER
Unilever is one of the largest consumer businesses in the world. It was created in 1930 by a 
union between Lever Brothers and Margarine Union in the Netherlands. Although it has 
head offices in London and Rotterdam with parallel UK and Dutch boards (Unilever PLC 
and Unilever NV), it is run as one business (known internally as ‘the Concern’). The role 
of the board is to approve plans and budgets, control capital expenditure, and appoint and 
develop executives. At an operating level, local managers have great latitude to develop and 
implement strategies that reflect the opportunities and constraints of their particular 
environment
The company employs more than 300,00 people across the world (of whom 20,000 are 
managers) with operating companies in more than 75 countries. Sixty per cent of its 
turnover derives from Europe and 21 per cent comes from North America. Following large- 
scale restructuring and a string of major acquisitions in the 1980s to create a more cohesive 
and efficient entity, 75 per cent of Unilever’s business is now in the three main consumer 
goods areas of food, detergents and personal products. Other core areas are specialties, 
chemicals and Agribusiness. Its products are manufactured and sold throughout the world by 
its operating companies such as Lever Brothers, Van den Berghs and Jurgens, Elizabeth 
Arden and Lipton. Other businesses include products for trade and industrial customers 
including detergents, bakery products and catering ingredients and medical products, 
including diagnostics.
Operations are directed through a three-dimensional matrix structure based on product- 
groups, territories and functions such as finance and personnel. The company tries to keep 
its lines of communication as short as possible. The previous chairman boasted that between 
him and the lowest level of operational management such as brand manager, there are
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typically only four layers of management. The company has been described as a ‘tight-knit 
but free-flow management structure in which, despite the size good and bad news travels 
swiftly and undistorted to every comer of the Unilever universe’. [Vineall, 1987]
The company deliberately keeps central control of three areas. It centralizes research, keeps 
control of the treasury function to maximise its ability to deal financially on an international 
scale and also centralized management development, believing that this is the only way to 
develop the kind of managers needed for an international concern. The personnel people 
stress that meritocracy is pervasive, and goes well beyond nationality. More than half the top 
450 jobs are held by people who are neither British nor Dutch.
A significant proportion of the people running the business in a country should be nationals 
of that country, the company believes. And if nationals of a country are to run a unit in an 
international business, they themselves should have worked outside their own country. It is 
also very important for them to have worked in head office. Ideally managers would have 
experience of both different countries and different industries. At any one time there are 
around 1,000 managers working outside their home country.
An important feature of the Unilever culture is its informality. Much depends on informal 
relationships across the organization. Those relationships are formed from very early in 
people’s careers.
Unilever has long believed in recruiting high-quality talent and providing career development 
that is useful for both the company and the recruit. While Unilever has traditionally filled 
most of its senior posts from its own resources, it expects the recruitment market for 
graduates and other categories of people to be very competitive for the rest of the decade. It 
therefore recognized the need to introduce more mid-career recruits to the business and that 
this needs careful planning; mid-career recruits are therefore provided with a mentor. 
Unilever now regards it as crucial that management development at any stage should both
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train and test individuals. The process of assessing potential should take place 
simultaneously with the development process. Behind this is a conviction that if the company 
wants to keep the best people it has to go on challenging them, even if this makes them more 
attractive to predator companies in search of talent
The company divides its management jobs into four levels, for each of which it maintains a 
central list of people in each business and each country who could have the potential to move 
to that level within five years. A lot of senior management’s time is invested in reviewing 
the lists to ensure both their continuing validity and that people are receiving the appropriate 
experience. Unilever also gives a great deal of attention to the company’s top appointments. 
Any appointment in the top 450 must be agreed with the Special Committee. Similarly, any 
appointment in the top 1,800 people has to be agreed by a main board director.
The company relies a lot on international networks which can help sort out various problems, 
for example try to help the spouse find a job in the Unilever operation in the new country in 
which a manager is posted.
Unilever has also been very concerned to develop the potential of its women managers and 
has been introducing such measures as career brakes, weekend schools for absentees on 
maternity leave, and arrangements for part-time working and job-sharing.
The company believes that a programme of central courses focused on the needs of managers 
at particular career stages can help to give cohesion to a group and can provide focal points 
for the evolution of the corporate culture, as well as for the development of individuals.
Initial training takes place within people’s national company, where programmes will differ 
according to local educational systems, but about 3-4 years after joining, by the time that 
people have any type of management job, the training becomes almost totally international. 
The international programmes correspond to major transition points in people’s careers. The 
first programme is the International Management seminar for people in their mid-to late 20s
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when they first become responsible for significant numbers of people or resources or, where 
specialists are concerned, when they are starting to make a significant contribution. The 
second programme is the General Managers’ Course, for people expecting to become 
operating company directors. At the third stage, senior managers attend an external general 
management programme at a major business school. The fourth level is the Senior Strategy 
Programme for senior managers.
As far as the relationship between Unilever’s culture and the national cultures in which it 
operates is concerned, Tony Vineall, deputy head of personnel, says there is a need for a 
”positive* corporate culture but that a wise company will not regard its corporate culture as 
something which challenges or replaces, or even transcends, the local manager’s identity. 
’’Ideally", he says, ”managers should feel fully nationals of their own country, yet equally 
fully member of the corporate club." As the culture develops and matures it will do so by 
drawing on the cultures of all the countries where it operates.”
In a further move to reorganize its operations, the organization is today trying to convince 
national operating companies to accept reduced autonomy over their traditional markets in 
exchange for a role in developing and executing a unified pan-European strategy. For 
example, the new Lever centre (Lever Europe) is based in Brussels, with a staff of 60 from 
11 nations, while key tasks have been distributed around the operating companies. Installing 
a new European mentality into a business long geared to national priorities will inevitably 
encounter some difficulties but the ‘intellectual logic’ of the company has indicated it the way 
forward. For many of the company’s old guard the change has been quite traumatic, but 
waves of younger executives argued that change was inescapable. The shift has been 
prompted by Unilever’s realisation that its traditional way of doing things was handicapping 
it in an industry which increasingly demands large-scale economies, rapid innovation and
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flexible response to market trends.
UNILEVER ITALY (UNILIT)
Unilever Italy, Unilit, is organized on the same lines of headquarters. The operating centre 
in Milan oversees financial strategies, personnel polices and mobility, as well as management 
development, while individual companies, such as Faberg& and Van der Bergh, have usually 
great latitude for strategy and budgetary decisions. Unilever was the first company to 
introduce in Italy in the post-war period the concept of marketing. It usually attracts the best 
graduates and together with Procter &Gamble, provides a steady flow of managers to the 
competition. Like most other Italian companies, graduates come from business studies (60 
percent) and engineering (25 percent). Recently though, strong performances of philosophy 
graduates in marketing and sales have encouraged a re-focus of the recruiting strategies.
Unilit trains inside; recruiting from other companies is still extremely rare. Like other life­
long employment companies, if a manager leaves, it is almost impossible to return. In 
general, the company selects people who conform to a pattern which will allow the company 
the maximum flexibility for picking and choosing from as a wide reserve as possible for its 
management requirements. Only one out of five candidates becomes a senior manager, and 
he/she is not necessarily the most impressive one. Careers are not very quick, but there is 
an attempt at increasing internal mobility. In a group in which everything is planned, 
programmed and established, superlative, aggressive candidates are usually sacrified for 
other ones, still competent but more reliable, stable, and who can offer clear continuity.
The company through its organizational development people delivers very advanced training 
and development, yet compared with headquarters, they do not strongly believe in the formal
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testing and assessment of managers.
Personal attributes such as calm and stability have at times been very useful characteristics. 
Managers, particularly in Italy, have been under public scrutiny for many years. The 
company was considered for long in the African and Latin American countries and from the 
European left as one of the most aggressive tools of international capitalism. Instead of 
bringing progress, the critique went, the commercial techniques of Unilever have imposed 
superfluous consumerism, while its plantations of vegetable oils in Africa and Asia have 
privileged agricultural monocultures which impoverish the producing countries and make 
them even more dependent on the West. In the 1970s, management almost was a 
second-class career. Sir Michael Angus, Unilever’s previous chairman, argued that because 
of quasi-socialist pressures, “none came on strong because it looked greedy and people 
thought you had your hand in the till.”
Today criticism is less vocal, yet Unilit is still keen on keeping a low profile. Similarly to 
headquarters, it does never advertise as a group (unlike its more aggressive competitor, 
Procter & Gamble), and its Milan headquarters, though impressive, look completely 
anonymous. The lack or flags or any sort of corporate logo is dictated by the fear of terrorist 
attacks on top managers, a key feature of the terrorist strategies in the 1970s. Overall, the 
company has a very low public profile, but is well known and recognized in financial and 
business circles. Business graduates in particular rank it constantly as one of the best 
companies to work for.
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ELECTROLUX
The Swedish company Electrolux is the world’s largest manufacturer of appliances (white 
goods). The company has pursued a remarkable policy of acquisition over the last few 
years, including Zanussi in Italy, White Consolidated in the USA and Tricity and Bendix in 
the UK. The household appliances operation accounts for over 50 per cent of its turnover 
and largely shapes the evolution of the organization, but the company has also interests in 
products ranging from chain saws to sewing machines. Electrolux employs nearly 150,000 
people worldwide, of whom only 20 per cent are in Sweden, and comprises some 500 
operating companies in 46 countries. Nearly 83 per cent of its sales are made abroad.
Some say that Electrolux is not a multinational, but an international company run by Swedes, 
yet in its product development and several other activities Electrolux is starting to develop the 
flexible combination of centralization and decentralization which business academics identify 
as the hallmark of a ‘transnational.’
Electrolux is now switching its focus from growth by acquisition to internally-generated 
growth. Some argue that it will take a few years for the company to ‘digest’ its large-size 
acquisitions. In the meantime, it is an organization in transition, involving changes in both 
strategy and structure. It has globalized several of its product lines, including white goods, 
believing in an ever increasing convergence of consumer taste. Electrolux has formed in 
1989 a pioneering joint venture with Sharp to sell its consumer electronics in Japan, where 
consumers regard European brand names as status symbols. It will use the Japanese 
company’s distribution system as a way into the market. Giving the structure of Japanese 
retailing, where major manufacturers control their own retail networks, such an arrangement 
represents something of a breakthrough for a Western manufacturer.
The company has long pursued a policy of decentralization; so much so that it talked about 
itself as a collection of ‘independent villages’. Electrolux wants to integrate these into
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interdependent but flexible ‘networks’ with product development, manufacturing and supply 
all spanning international borders. The white goods business is pursuing a ‘multi-centre’ 
approach where it is pushing ‘centre’ functions out to the countries. The UK for example is 
not only a national unit but is also responsible for microwave ovens worldwide, while Italy 
is globally responsible for washing machines. The company has also experimented with 
multi-disciplinary task forces for designing and developing products with members drawn 
from different units. The design of a new product may come from Italy, be produced in 
Finland and marketed by the UK.
These ‘interactive global networks with multiple channels of communication’ are often 
difficult to cope with, but the company tries at all costs to avoid creating hierarchies and 
bureaucracy in general. The centre is primarily responsible with financial control, without 
emphasizing structure.
This informal and non-hierarchical style of organization has been under increasing pressure 
in the last few years. Some people are resistant to change, but the company believes that 
after turbulence in the beginning, it will be quite easy to produce concrete results. Electrolux 
has never had a strong sense of corporate identity, with managers around the world feeling 
that they were all working for some common goal. Developing the cross-border mind-set in 
all the company’s managers and specialists is however, a slow process and will not happen 
overnight. In the words of a top manager, “it is a long, maturing process”.
In order to maintain a slim organization and good cross-fertilization of ideas, travelling is 
fundamental. The company is traditionally suspicious of paper and structure. Managers 
know they can get hold of top people, if they are unsure about something or need a decision. 
The trips done by the firm’s senior and top managers are a vital part of the glue that holds 
Electrolux together. The lifestyle of most people at or near the top of Electrolux’s product 
lines (divisions) as well as to top executives and senior staff from head office is decidedly 
nomadic.
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Most of the travel is done on commercial airlines, but to save time the chief executive and his 
deputy make frequent use of one of the corporate jets, an aircraft which came as part of the 
big Italian acquisition of 1984, and is still known as ‘the Zanussi plane’ as if it did not quite 
suit Electrolux’s sparse corporate style.
In line with its anti-bureaucratic philosophy, Electrolux does not have well-established, 
centrally-controlled systems for career progression. The corporation believes that the local 
companies are quite capable of handling their human resources issues without too much 
interference from a distance. Having operated with in the past with the minimum of formal 
procedures, other than a very precise financial reporting system, today the increase in 
formality in inevitable within a company where threefold growth since 1981 has made it 
difficult for top management to rely as completely as they did in the past on informal personal 
contact with the divisional managers and those below them. Some increase in staff influence 
is probably necessary because of the group’s recent rapid growth in size and complexity. 
The company still tries to preserve the fundamental characteristics of Electrolux’s culture, 
which has made it unusually fast on its feet over the past 20 years. Everything is done by 
constant personal contact, either face to face or on the phone.
Electrolux’s management policy is that “ if you want something you go out and grab it. 
Don’t expect to be given it. You can do something.” The company is scarce on resources, 
and managers have to find out themselves what they should be doing. They stress that if 
managers want to participate, they must make a proposal. If they want to perform well in 
the company, they must be very active and take initiatives. In the past, Electrolux has relied 
on finding new management talent through acquisition. Training was regarded as a perk for 
good performance, rather than as a necessity. The organisational culture had a general lack 
of faith in traditional courses as valuable learning experiences, particularly when the training 
was not directly tailored to meeting specific company needs. Now it is more concerned to
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build and educate its own cadre of managers and is giving more attention to international 
management education.
Decentralization and project teams are important means of providing challenge and 
responsibility, and as major vehicles for learning and development”. The new emphasis on 
the individual is reflected by a trend away from structured, taught courses to a learner- 
centred approach, where on the job training is regarded as the best form of development 
This might involve giving individuals responsibility, providing support, tolerating some 
mistakes and using work problems as the basis for looking at new theory. Their formal 
programmes are about implementing global strategies and about giving those who have to 
implement them a sense of ownership. Two such programmes are called The Electrolux 
International Executive Programme and the Business Leadership Programme, mostly for 
high-potential managers in their late 30s. The programmes aim at the development of a 
common corporate identity and culture, an international perspective and international 
networks. Networking is regarded as a major objective of the programme. In the words of 
one manager, ‘it is more a matter of meeting new people and finding out what they do’. 
Management development is about helping managers to improve themselves but also give 
them a sense of being part of an international Electrolux culture which depends on networks 
and develop debate and friendships. The inter-personal factor is very important, managers 
must learn to respect each other and work together effectively.
Electrolux says that the main purpose of the international management programmes it has set 
up since 1988 has been to foster networks between its managers worldwide, rather than to 
develop individual skills. It is already setting the development of such networks, it says, 
with people calling each other up after the programmes to share problems and seek expertise. 
As one manager says, networking offers ‘consultancy that one can trust.’ In Electrolux we 
are not people who are looking for titles or status symbols. They fear the danger of
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recruiting and developing ‘clones’ and of promoting people in one’s own image. They feel 
that organizations need to take more risks in their human resources policy, both in terms of 
tolerating some ‘oddballs’ inside the organization and by sometimes recruiting some fresh 
life from outside. Corporate personalities, they conclude, must be balanced with 
unconventional ties and outside perspectives.
ZANUSSI
Nearly lm large household electrical appliances are sold in Europe in any given week. 
About 400,000 will have come from Italian factories. Italy became Europe’s biggest 
manufacturer in the 1960s, and continues to hold the leadership; the visual appeal and highly 
competitive prices are seen as two major factors behind the success.
Until the late 1960s, Zanussi was a white goods market leader which continued to absorb 
through acquisition its main Italian competitors. In the 1970s the company’s Managing 
Director, Lamberto Mazza, launched the company into new sectors such as solar energy and 
banking. As a result, the company, already under stress after the death of the founder, Lino 
Zanussi, perished in a plane crash in 1968 which almost wiped out the entire board of the 
company, was near bankruptcy, with 70% of operating income as debt. Zanussi called for 
help and the Swedish answered by acquiring the company outright in 1984. The irony was 
that in the early 1970s in fact Electrolux was in troubled waters and Zanussi looked ready to 
step in; two decades later, the situation was reversed.
When Electrolux stepped in, Zanussi was in the red for 33 billion lira; next year the profits 
topped 33 billion, growing yearly to 98 in 87 and 106 in 1988. This seemed to indicate that 
the company was generally healthy, but that it had amassed a large debt through poor 
leadership and venturing into new markets.
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In a highly competitive market, Zanussi today exports 70% of turnover. Twenty percent of 
global production goes to Germany, where there is a long standing agreement with Quelle, a 
retail chain, whereby Zanussi ships goods to Germany with the Quelle brand. The 
relationship imposes high quality on these products, in competition with the likes of AEG 
and Bosch-Siemens. In a recognition of the Italians’ productive capacity, Electrolux has 
transferred part of its production to Italy. All these factors considered, it is not surprising to 
find that there are still people in Zanussi who think it was wrong to sell out to Electrolux. 
Aware of this hostility and sticking to its ‘hands o ff  policy, Electrolux did not send a large 
team of expatriates to head the newly acquired company, as Phillips did when it took over 
Italy’s Ignis in the 1970s. Electrolux instead appointed two senior Italians to run Zanussi: 
Gian marco Rossignolo as chairman and Carlo Verri as managing director.
When Electrolux bought Zanussi the situation was disastrous with lay-offs, productive 
stoppages, and general hostility. Through tough bargaining with the unions and 
concentration on the core business of white goods, plus investment in new facilities, the 
situation has reversed. A general policy of transparency has helped in the process. As an 
example, the company is now reverting to outplacement job schemes with the unions’ 
understanding and agreement.
It is said that Zanussi has now adopted the Swedish work ethic, where everybody keeps his 
word and all information is correct. Management also tries to be honest and upright with the 
local authorities, the trade unions and the customers. The message took some time to get 
across, but now it seems to be well received. Electrolux has abolished the pyramid structure 
to introduce a more innovative structure at the divisional level. This is taking time and effort 
to implement, but there seems to be agreement on its success.
Today the way Electrolux and Zanussi operate has converged still further - a process helped 
considerably by the extent to which the Swedes have involved senior Italian executives in
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developing new structures and procedures for the new, larger white goods ‘product line’. 
Zanussi controls diverse productive units and more than 14000 employees. It will focus on 
the core business of refrigerators and centrifuge, with a presence in the components and large 
commercial appliances. In order to bypass impasses and backups, Zanussi has decided to 
opt for technological innovation and internationalization. The Susegana plant, near Treviso, 
specialized in the production of refrigerators, is on the leading edge of technology.
Relations have been fostered further by the fact that several Italians have been given senior 
international coordination roles within Electrolux as a whole; one of them heads the global 
components business, while in white goods another is responsible for pan-European 
marketing policy, and a third for European and US washing machine development The 
decision to maintain local managers at the top has been dictated by the quality of these 
managers, the company realizes the need to have local managers with roots in Italy and an 
understanding of its laws.
But for many Zanussi managers there is still a considerable difference between the 
hierarchical attitudes and behaviour to which they were used before the takeover - and which 
are traditional in Italian industry -and the extreme informality which pervades the way 
Electrolux executives have always gone about their business. The most obvious evidence of 
this is, as it has been reported, the way Rossignolo’s immediate subordinates still address 
him deferentially as “Presidente,” while Anders Scharp, the president and chief executive of 
the Swedish parent company, is known by his Christian name within many other parts of 
Electrolux. Rossignolo himself pointed out that “You can’t destroy hierarchical thinking 
from one day to the next.” Some Italian managers are also experiencing considerable 
difficulty adjusting to the ambiguous matrix structure, which has been introduced since the 
Zanussi acquisition to bind it and Electrolux together and to enable them to manage a 
complex network of cross-frontier product flows between factories in one country and sales
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companies in others. There is also a reluctant shift of Italian attitudes and behaviour towards 
the ambiguous lines of authority which are endemic to the structure of Electrolux white 
goods product line.
Management is now open to admit that, traditionally, Zanussi was based on a rigid 
hierarchical-functional structure. In 1988, together with Electrolux, they designed a new 
organizational structure. One of the major aims was to move to a global matrix organization, 
which inevitably will exacerbate the conflict between national and product lines. In order to 
prepare management to this change, the proposed personnel policies target for the 1990s 
were:
- motivation
- information-communication-participation
- organization of roles
- job evaluation
- performance evaluation
- selection and development
- emphasis on clarity and transparency
- ability to understand the Swedes’ mentality and how to establish good personal and 
management relationships
Some critics, especially in Italy, argue that Zanussi has been emptied of strategic direction 
and decisional and research centres, reducing the company to an assembly line. On the other 
hand, Electrolux brings experience and a worldwide network for sales and support, plus 
sound accounting skills. Analysts still reckon that Electrolux is one of the best managed 
companies in Europe. In a mature, highly competitive market, the partnership with
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Electrolux could place Zanussi in a good competitive position, providing skills such as 
financial and managerial accounting, which lacked in the past and almost brought Zanussi to 
a collapse. From a management point of view, the Swedish influence has already been felt. 
Relationships with customers, suppliers and unions have improved considerably, and the 
policy of ‘transparency’ is filtering down the Zanussi ranks, where the old hierarchical 
structure is replaced with a more up-to-date managerial approach. Consultation, delegation 
and consensus are today high on managers’ agendas.
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Italian Management
Attention in Italy is often paid to small, medium size companies, which make up over 80 
percent of industry. Some of Italy’s industrial sectors such as food and detergents are 
nevertheless dominated by large companies. Many of these are often of foreign origin, yet 
they are well versed in addressing and dealing with the peculiarities of the Italian market 
While Italian industry has developed considerably in the past ten years, it is argued that its 
management has not kept up with the change.
Italy can be considered a modem, industrialized country from an economic point of view. 
Under ideal conditions one should expect to find modem, rational patterns of administration 
and management in work organizations, corresponding to modem characteristics of the social 
structure.
Until recently, however, many of the largest firms in Italy have maintained some aspects of a 
traditional form of administration. Two traditional characteristics were particularly evident in 
these firms: the concept of organizational membership as a form of permanent affiliation, 
and the prevalence of ascriptive criteria in the selection of top managers. [Inzerilli, 1981] 
These characteristics have survived 40 years of American managerial influence.
Italy, following World War II, entered a period of heavy economic and technological 
dependence upon the United States. Italian industry leaders relied heavily upon American 
management theories, philosophies, procedures, and techniques, but little effort seems to 
have been made toward adapting them to the socio-cultural aspects of the Italian people. 
After all, research had “proven” that the proper application of those principles increased both 
the effectiveness and the efficiency of U.S. organizations. Therefore, it seemed safe to 
assume that what worked in the United States would also yield positive results in Italy; it
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often did not In the past, Italian managers frequently felt that working to make their 
company prosper was probably their most important responsibility to society. Since 
patriotism has never been very strong, patriotic sentiment had been replaced by the affection 
for more fragmented societies. The adoption of American management theories in such a 
context was bound to run into trouble. Italians still prefer to work for family-like 
organizations where they will be recognized rather than for anonymous companies. If they 
belong to the former, they work extremely hard and work very long hours like the Japanese. 
[Porter and Testi, 1990] When such concepts as employee participation, trusting 
interpersonal relationships, involvement in decision-making processes, and collaboration 
between employees and management were put into practice, they met with substantial 
resistance and resulted in a considerable loss of credibility among practitioners "who failed to 
consider the cultural implications of notions so foreign to the values of their people”. [Boss 
& Mariono, 1987] Many of the successful American conflict management and 
confrontation/team building designs have failed in Italy. It is suggested that this has also 
happened because the Italian culture is not conductive to dealing with emotionally charged 
issues in a group context. The vulnerability of dealing with affect-related issues, the 
personal pride of the people, the potential loss of face in a group context, and the lack of 
consultant experience and skill in dealing with emotionally charged issues are some of the 
factors working against successful group confrontations. [Boss & Mariono, 1987]
Although there is little quantitative evidence to support the previous statements, a general 
consensus has emerged on the ’peculiarities’ of the Italian managerial system. Ample 
empirical as well as impressionistic data also confirm expected stereotypes of Italian 
managers. They are usually seen as autocratic, paternalistic, and very concerned about status 
symbols. [Hofstede, 1980] “The more frequent managerial philosophy,” in the United 
States, according to Harbison and Myers, “is one that asserts top management’s primary
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responsibility for decision-making and for directing the efforts of subordinates, motivating 
them, controlling their actions, and modifying their behaviour to fit organizational needs”. 
This is the core of managerial belief in Austria and Italy as well as in the United Stares, but 
these countries differ between themselves in the degree of “liberalism” which managers 
apply in interpreting this general and essentially authoritarian core. Of the three countries, 
Italy and the United States provide the clearest contrast [Harbison and Myers, 1959] Given 
these peculiar factor conditions, it is generally agreed that most of the new managerial 
concepts should have enjoyed little success in Italian companies.
The ’prototypical’ image of Italian companies appears the end product of a distinctive 
society. The political culture of Italy, as analyzed by Banfield on his study of a village in 
Lucania, is characterized by “amoral familism”, according legitimacy neither to the 
bureaucratic authoritarian organs of the state nor to the civic-political organs of party, 
interests groups or local community. Almond and Verba admit that it would be incorrect to 
view all of Italy in these terms, but they argue that the Italian political system contains 
unusually high parochial, alienative participative components. A large proportion of the 
Italian population tends to think of the political system as alien and exploitative. The 
liberating experiences and freedom brought about by the Risorgimento and the resistance to 
Fascism before and during World War II were incomplete and deeply divisive in their 
effects. Thus Italians tend to look upon government and politics as unpredictable and 
threatening forces, and not as social institutions at their service. This lack of confidence in 
the official structure is in turn, channelled inside the firm. Managers who do not have access 
to clear organizational charts or career paths ally themselves with those seen to having 
authority and power.
The creation of these ’power networks’ inside the companies is considered an almost
87
endemic characteristic of Italian management. This image is however derived from 
impressionistic data alone. There is no hard evidence on the salient characteristics of Italian 
managers. Furthermore, there is in general a lack of evidence on the late development of a 
modem industrial, and, in particular, managerial structure.
Comparatively few researchers have analyzed the structure and components of Italian 
management Ferrarotti’s work [1959] is one of the earliest and perhaps most interesting 
attempts. His work developed in a period in which Italy, while enjoying relative economic 
growth, was still lagging behind in industrial development and managerial culture. The few 
large private sector companies were still run by their original founders or next of kin. The 
managerial structure within these companies was still rather archaic, with most decision 
based on the whims of the owners rather than on market forces or management teams.
Thirty years since many things have changed; most original founders have gone, and a 
number of their companies are now part of big, often foreign, conglomerates. Nevertheless, 
many of the conclusions achieved by Ferrarrotti are still relevant When, for example, he 
attempted to explain Italian management by looking at the short history of Italian unity as 
well as at its industry, he anticipated most of the later commentary by Child [1981] and 
Hofstede [1983] on ’cultural background’. Ferrarotti argued that, compared with other 
Western European countries, Italy’s natural and human resources were grossly 
underutilized. ”Italy suffers not only from a shortage of productive capital and raw materials 
but from a shortage of business leadership which could effectively manage available 
resources*. [Ferrarotti, 1959, p.235] Italian capitalism, in fact, has remained family 
capitalism. The individual firm, owned and operated by a single family group, was still the 
prevailing pattern in Italian industry. Even in firms with more than one owner (i.e. 
shareholders), a high percentage was owned by closed family interests.
As far as the research was concerned, intensive interviews were made during the period
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1954-1957 with 30 businessman, 95 union leaders, 64 government officials, and 120 
business executives. This is all that can be gathered on the research methods.
On the basis of the study, three main types of patrimonial management have been abstracted 
to which correspond three types of professional managers. The objective criterion for 
differentiation is the position afforded by the power of the family in the managerial structure. 
The first type is Feudal or authoritarian paternalism; it occurs where the business enterprise is 
completely family owned, controlled, and operated. The family is the only source of power. 
The second type is Manipulative paternalism; the family still owns and control the enterprise, 
but it is no longer the sole source of personnel. The most important problem is ensuring 
loyalty to the family from persons who hold managerial positions but who do not belong to 
the family.
The third type is democratic or participative paternalism. The enterprise in this case is still 
predominantly family owned but it is no longer family operated. The firm is managed by 
professional managers.
Ferrarotti argued that, at his time, most Italian managers fit the second category. The use of 
clear functional and organizational charts was still rare, and most managers wanted to be 
involved in all decisions related to their self-perceived areas of expertise, making job 
definitions and classifications very difficult to identify and classify.
As far as career was concerned, avenues to management were determined by family 
connections or fortuitous circumstances. Management was still considered a family 
prerogative which could not be acquired simply through education and training. Thus the 
educational system reflected the prevailing mentality of the country, resulting in a reluctance 
to be concerned with practical issues. Ferrarotti concludes by saying that:
“We have seen that the Italian business elite is family centred and motivated, that it is very 
jealous of its power prerogatives, and the consequences of this centralization of authority are 
conditioning factors with regard to business operations and behaviour both at the plant level
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and in the society at large.” “...In Italy we have charismatic leaders or, in Schumpter’s term, 
’innovating pioneers.’ Their presence and initiative account for the amount of dynamism 
apparent in the present-day industrial scene. But this extraordinary dynamism should not 
give rise to unwarranted optimism. The problem remains: What is next? How is Italy going 
to substitute institutional creeds for personal creeds?” [Ferrarotti, 1959, p. 246,248]
Some of the characteristics of Italian management as identified by Ferrarotti have not changed 
considerably for the next twenty years. Tannembaum [1974] argues that, nonetheless, some 
tempering of the Italian system is occurring as industrialization develops and family 
ownership in its traditional form declines. Professionalization is on the increase even in 
family-controlled firms, and managers are beginning to adopt some of the pragmatic 
approaches to managerial control that imply a softening of the traditional autocratic form. A 
basic concept of american management, managerial mobility, in the past found little success 
in Italian companies. In a study of a representative sample of 663 managers in Italy, 
[Derossi,1974] it was found that most of the subjects saw their promotion opportunities as 
lying within, not outside, their present firm. Derossi also found that their mobility was as 
low as among Japanese managers. When the Italian managers reach the position of Dirigente 
- this title indicating top management status - their mobility decreases even further. Derossi 
found that only 17 percent of her subjects had achieved that position before entering their 
present firm, compared with a corresponding proportion of 53 percent among American 
executives [Warner and Abegglen, 1955]. Today, a research published by the Agnelli 
Foundation in 1989 claims that more and better opportunities for university graduates have 
been reflected in the fact that the turnover rate among young Italian graduates in industry 
was, in 1989, above 25 percent. Young managers do not find in the organizations they join 
after university the challenges and opportunities they expected. Perhaps these young 
managers have refused other Italian traditional managerial characteristics in favour of a more
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modern, northern European style of management.
Conclusions
The striking economic improvements in recent years have severely altered some aspects of 
social and political structure. Italy joined the ranks of advanced nations in the last two 
decades. Rapid industrial development has weakened traditionalism; rising standards of 
living have increased confidence in personal success. Yet, Italian industry is still a mix of 
parochialism and internationalism. Small, medium size firms have established a level of 
productive sophistication of technologies which have allowed them to enter highly 
competitive markets all over the world. Michael Porter [1990] in fact ranks Italy, with 
respect to progress in international competitivity, only second to Japan. He points out that 
there are many similarities in the industrial sections. A striking Italian feature of successful 
industries is geographical concentration in which many, if not hundreds of firms in one 
industry are located in a single town. This idea of using clusters appears more justified when 
applied to economic circumstances, such as in this case, than cultural ones, as the culturalists 
[Hofstede, 1980], would argue.
In general, little is known, at least abroad, on Italian management and on how its managers 
operate. Rapid industrialization and a more competitive market are forcing companies to 
review their industrial and manpower policies. What little is known on Italian management is 
quite dated, and almost invariably linked with other countries, most notably France, in a 
Latin cluster. Although Italian and French managers share some similar characteristics, they 
are products of drastically different educational systems. The French one is quite elitist, 
extremely selective and protective, while the Italian one is less elitist but more disorganized.
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Young French managers also work in the public administration before switching to the 
private sector; Italian managers do not enjoy such osmosis, and their career is either tied to 
the private or the public sector. Inevitably, views on the role of the state, the enterprise and 
the unions will vary considerably. Clustering these differences in a Latin group was a good 
idea when cross-national research was in its early stages. It is perhaps time to break this 
cluster into sub-clusters which would reflect more individual countries’ characteristics which 
have not been analyzed before.
In summary, previous works have validated the view that Italian managers are autocratic, 
paternalistic and the like; these characteristics are the result of comparisons with other 
nations under the same variables. These characteristcis should now constitute the basis for 
the new analysis and interviews. The issues to look at when analyzing Italian management 
would be those of autocracy, paternalism and clientelism. These issues should be tested in 
depth and with an array of different tools in order to ascertain the validity of previous 
evidence. Following the research hypothesis, it is expected that most of the previous 
findings on Italy will appear dated, and no longer applicable to today’s management reality.
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CHAPTER 4
The purpose o f this chapter is to test Laurent and Hofstede’s evidence on UK and Italian 
managerial characteristics. The original scores will be reported alongside the new evidence ; 
the two sets o f results will then be compared and discussed. This first evidence highlights 
the fact that managerial differences between UK and Italian managers are, at least today, less 
relevant than in the original studies. The second section o f the chapter looks at the decision- 
making process in the organization, analyzing both how managers believe decisions should 
be taken and how in reality they are taken. The last section focuses at the level o f satisfaction 
with career progression within the organization. Once again, it is quite difficult to draw 
distinct conclusions from the evidence produced in this chapter. Italian and UK managerial 
characteristics are very difficult to isolate and categorize into national profiles.
After a flurry of publications in the 1970s and early 80s, in the last few years the field of 
cross-national managerial studies has been quite neglected. Few new publications have dealt 
with this topic, and relatively little additional empirical evidence has been presented. This is 
regrettable, since the considerable social and economic European changes of the last few 
years are likely to have challenged previous assumptions on national managerial 
characteristics. In addition, there are a number of areas which still need to be explored more 
in detail. For example, there is little research on national vs. organizational managerial 
characteristics, and few publications specify whether their results refer to managerial values, 
practices, aspirations, and so forth.
The lack of new research has, indirectly, helped to legitimize the evidence published in the 
1970s. For example, the notion that Italian and UK managers have considerably different 
characteristics has been backed in particular by evidence published between the late 70s and 
early 80s [Hofstede, 1980]. This evidence is linked to the culture-specific theory, which 
argues that the national origin of European managers significantly affect their views of what 
proper management should be. This argument has gone unchallenged in the last few years;
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as a result, the culture-specific theory is now widely accepted and utilized in business and 
academic settings alike.
This research will try to put some of these ‘national’ assumptions to the test. The main 
hypothesis is that Italian and UK managerial differences are very difficult to categorize. 
Therefore, characterizations of ‘national’ managerial differences are very difficult to sustain 
as no overall ‘national’ patterns can be identified. Thus there is no such thing as “Italian 
management”: each organization displays a set of characteristics which are related to its 
history, product area, ownership and management style.
This hypothesis will be tested with a two-fold approach; first, some of the tests carried out 
in the past will be repeated, in order to observe whether, after 10 years, national scores have 
changed or tend to remain stable. New evidence will also emerge from a new set of tests 
looking at decision making and satisfaction with career progression. These new result should 
provide more data on Italian and UK managerial differences.
The second step is to expand the knowledge on cross-national managerial studies by looking 
at different factors such as, for example, the influence of company affiliation on the 
distribution of the results.
Before drawing any firm conclusions on national managerial differences, it is important to 
specify at the outset what the research aims are. Otherwise, one could be left with the 
impression that the researcher is most concerned with providing plausible explanations for 
the results rather than explaining at the outset what the research hypotheses are and how they 
are going to be tested. The research hypothesis should therefore be implemented within a 
clear framework, which specifies what the research is tapping (values, perceptions, attitudes, 
etc.), why, and how it intends to go about doing it.
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As it has been outlined before, the material available on Italian management is not substantial 
and also quite dated. Nevertheless, a number of characteristics of Italian managers have been 
identified. It is accepted that Italian managers are generally autocratic and see their role as 
that of a benevolent father (paternalism). [Ferrarotti, 1959] One of the consequences is that 
the decision-making process is rather centralized and structured on a rigid hierarchical scale. 
Career progression is another topic which distinguishes Italian from UK managers. Italian 
managers give little value to standardized performance-evaluation schemes, and tend to 
favour more personal superior-based decisions. Some managers now argue that, as a result, 
organizational politics, rather than effective performance, is the major yardstick for 
promotion. [Vineall, 1987] The development of one’s potential for career progression in 
‘latin’ firms is described by Evans, [1990] as a political tournament. It is up to each 
individual to make achievements visible, to attach oneself to sponsors and coalitions, to 
collaborate with peers but compete behind the scenes. Reading the signals is important - if 
one is seen as moving slower than competitors, one should move out and on to a smaller and 
less prestigious firm. Unevenness of power in the organization subtly influences how 
managers and subordinates relate to each other. Managers who believe that they are on the 
receiving end of unreasonable or unfair actions from their bosses, for example, may act 
similarly towards those below them in the organizational pyramid. And the pattern may 
repeat itself down the chain of command. [Evans, 1990] These arguments have been largely 
substantiated by evidence produced by the culturalist researchers [Laurent, 1985, Hofstede,
1980]
In order to put this culturalist argument to the test, it is necessary to re-confirm the evidence 
on which this argument was based. The first task, therefore, is to reproduce Laurent’s 13 
questions,[1983-1985]; in his study, Italian and UK managers’ responses to these 13 
questions differed significantly. The same questions are to be tested on a new sample of UK
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and Italian managers. The second part of the research reproduces a test (5 questions) 
suggested by Hofstede in his book [1980] which looks at superior/subordinate relationships 
in the organization. There are no published results on this test, b u t , on the strength of 
Hofstede’s research evidence, it is expected that UK and Italian managers would differ from 
each other on these questions. After this initial analysis, it should already be possible to 
identify a few patterns of answers and compare them to previous evidence.
The chapter will also begin to explore new areas of research, such as the role of company 
affiliation in the composition of national scores. Although the aim is not to analyze the value 
of organizational vs. national culture (two dimensions not easily classifiable) it is expected 
that the results will throw some light on the composition of national scores. It could be that 
national company A and company B scores are on the opposite ends of the spectrum. When 
the results are combined, they are likely to indicate that national managers (A and B) answers 
lie somewhere in the middle. The Global company could for example indicate that most 
managers in its Italian operations feel free to challenge their superiors. Results ffom the 
Polycentric Italian unit could indicate the opposite, that is, managers cannot challenge their 
superiors. The combined published results would indicate that Italian managers lie 
somewhere in the middle, hiding the importance of the organizational setting.
The chapter will compare Italian vs. UK managers’ scores, and will develop as follows: in 
the first section, Laurent’s evidence will be described and tested with new data (4.1). The 
next section will repeat a test suggested by Hofstede, which looks at superior/subordinates 
profiles (4.2). The third section will look at Schein’s test on decision-making (4.3) and 
Career success (4.4). The last section (4.5) will summarize the results, attempt to insert 
them in a contextual framework, and link them to a body of organizational theory relevant to 
this study. Where possible, the quantitative results will be coupled with qualitative evidence
96
gathered in the units studied. This evidence is meant to strengthen a particular point or 
highlight important characteristics or differences which did not emerge from quantitative 
research. The extensive chapter appendixes contain individual unit (4 units) results on each 
of the sections. These company results will be described and analyzed throughout the 
chapter. However, it was felt that for ease of reading and clarity of structure, it was better to 
report the complete company results in a separate appendix at the end of the chapter.
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4.1 Laurent’s data
The first section o f this chapter deals with Laurent's thirteen questions. The aim was to 
replicate his study on a new data set, and compare the two sets o f results. In this research it 
was also possible to control for company affiliation and therefore establish how the average 
national scores were composed. The results highlight two important factors: the gap 
between UK and Italian managers on Laurent's 13 questions in the last 10 years has 
narrowed considerably. Also, when one looks at the company results, on a number o f 
items there are significant differences among national companies themselves. This, in turn, 
suggests that company affiliation is an issue which needs to be looked at closely.
Laurent’s research, carried out at INSEAD and in two multinational companies between 
1979 and 1983 is considered today as one of the bench-marks for cross-national studies. 
Laurent, like his colleague Hofstede, is a strong believer in the culture-specific theory, 
which argues that national managers think and behave according to the cultural 
environment in which they were brought up and currently operate in. Since Italian culture 
is perceived as being substantially different from the UK one, it is expected that Italian 
managers think and behave differently from their UK colleagues. In short, the national 
origin of European managers significantly affects their views of what proper management 
should be. It is necessary to underline the fact that both Laurent and Hofstede do not state 
what they study in their research, whether it is managerial values, beliefs, perceptions or 
assumptions. In fact they do not even contemplate a distinction: they group everything 
under the wide umbrella of “national culture”.
Laurent argues that every manager has his own managerial theory, his own set of 
representations and preferences that in some way guide his potential behaviour in 
organizations. In order to elicit their implicit theories of management, he developed a 
questionnaire proposing 56 different statements about the management of the organization.
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A five-point, Likert-style opinion scale was attached to each statement to record the 
respondent’s degree of agreement or disagreement with those statements. The questionnaire 
was administered to groups of upper-middle level managers attending various INSEAD 
executive development programmes. There was no control over company affiliation, since 
managers came from a large number of different enterprises and from a variety of Western 
countries. Most questionnaires were administered in their English version, though some of 
the French versions were used for French nationals. The questions were not grouped 
under specific labels: there is little information as to what Laurent wanted to explore with 
his questionnaires, beyond a vague concept of “national managerial styles”. In general, 
they fall under three main headings: authority, decision making and hierarchical vs. matrix 
management.
Statistical analysis of the data was performed by computing “ecological” (see Chapter 1) 
correlations among country mean scores across the 56 items.2 Four indices or dimensions 
emerged from the statistical analysis. Three of them cluster three questions each, one 
clusters four questions.3 The results can be interpreted in a number of ways. Italian 
managers have changed, sample differences heavily affect the results, or Laurent’s 
clustering was less than adequate. Laurent labelled the four dimensions as: organizations as 
political systems (Table 1), organizations as authority systems (Table 2), organizations as 
role-formalization systems (Table 3) and organizations as hierarchical-relationship systems 
(Table 4).
Although statistical analysis was performed initially on country mean scores from five-point
2Ecological factor analysis was also performed in this research, but the limited number of unit of analyses (two, the 
UK and Italy), resulted in no output.
3Individual factor analysis imposing four factors was run on this data set and resulted in four factors 
containing relatively different items from those identified by Laurent in his four tables.
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opinion scales, Laurent presents the results in terms of percentage average agreement scores 
(“strongly agree” and “tend to agree” responses) and percentage average disagreement 
scores (“strongly disagree” and “tend to disagree” responses) for ease of reading and 
interpretation. Each table thus presents the percentage of managers agreeing or 
disagreeing with each statement and their percentage average score across the clustered 
questions for each country.
Since the initial results had been obtained from ad hoc samples of managers in executive 
programmes, it was not clear whether similar differences in management and organizational 
concepts would persist within the potentially homogenizing, corporate culture of a single 
multinational company, or whether the multinational culture would be sufficiently strong 
and pervasive to swamp national differences.
A full replication of the study was obtained in two, large U.S.-based multinational 
companies with subsidiaries in France, Germany and Great Britain (not Italy). The results 
indicated the consistent and pervasive effects of national cultures for the three countries 
involved. A homogenizing effect of a large multinational corporation toward 
standardization of managerial concepts across national cultures was not found in these data. 
If anything, the opposite hypothesis could be advanced.
Looking at the percentage of agreement (11 questions) and disagreement (2 questions) with 
the statements, Laurent derived conclusions on what he calls “national managerial styles 
and practices”. The higher the agreement (or disagreement) with the question, the more 
that particular characteristic described in the question was considered relevant for a 
country’s managerial style and practice. Since the nature of the questions referred to 
concepts of organizational power and politics as well as role-definition and superior - 
subordinate relationships, Italians were found to score consistently higher on most of the
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questions than their UK counterparts. These results reveal a wide gap in conceptions of 
management between Italy and the UK, confirming the culture-specific theory, which 
suggests that the national origin of managers has a direct influence on their views of what 
the ‘right’ kind of management should be like.
These conclusions will be tested in this first section of the chapter. Almost 20 years have 
passed since Laurent’s first data collection, and it is possible that social, political and 
economic changes will also be expressed in a new, different set of results. The following 
tables report Laurent’s findings alongside the results of this research. The new set of data 
indicate that the gap between the two nations’ responses is much smaller than it was in 
Laurent’s research. In three out of four of the tables the total average score for Italy, 
though higher than the UK one, is considerably closer than in previous studies. In the 
fourth one, organizations as role-formalization systems, the score for Italy is, in fact, lower 
than the UK one.
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LAURENT QUESTIONS
Organizations as Political Systems
Laurent’s Data This Data
UK Italy UK Italy
1. Through their professional activity, 
managers play an important political role
insociety. agree 40% 74% 41% 67%
8.Most managers seem to be more motivated 
by obtaining power than by achieving objectives.
agree 32% 63% 33% 47%
2. Most managers have a clear notion
of what we call organizational structure. disagree 23% 61% 18% 22%
average agreement/ 32% 66% 30% 45%
disagreement
Table 1 Italy + 34 Italy +15
Organizations as Authority Systems
6. The main reason for having a 
hierarchical structure is so that everyone 
knows who has authority over whom.
Laurent’s Data 
UK Italy
agree 38% 50%
This Data 
UK Italy
34% 34%
12. Today there seems to be an authority
crisis in organizations. agree 43% 69% 18% 29%
3. The manager of tomorrow will be,
in the main, a negotiator. agree 61% 66% 61% 61%
average agreement/ 48% 61% 38% 41
disagreement
Table 2 Italy + 13 Italy +3
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Organizations as Role Formalization System
Laurent's Data 
UK Italy
11. When the respective roles of the members
of a department become complex, detailed job agree 86% 90%
descriptions are a useful way of clarifying.
7. The more complex a department’s
activities, the more important it is for agree 85% 94%
each individual's functions to be
well-defined.
13. Most managers would achieve better
results if their roles were less precisely disagree 68% 69%
defined.
average agreement/ 80 % 84 %
disagreement
Table 3 Italy + 4
Organizations as Hierarchical Relationship System
Laurent’s Data 
UK Italy
10. Most organizations would be better off agree 13% 41%
if conflict could be eliminated forever.
5. It is important for a manager to have
at hand precise answers to most of die agree 27% 66%
questions that subordinates may raise 
about their work.
9. In order to get efficient work relationships,
it is often necessary to bypass the disagree 31 % 75%
hierarchical line.
4. An organizational structure in which
certain subordinates have two direct bosses agree 74% 81 %
should be avoided at all costs.
average agreement/ 36% 66%
disagreement
Table 4 Italy + 30
This Data 
UK Italy
56% 72%
83% 58%
61% 49%
66% 57%
Italy - 9
This Data 
UK Italy
33% 60%
52% 77%
22% 26%
76% 59%
45 % 55 %
Italy + 10
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There may be many factors to explain these differences. The new set of data was collected 
in 1991, almost 20 years after Laurent’s firsts tests. In this period, it has been 
acknowledged that European industry has undergone a process of rationalization and 
growth. Italian managers in particular, may have reached a higher degree of skills- 
knowledge and professionalization. In the last 20 years, Italian industry and its managers 
are said to have narrowed the gap with its more experienced Northern European rivals. It 
is quite possible that this Italian managerial growth is partly reflected in a stronger similarity 
between the Italian and UK scores for this study.
For example, question 6 states:
The main reason fo r having an hierarchical structure is so that everyone knows who has 
authority over whom.
Privately owned Italian companies, starting from the 1980s, have proceeded to reduce the 
number of both blue and white collar managers, in an attempt to remain competitive and 
reduce costs [Porter, 1991]. Fewer levels of management mean that individuals are asked 
to take more responsibilities and rely less on the advice and directives of their superiors. 
The answers to this question reflect this change; only 34 per cent of Italian ( as well as Uk) 
managers, agree with the above statement 
Similarly, question 9 argues that:
In order to get efficient work relationships, it is often necessary to bypass the hierarchical 
line.
From existing knowledge, it would be expected that managers would agree with the 
statement more than they would have in the past, since they now have to take more 
responsibilities. In the original research, 75 per cent of Italian managers agreed with the 
statement In the new study, the percentage was reduced to 26 per cent, compared to 22 per 
cent for the UK managers.
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4.1.1
As far as the individual companies are concerned, (see chapter appendix), it appears that on 
a number of questions there is a significant difference between the two national companies 
(Unilever UK vs. Electrolux / Unilever Italy vs. Zanussi). For example, on Question 10: 
Most companies would be better o ff i f  conflict could be eliminatedforever.
49% of Electrolux UK managers agree, while only 14% of Unilever UK do. The level of 
conflict within UK industry in this case seems to vary from one organization to the other. 
Managers working for Electrolux perceive conflict as a more pressing issue than those at 
Unilever UK. Although there is no direct link, it is possible that different organizational 
cultures may have an impact on the level of conflict within each organization. In this case, 
collecting data only at the national level would have hidden the fact that, within the same 
country, managers express different views according to the organization they work for. 
Similarly for Italy, on Question 7:
The more complex a department's activities, the more important it is fo r each individual's 
Junctions to be well-defined.
46% of Unilever Italy (UnillT) and 71% of Zanussi agree with the statement.
What emerges from this initial test is that the gap between UK and Italian managers’ scores 
seems to have narrowed, and that company affiliation, when possible, is a variable which 
should be taken into account. As a result, it seems that it is increasingly more difficult to 
justify traditional national managerial stereotypes, without also specifying where these 
stereotypes are drawn from.
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4.2 Superior/Subordinate Relationship
This second section o f the chapter analyzes the results o f Hofstede's four questions on 
Superior/Subordinate Profiles. This test was taken from Hofstede’s 1980 book; he 
includedfour questions at the end o f his book as a suggestion fo r future research. There is 
little evidence on published results on these questions, therefore the analysis will be limited 
to the results produced from this research. It appears that here national differences are even 
narrower than they were in Laurent's replicated study.
Loss of status can be expected to be one of the manager’s major concerns during the 
process of modernization, because in societies that are still traditionally oriented, there are 
no differential status systems across different institutional areas. Therefore, loss of status in 
the work organization also means loss of status in the larger social context. [Inzerilli,
1981] In Crozier’s study [1964] 47% of French and Italian managers agreed with the 
statement "Managers have lost much of their prestige”. Italian managers in Derossi’s 
analysis [1974] have a significant low perception of their own status and believe that the 
wider public shares these same opinions. In reality Derossi rightly points out that the 
general public considers the occupation of Industrial managers as one of the most 
prestigious.
A traditional type of authority in Italian organizations is more difficult to exercise when 
involved in a modernization process. This type of authority is characterized by the fact that 
the deference of the subordinate is usually motivated by personal loyalty to the superior. It 
must also be diffused and informal. In fact, since the objectives of traditionally oriented 
organizations are not specifically defined, it is impossible to define a specific area, 
functionally related to these objectives, to which the manager’s authority applies. The
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informal and nonspecific nature of the manager’s traditional authority implies that, within 
the limits of his obligations to his superiors and the rest of the community, he has a certain 
degree of freedom in administering reward and sanctions to his subordinates. In other 
words, he can exercise his authority, to some extent, arbitrarily [Inzerilli 1981, Weber, 
1947].
Hofstede focused on superior/subordinate relationships and managerial decision making. 
His aim was to distinguish between those who listen and delegate and those who do not 
Italian managers were identified as those who neither listen nor delegate. These traditional 
Italian characteristics were not confirmed from this research evidence. The repetition of 
Hofstede’s test produced interesting results. Managers’ answers, both from the UK and 
Italy, scored consistently between managerial profile II and III (see chart). Once the 
answers were compared with Student’s T-tests, (UK vs. Italy) no items were found to be 
significantly different. The first question (q.34) asked managers to identify, among the 
four managerial profiles, what sort of superior they would like to work with. 
Surprisingly, UK and Italian scores were identical. (2.9) Subsequently, the test asked 
(q.35) respondents to identify the managerial profile which most closely reflect their 
superiors. Again, the UK and Italian scores on this question were identical. (2.6) On 
question 36, even more surprisingly, the Italian score was higher than the UK one, closer 
to managerial profile III. That is, the Italian respondents identified managers in their 
company as being more open than the UK ones did. Finally, on question 37, which asked 
to which managerial profile the respondents identified with, once again there was no 
difference between the two scores.
On the strength of previous arguments/evidence, it was expected that Italian managers 
would have scored differently from the UK ones. Their superiors should have been 
between managerial profile I and II; direct, authoritative and not in favour of debate; in
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short, autocratic managers. In reality, Italian managers’ responses were almost identical to 
those of the UK ones, and very close to manager III. In this profile, the manager is open to 
debate and consultation before taking any decision.
In the interview process, all managers stressed a desire for a more open relationship with 
their superiors. On average, managers in Unilever UK and Unilever Italy and Electrolux 
were quite happy about their relationship, whereas managers from Zanussi wanted a more 
open system of management and complained about lack of contact and directives from their 
superiors. This difference is not reflected in the individual companies’ scores (see 
Appendix). There are no clear justifications for this lack of coherence between Zanussi’s 
interviews and company data. It is possible that, on words, Zanussi’s managers still 
refleceted the conflictual management style of the 1970s. One of the main characteristics of 
this old management style was the amount of complaining within management ranks. 
When confronted with an anonymous questionnaire, it is possible that the managers 
reflected about the new reality (as specified in the questions themselves) and their responses 
reflected closer the new management style. On question 36, which asks to which type 
managers usually correspond in their company, the answers from Electrolux UK, Zanussi 
and Unilever Italy scores differ significantly from Unilever UK. Managers from Unilever 
UK described their superior closer to profile II than the other three companies’ managers 
did. If the results were analyzed only at the national level, it would not have been possible 
to highlight the fact that, on question 36, although Unilever UK differed, the scores for the 
other three units (one Uk and two Italian) were quite similar among each others. Limiting 
one’s research to the ‘national’ level seems, at this point, not enough.
These organizations seem, to a certain extent, to have identities of their own. Whether 
this is organizational culture, or climate, is difficult to say. It is apparent however that 
national generalizations, so far, have been very difficult to maintain.
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A) The descriptions below apply to four different types of managers. First, please read 
through these descriptions:
Manager I
Usually makes his/her decisions promptly and communicates them to his/her subordinates 
clearly and firmly. Expects them to carry out the decisions loyally and without raising 
difficulties.
Manager II
Usually makes his/her decisions promptly, but, before going ahead, tries to explain them 
fully to his/her subordinates. Gives them the reasons for the decisions and answers 
whatever questions they may have.
Manager III
Usually consults with his/her subordinates before he/she reaches his/her decisions. Listens 
to their advice, considers it, and then announces his/her decisions. He/she then expects all 
to work loyally to implement it whether or not it is in accordance with the advice they gave.
Manager IV
Usually calls a meeting of his/her subordinates when there is an important decision to be 
made. Puts the problem before the group and then invites discussion. Accepts the 
majority viewpoint as the decision.
T.Sample UK Italy
34. Now, for the above types of manager, 
please circle the one which you would 
prefer to work under
2.9 2.9 2.9
35. And to which one of the above four 
types of managers would you say your 
own superior most closely correspond? 2.6 2.6 2.6
36. To which type do managers usually 
correspond in your company? 2.4 2.2 2.6
37. To which type do you think you 
correspond? 2.8 2.8 2.8
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4.3 Decision Making
This third section o f the chapter is a repetition ofSchein’s [1985] suggested questions. 
Similarly to Hofstede’s test, there are no comparable results and its data will therefore be 
analyzed on its own. Interestingly, the differences between national managers are most 
consistent here at the *should be ’ level, than at the *are ’ level. It would seem to imply that 
managerial expectations (should be) are more different between national managers that the 
perceptions o f reality (are) prove to be.
Schein’s questions are aimed at identifying the most typical decision making processes in 
an organization. Following Argyris and Schon’s work, the questions are divided into 
“Should be” and “Are presently” columns. These questions were included in this study in 
order to test the level of “authorative decision making” in the organization (see table .33 on 
page 116). It was expected that Italian managers would opt for statements such as “It has 
always been done this way” or “Our managing director wants to do it this way”. It was 
also expected that the gap between the “should be” and “are presently” column would be 
much higher for the Italian sample than for the UK one. Italian managers in fact may 
aspire to a more open managerial style which does not exist in their organization, while the 
UK ones are more content with the relationship between expectations and reality.
It is usually assumed that participative decision-making is more a characteristic of the UK 
(Anglo-American) than the Italian (Latin) cluster. [Ferrarotti, 1959; Harbison and Burgess, 
1954; Haire et al, 1963]. In fact, in Tannembaum’s study [1976] members in the US 
plants do report a higher level of participativeness on Likert-type questions than do their 
counterparts in the Italian organizations. Furthermore , the difference in control between 
the Italian and US plants is primarily in terms of the total amount, not the distribution, 
according to members. U.S. workers, in their relatively participative plants, exercise 
more control over what goes on in their organizations than do Italian workers - but US 
managers also exercise more control than do their Italian counterparts.
I l l
Italian organizations, for example, are thought to be more ’authoritarian’ than US 
organizations. The fact that US workers exercise more control than the Italian workers fits 
this conception, but the fact that US managers exercise more control than do their Italian 
counterparts is not consistent with the notion that Italian organizations are the more 
authoritarian. There is more concern with status in the Italian organisations than in the US, 
and Italian managers may behave more atocratically. Lammers and Hickson provide their 
explanation for this “Italian authoritarian style”, they argue that this behaviour, which is 
manifestly designed to strengthen the control exercised by the top leaders, is apparently 
more a ritual than an effective technique of control and Italian managers are not in fact 
’strong’ leaders. Thus the Italian organizations are probably not more authoritarian since 
the Italian ’authorities’, after all, do not exercise more control than do their US 
counterparts - quite the contrary. If anything, the Italian plants in their study seem to be 
more laissez-faire than those in the USA. Lammers and Hickson [1979]
At the national level of analysis, although some variations in the results did occur, they 
were however not sufficient to be classified into ‘proper’ national clusters (see table .33 on 
page 116). At the level of how important decisions are taken in the organization there 
were no significant differences, while at the level of how decisions should be taken in the 
organization the differences were more significant. The third statement “Our managing 
director wants to do it this way”, was chosen by 18 percent of the UK managers and 4 
percent of the Italian ones. On the next question, which argued that “We take this kind of 
decision to the marketing committee and do what they decide” Italians showed that they 
were more willing to rely on their marketing experts (27 percent), than the UK managers 
(13 percent).
At the company level of analysis, the national results were confirmed without substantial
112
variations. On a limited number of items, however, the scores between the national units 
(Unilever UK vs. Electrolux / Unilit vs. Zanussi) differed significantly. For example, in 
the section how important decisions should be taken in your organization, 52 per cent of 
Unilever UK managers chose Let’s try and see, while only 25 per cent of Electrolux 
managers agreed. On all the other items, there was a higher degree of conformity than in 
the previous tests. Similarly, Unilever Italy and Zanussi disagreed significantly only on 
one item, We take this decision to the marketing committee and do what they decide, 37 per 
cent of Zanussi managers agreed, while only 18 per cent of Unilever Italy did the same.
In the section how important decisions are presently taken in your organization there 
were considerably more differences between national unit scores than in the preceding 
section. For example, 31 per cent of Unilever UK managers choose We take this decision 
to the marketing committee and do what they decide, while only 14 per cent of Electrolux 
managers agreed. The same Electrolux managers chose let’s try and see more consistently 
(53 per cent) than Unilever UK ones (23 per cent). On three other items the Electrolux 
and Unilever Uk scores differed significantly. In the Italian section, 36 per cent of 
Zanussi managers chose Let’s try and see, compared to 16 per cent of Unilit managers, 
who identified Our research shows this is the right way to do it more consistently (65 per 
cent), than Zanussi managers (16 per cent).
The results indicate that the previously cited “Italian authoritarian managerial style” is not 
confirmed by these results. The differences among national samples are not significant, 
and, if anything, the UK managers would like (should be column) a decision making 
process which is more authoritarian than the Italian one. The notion of “authoritarian 
decision making” as culture specific in this particular case does not apply.
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(33.) Of the following statements, which the three which you think best typify 
how important decisions are taken in your organization. (Please tick just three
appropriate items for each column)
HOW IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
PRESENTLY
TAKEN IN YOUR ORGANIZATION 
( SELECT 3 ITEMS)
It has always been done 
this way
This is the right
way
to do it.
Our managing director wants 
to do it this way
We take this kind of decision to the 
marketing committee and do what 
they decide
We thrashed it out in three different 
committees, tested it on the sales 
force, and if they idea is still 
sound,
so we will do it.
Let’s try and 
see
Our research shows that this is the way 
to do 
it
Other
SHOULD BE ARE
UK Italy UK
6% 0% 50%
67% 43% 47%
18% 4% 63%
13% 27% 22%
38% 70% 21%
37% 22% 38%
85% 84% 36%
21% 11% 13%
Italy
40%
42%
55%
23%
27%
26%
50%
6%
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4.4 Career Success
This section looks at what managers think should determine career progression and at what 
in reality determines career progression. It also explore managers ’ level o f satisfaction/ 
dissatisfaction with their career progression. In this instance, the results are once again 
quite difficult to classify and the differences between UK and Italian managers are not 
substantial.
The section was aimed at testing the importance of Connections, Loyalty and Deference for 
the career progression of Italian managers. The section was divided into “should”, that is 
the managers’ ideal criteria for promotion, and “determines”, what in fact actually happens 
inside the organization (see table on page 120). It was expected that Italian managers 
would have identified in the “should” column criterias such as Achievements, 
Communication and Delegation. In the “determines” column on the other hand the criteria 
would have been items such as Connections, Loyalty and Deference. The results were 
quite different.
From the results reported on the table on page 120, it emerges that Italians value 
Delegation (30%) Personality (24%), Communications (42%) and above all Achievements 
(71%) as criteria which should determine career success, while UK managers are 
attracted by Business Sense (64%), Communications (50%), as well as Achievements 
(70%). As far as what determines career success, Italian respondents emphasize the 
same items as their UK colleagues except for Power o f  Analysis and Political Analysis 
which are ranked higher. The UK managers instead choose more consistently Business 
Sense as a determinant of career success.
Interestingly, the percentage of UK managers choosing Connections in the determines 
section was higher (28 percent) than the Italian (20 percent). On existing evidence, it was
115
expected that Italian managers would have chosen Connections more consistently than the 
UK ones. Connections are in fact an integral part of the concept of clientelism (see 
chapter 2), one of the perceived characteristics of Italian management. Managers are 
recruited and promoted on the strength of their personal, family or political connections, 
rather than their record or performance. This is particularly true of state-owned 
companies, where family and political patronage are rife and career paths unstructured and 
unreliable. In this instance, the fact that Italian managers did not identify Connections as 
an important factor for career progression may be related to the fact that they work for 
private, foreign-owned companies based in the north of Italy. Unfortunately, there is no 
comparable data from the South of Italy, but this evidence indicates that regional and 
organizational environments may be an important factor in the perceptions of practice of 
the managers polled. The notion of clientelism as “culture specific” therefore would not 
apply here.
At the company level of analysis (see Appendix 4), there were a number of items on which 
national units’ scores differed between each other. Unilever UK identify power of 
analysis as a criteria which should determine career success, while managers in 
Electrolux chose sense of Reality more consistently. Zanussi managers were more in 
favour of Political Analysis, while Unilever Italy identified Personality.
In the section asking what in reality determines career success, UK units scores varied 
more than the Italian ones. Whereas Italian managers were quite consistent in their 
answers, Unilever UK managers identified Power of Analysis and Communications as 
determinants for career success, whereas Electrolux ones ticked Loyalty and Sense of 
Reality. It is interesting to observe that 42 per cent of Unilever UK managers chose 
Connections as a determinant for career success. The idea that managers are promoted on 
the strength of their personal friendships rather than business achievements has been often
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linked to Italian industry. In this instance, however, 30 per cent of Zanussi and only 10 
per cent of Unilever Italy managers chose Connections as a determinant for career 
success.
The results of the questionnaire so far are starting to define an image of Italian management 
which has little to do with most available evidence. The standard notions available on 
Italian management are not confirmed by the data. It may be that these tests alone are not 
sufficient to doubt existing evidence. More data is thus necessary to confirm these early 
results.
117
(32.59) Of the following, which do you think are the three most important factors which 
currently
should determine (question 32) 
determine (question 59)
career success for people like you in this organization? (Please just circle the three most 
important ones)
SHOULD DETERMINES
CAREER SUCCESS 
(select 3 items)
UK Italy UK Italy
1.Power of 
Analysis 31% 7% 16% 35%
2.Political
Analysis 0% 10% 14% 32%
3.Connections 0% 2% 28% 20%
4.Loyalty 5% 2% 20% 14%
5. Deference 0% 0% 7% 7%
6.Imagination 25% 17% 6% 7%
7.Business sense 64% 11% 34% 11%
8.Delegation 8% 30% 6% 14%
9.Personality 11% 24% 47% 42%
lO.Sense of reality 16% 14% 8% 11%
11. Achievements 70% 71% 73% 63%
12.Communications 50% 42% 29% 31%
13.Courage 4% 7% 1% 4%
14.0ther 11% 6% 10% 5%
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4.4.1 Career satisfaction
The section on career satisfaction and career progression consists o f  a set o f three 
questions aimed at testing the general level o f satisfaction with career progression inside 
the organization. From previous evidence, it is expected that Italian managers would be 
quite unhappy with their career progression, since the organization should be run with an 
autocratic, paternalistic and clientelistic management style. The items on career satisfaction 
and career progression provide new and contrasting evidence.
Managers’ responses on the career satisfaction questions are reported on the table on page 
120. On question 60, UK managers (76 per cent) and Italian ones (62 per cent) are 
generally satisfied with their career progression. However, when asked to compare their 
career progression with that of other colleagues, 59 per cent of UK managers consider 
their career progression superior to comparable colleagues, whereas a low of 38 per cent of 
Italian ones consider it to be better. Finally, 51 per cent of UK managers think that there 
are factors which have hindered their career progression (question 63), while only 40 per 
cent of their Italian colleagues agree. From these results, it is difficult to extract enough 
information to sustain that UK managers are happier with their career progression than 
Italian ones, or viceversa.
On the company scores (see chapter appendix), there was an overall similarity in the 
results, with individual units confirming the average national results. The only significant 
difference was on question 61, where only 17 per cent of Unilever Italy managers felt their 
career had developed better than their colleagues, compared to a substantial 49 per cent 
from Zanussi.
The similarities at the company level of analysis are further confirmation that Italian 
managers are closer in their scores to their UK colleagues than expected.
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60. How satisfied are you with your career progress to date in your company?
UK Italy
Very Satisfied 11% 8%
Satisfied 65% 54%
Undecided 11% 17%
Dissatisfied 10% 17%
Very Dissatisfied 0% 3%
61. How would you rate your career progression to date in your company compared with 
other people you know who joined at the same time as you?
UK Italy
Much Better 13% 9%
Somewhat Better 47% 29%
About the Same 33% 50%
Somewhat Worse 7% 11%
Much Worse 0% 0%
Are there any factors which you can think have hindered your career progression in your 
company?
UK
YES 51
NO 48
Italy
40
59
120
When a number of these ‘career’ results were discussed in the interview process, it 
emerged that being sent abroad was described as vital for career success at Unilever Italy, 
and less so at Unilever UK. On the other hand, it was deemed irrelevant at both Electrolux 
UK and Zanussi. In fact, managers in both these two units felt that staff from headquarters 
tried to limit staff mobility to the necessary minimum. Career paths were well laid out in 
both Unilever UK and Unilever Italy, relatively clear at Electrolux and very difficult to 
identify at Zanussi. In fact, managers in Zanussi felt that the company did not have any 
fixed career paths; it was more a matter of personal connections and being the right person 
in the right place at the right time.
These results outline the fact that each unit, to a certain extent, is an entity of its own, with 
its own described peculiar characteristics. It is probable that these units will have in turn 
many different facets, displayed by different results in the sub-units. This, once again, 
highlights the importance of the organizational unit of analysis and the need to support 
quantitative evidence with interview data. The richness in history and tradition of each 
company is likely to be borne out by the answers of its managers, and cannot be 
overstated.
Conclusions
The evidence of this chapter is an early indication that generalizations about national UK 
and Italian managerial styles and practices are difficult to sustain. Laurent’s evidence does 
not find support from this set of data: this research does not in fact identify such a thing as 
“Italian management”. Hofstede and Schein’s tests fail to provide conclusive evidence in 
favour of one national managerial style or the other. Issues such as satisfaction with career 
progression do not provide evidence in favour of an “Italian management profile”. When 
asked to distinguish between “it is” and “should be” Italian managers did not report a wide
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gap between expectations and reality. According to existing literature, this gap should 
instead be substantial. Italian managers are expected to wish for an open and meritocratic 
management system, but in reality must cope with an autocratic and paternalistic one. 
From the evidence of this chapter a number of items on the “it is” scales have identified the 
UK managers closer to the traditional Italian profile than the Italian managers themselves. 
Perhaps the UK managerial profile needs rewriting too. Also, it is worth exploring more in 
detail in Chapter 5, whether the difference between values and perceptions of practice 
(should be - it is) is a logical one and provides data to back up these early findings.
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CHAPTER 5
The amount o f literature on cross-national managerial differences usually does not specify 
at what level these national differences are to be found (values, practices, etc.), and 
whether these differences are consistent not only at the national, but also at the 
organizational level. The focus o f analysis is usually at the national level, comparing one 
country against the other. This strategy tends to ignore organizational differences, which 
could possibly give some meaningful explanation and interpretation to the national results. 
This chapter will focus on managerial values and perceptions o f practice, and it will analyze 
the managers ' responses both at the national and at the organizational level. The 
techniques used in the analysis o f  the data will be factor analysis and Student's T-tests.
The evidence from this chapter suggests that, similarly to the previous chapter, the 
differences between Italian and UK managers tend to vary at the national as well as at the 
organizational level. The two sets o f  results cannot be therefore classified into clear 
'national'profiles; the culturalist thesis does notfind supportfrom this evidence either.
This research is an Anglo-Italian comparison of managerial values and perceptions of 
practice. It aims to establish, among other things, where Italian and UK managers differ 
from each other. In the existing literature, there is little information on how possible 
national differences relate to the organizations respondents work for. Organizational 
affiliation was a factor few researchers took into consideration. In this particular study, it 
was decided to analyze both national and organizational units’ results, in order to explore 
more in detail the composition of the aggregate, national results. The first section of the 
chapter (5.1) will outline the 14 related values and perceptions of practice. The second 
section (5.2) will report the results of factor analysis. The third section (5.3) will look at 
managerial values (5.3.1) at the national and organizational level; the same tests will be 
reproduced for the perceptions of practice section (5.3.2). The last section will draw some 
conclusions on the strength of the evidence collected.
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5.1 Related Values and Perceptions of Practice
This first section, reports the 14 related values and perceptions o f practice: each value has 
its corresponding perception o f practice listed below. In the following sections, the two 
sets o f  questions will be analyzed separately.
As mentioned before, there is little evidence on what questionnaire items tapped in 
previous research. Was it beliefs, behaviour, perceptions of practice, values? This part of 
the questionnaire was designed in order to identify first 14 values, that is what a manager 
feels with respect to a number of managerial concepts such as superior/subordinate 
relations, meritocracy and decision making. For example, the following question asks: 
“Subordinates should only report to their direct superior”. This statement taps a managerial 
value. The corresponding perception of practice states that “Subordinates usually report 
only to their direct superior”. These questions were designed in order to test the gap 
between Italian managerial values and perceptions of practice. The aim was to test the 
traditional Italian managerial style as identified in previous literature and to observe whether 
its salient characteristics (Autocracy, Paternalism and Clientelism) were more prevalent at 
the level of value or perception of practice. The idea was to explore the role of the 
organizational environment. If the Italian managerial profile was predominant at the value 
level, then the culture specific theory may have proved appropriate. If, instead, it was 
predominant at the perceptions of practice level, the role of the organization needed further 
analysis. The following list reports the 14 values with the corresponding 14 perceptions of 
practice.
15. Managers should give their subordinates only that information which is necessary for 
them to do their immediate task.
49. Subordinates are only given the information necessary to do their immediate task.
124
16. Superiors should have a great deal of influence over the careers of their subordinates.
53. Superiors in this company have a great deal o f  influence over the careers o f their 
subordinates.
17. Each level of management should have its own set of rewards and fringe benefits.
48. In this company each level o f management has its own set o f  rewards and fringe 
benefits.
19. Major decisions in an organization should always be cleared with superiors.
41. Major decisions must always be cleared with superiors.
20. Companies have a responsibility to do what is best for their employees.
40. In this company, the interests o f the employees are a priority.
21. Subordinates should only report to their direct superior.
51. Subordinates usually report only to their direct superior.
22. Managers with ability should succeed whether they are involved in company politics or 
not.
46. To be a successful manager with this company, it is important to be aware o f and play 
company politics.
23. The manager-subordinate relationship should be a paternalistic one.
52. The manager-subordinate relationship in this company is a paternalistic one.
24. Superiors should give detailed and complete instructions to their subordinates, rather 
than providing general directions and depending upon their initiative to work out the 
details.
47. Senior managers always give detailed and complete instructions to their subordinates.
26. In business, merit should be the most important criterion for promotion.
42. Employees * careers in this company are determined on merit.
125
27. Superior should usually know what is best for their subordinates.
55. My boss usually thinks he knows what's best for me.
28.When superiors take major decisions, subordinates don’t have to be consulted.
43. I  am rarely consulted when superiors take important decisions in my area or 
department.
30.The use of rewards (pay, promotion,etc.) and punishment (failure to promote, etc.) is 
not the best way to get subordinates to do their work.
45. Senior managers seldom use rewards (pay, promotion, etc.)and punishment (failure to 
promote, etc.) to get subordinates to do their work
31.Management development programmes should be considered more fringe benefits than 
real learning opportunities.
54. Our management development programmes are in reality more fringe benefits than real 
learning opportunities.
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5.2 Factor Analysis
This second section reports the results o f the factor analyses. The use o f factor analysis in 
this research was aimed at identifying groups o f questions or dimensions on which national 
managers differed significantly.
The first step in the data analysis was to run factor (individual) analysis on the 14 values 
and related perceptions of practice items in an attempt to identify groups of questions in 
which the distribution of scores showed similar patterns from low to high agreement across 
the clustered questions. These groups of questions or indices should have suggested 
factors or dimensions that may have meaningfully differentiated national managers.
Work-related Values
The test was run at the Value level (Table 3) first on all cases (UK plus Italy) . Three 
factors of at least four items each were found. The groups were:
Group 1
24. Superiors should give detailed and complete instructions to their subordinates, rather 
than providing general directions and depending upon their initiative to work out the 
details.
28.When superiors take major decisions, subordinates don’t have to be consulted.
15. Managers should give their subordinates only that information which is necessary for 
them to do their immediate task.
31.Management development programmes should be considered more fringe benefits than 
real learning opportunities.
Group 2
30.The use of rewards (pay, promotion,etc.) and punishment (failure to promote, etc.) is 
not the best way to get subordinates to do their work.
16. Superiors should have a great deal of influence over the careers of their subordinates.
27. Superior should usually know what is best for their subordinates.
17. Each level of management should have its own set of rewards and fringe benefits.
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Group 3
19. Major decisions in an organization should always be cleared with superiors.
20. Companies have a responsibility to do what is best for their employees.
21. Subordinates should only report to their direct superior.
23. The manager-subordinate relationship should be a paternalistic one.
In order to confirm the validity of these initial findings, the same test was subsequently run 
separately on the UK cases, and then on the Italian ones. It was expected that the factor 
groupings from the UK and Italian analyses would have been quite similar to those resulted 
from the analysis of the overall sample, therefore identifying a few stable patterns across 
the three groupings of cases.
Factor analysis on the UK cases did nor result in any clusterings. Varimax failed to 
converge 24 iterations. The analysis of the Italian cases instead produced 5 clusters, one 
more than on all cases.4
There were few similarities among the only two comparable sets of results, all the cases 
and the Italian ones. Only three items, V31,V24 and V15 were factored together in both 
results.
31.Management development programmes should be considered more fringe benefits than 
real learning opportunities.
24. Superiors should give detailed and complete instructions to their subordinates, rather 
than providing general directions and depending upon their initiative to work out the 
details.
15. Managers should give their subordinates only that information which is necessary for 
them to do their immediate task.
Looking at the UK factor matrix, only V31 and V15 grouped together.
31.Management development programmes should be considered more fringe benefits than 
real learning opportunities.
15. Managers should give their subordinates only that information which is necessary for 
them to do their immediate task.
The evidence presented here is a confirmation of the difficulty of identifying consistent
4Since Varimax did not cluster the UK sample, the analysis was run with Oblimin as well, to see if this 
technique would cluster the UK sample. It did not, and it also failed to converge the Italian sample.
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patterns among national scores. Perhaps the perceptions of practice questions would 
cluster in more homogeneous groups.
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Factor Structure o f Work-related Values 14 related items
International Sample UK sample * Italian Sample
Fact 1 Fact 2 Fact 3 Fact 4 Fact 1 Fact 2 Fact 3 Fact 4 Fact 5 Fact 6 Fact 1 Fact 2 Fact 3 Fact 4 Fact 5
V24
V28
V15
V31
.611
.576
.548
.533
.617
.502
-.491
.490 .624
.612
.653
.591
V22
V26
.736
.712
.552
-.651 -.561
.519
V30
V16
V27
V17
.588
.569
.538
.455
.463
.464
.538
.560
.707
.744
-.700
.781
V23
V19
V20
V21
.628
.536
.444
.430
.557
.439
.561
-.564
.409
.603
.558
.578
* For the UK sample, Varimax failed to converge in 24 iterations. The numbers reported are therefore only factor matrix results. Table 3
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Perceptions of Practice
The same factor procedure was later used for the analysis at the Perceptions of Practice 
level on the 14 related items. (Table 2) Factor analysis was run first on all cases, and then 
separately on the UK and Italian cases only. The first analysis generated once again four 
different factors of at least three items each. In contrast with the value section, factor 
analysis on the perceptions of practice for UK managers was able to cluster a number of 
items together, albeit factor 5 and factor 6 were made up of two and one item respectively. 
The last group, Italy, reported five factors with the last two made up of three items in total. 
In this section as well there were no clear, identifiable patterns; the items loaded differently 
depending on the group of cases (all, UK and Italy) analyzed. Only two items, Y42 and 
V46 were consistently factored together.
The mixed results which emerge from the factor analyses make any categorization of the 
data very difficult. For this particular research, factor analysis is therefore not very useful; 
other test will be needed in order to draw some meaningful conclusions.
As far as the questions were concerned, there is no conclusive evidence to support national 
managerial differences. At the value level, factor analysis did not work for the UK data. 
As far as the perceptions of practice were concerned, the fact that only two items 
consistently loaded together confirmed the inability of statistical analysis to reproduce the 
“national managerial profiles” identified before. The distinction introduced between values 
and perceptions of practice did not help to shed light over the culturalist hypothesis. At this 
point of the research, the culturalist thesis looks increasingly difficult to sustain with this 
set of data.
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Factor Structure of Perceptions o f Practice 14 related items
International Sample UK sample
Fact 1 Fact 2 Fact 3 Fact 4 Fact 1 Fact 2 Fact 3
V42
V46
V47
.760
.696
-.624
.510
.670
V51
V54
V49
V52
.592
.553
.548
.527
.593
.742
.737
.691
V41
V43
V40
.705
.579
.320
.728
.498
.708
V45
V48
V53
V55
.615
.585
.554
.413
Italian Sample
Fact 4 Fact 5 Fact 6 Fact 1 Fact 2 Fact 3 Fact 4 Fact 5
.779
.728
-.478 -.628
.624
.403
.642
.481
.875
.602
.607
.848 .686
.709 .605
.750 .576
.629 .722
Table 4
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5.3 Student ‘s t-tests
This third section will look at the 14 values and perceptions o f practice through the use o f 
student's t-tests. At the UK vs. Italy level, both values and perceptions o f practice differ 
significantly. However, when the analysis is limited to the organizational cases, without 
the business school ones, the items significantly different tend to be fewer and also 
different ones. The same conclusions can be drawn from the analysis o f  the individual 
companies (four companies fo r  a total o f six tests), where each company displays 
characteristics o f its own.
Since the study was an Anglo-Italian comparison, it was decided to look individually at 
each of the 14 values and related perceptions of practice items through the use of Student’s 
t-tests, comparing the UK cases versus the Italian ones. The goal of this statistical analysis 
was to establish whether or not there were significant differences between the two groups. 
This first section focuses on the relevant differences between the UK and Italian managers 
on the work-related values answers. The data is analyzed with T-tests on a country level 
and subsequently on a company level.5
Here will follow a preliminary analysis of the results and an eventual classification. The 
first section will look at the value statements, the second at the perception ones. The 
questionnaire has been coded so that a high score from a question indicates a high level of 
agreement with the statement. A low score implies that the respondent does not agree with 
the statement. The statements used here refer to the issues of Autocracy, Clientelism, and 
Paternalism. A high score thus indicates a high presence of these factors. Where not
5 The complete results of the T-tests are reported in the chapter appendixes.
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indicated, Italy scores higher on each question.
From previous literature, it was expected that the UK and Italian managers scores’ 
differences would have been significant on a number of items. The ‘cultural specificity’ 
argument popularized by Adler [1986] and Schneider [1989] argued in fact that Italian and 
UK managers differed consistently on items such as power distance, company politics and 
paternalism.
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5.3.1 UK vs Italy
Work-related Values
The tests were initially run at the national level (UK vs. Italy), first at the work-related 
value level. Table 3 shows each of the 14 selected values, and how they score.
values T.Sample UK
[0]
Italy
[1]
V15 1.79* 1.60 1.92
V16 3.06* 2.91 3.16
V17 3.47* 3.06 3.75
V19 3.68 3.60 3.73
V20 3.51 3.61 3.44
V21 2.94 2.87 2.99
V22 1.60* 1.74 1.51
V23 1.87* 2.26 1.61
V24 2.29* 2.13 2.40
V26 1.88 2.00 1.80
V27 3.54* 3.13 3.81
V28 2.36* 2.21 2.45
V30 2.67* 2.41 2.83
V31 2.00* 1.77 2.15
The sign * denotes a significant difference between the two scores (5 % level). Table 3
The specific items to which the variable numbers refer to are listed in full on pages 127-128.
The UK and Italian scores differ substantially at this level. In fact, 10 out of 14 values 
differ below the 0.05 level. Significantly, Italy scores higher on 8 out of these 10 items. 
Without looking at the specific items themselves, these results tend to confirm the majority 
of cross-national studies; Italian and UK managers have their own peculiar managerial 
characteristics, and share little similarities.
It is worth pointing out at this point that previous researches have limited their analysis at 
this ‘national’ level. One of the criticisms on previous literature, as described before, is 
that there is little evidence on how the national results compare to the organizational ones.
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In other words, there is little information on the distribution of the scores for each 
organization or unit which make up each national sample.
The following analysis will therefore look first at the national samples, and then focus on 
the organizational ones. The hypothesis was that the organizational results within the 
Italian sample may differ substantially from one unit (Unilit) to the other (Zanussi). The 
differences in results would therefore be attributed to company affiliation rather than 
nationality. The more rigid organizational environment of Zanussi could, for example, be 
expressed in a higher score for autocracy and paternalism on behalf of the Zanussi 
managers themselves.
136
UK vs. Italy (organizational cases only)
Student’s t-tests comparing UK and Italian managers using only the organizational cases, 
(that is, without the business school questionnaires) originated a slightly different set of 
results. Seven items differed significantly at the value level, (compared to 10 when all 
respondents were used). These results did confirm, to a certain extent, those that emerged 
from the analysis of the overall sample, in that the same items which were significantly 
different on the company cases were also different on all the cases. However, the 
numbers in the analysis of the organizational cases were smaller; seven items differed 
significantly, instead of the 10 at the Total sample level.
values O.Sample UK Italy
[0] [1]
V15 1.70* 1.59 1.81
V16 3.08 3.00 3.15
V17 3.52* 3.12 3.81
V19 3.70 3.67 3.70
V20 3.48 3.61 3.41
V21 2.76 2.81 2.72
V22 1.59* 1.76 1.50
V23 1.87* 2.25 1.65
V24 2.17 2.05 2.23
V26 1.90 2.01 1.83
V27 3.52* 3.23 3.74
V28 2.35 2.31 2.38
V30 2.65* 2.45 2.79
V31 1.96* 1.83 2.05
The sign * denotes a significant difference between the two scores.
The last analysis compared the two individual Italian units. The aim was to observe the 
distribution of significant differences. Wether, for example, Zanussi scored consistently 
higher than Unilit. This evidence would not be reported at the national level of analysis
137
and it would hide the power of organizational affiliation within each individual country. 
Such a result would be further confirmation of the difficulty of sustaining the “culture 
specific” argument, which considers culture only at the national level of inquiry.
Organizational Units
Student’s t-tests comparing Italian units also produced results which did not identify any 
consistent patterns. There were only 5 items with a considerable difference between 
organizational units.
Zanussi Unilever Ita
V15 3.0 3.5*
V17 2.7* 2.3
V20 3.2 3.5*
V21 3.0* 2.4
V30 2.4 2.7*
Zanussi scores higher on V17 and on V21
17. Each level of management should have its own set of rewards and benefits.
21. Subordinates should only report to their direct superior.
Unilever Italy scores higher instead on V15, V20 and V30
15. Managers should give their subordinates only that information which is necessary for 
them to do their immediate task.
20. Companies have a responsibility to do what is best for their employees.
30. The use of rewards (pay, promotion, etc.) and punishment (failure to promote, etc.) is 
not the best way to get subordinates to do their work.
As far as the Italian organizational sample is concerned, it appears that no consistent
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differences can be observed at the value level. Managers carry with them a set of values 
which cross organisational boundaries.
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5.3.2 Perceptions of Practice
On the perceptions of practice side, at the Total sample level, there are eight differences 
between the Italian and the UK responses. It should be stressed that the organizational 
structure and ownership of the Italian units being observed does differ substantially from 
average Italian companies. These companies are private, based in the north, and controlled 
by foreign multinationals. The Business school sample as well did not include any 
managers from the state sector. Although issues such as paternalism, and, in particular, 
clientelism, are still relevant, they are not an overwhelming factor as in the state sector.
Perceptions T.Sam ple UK
[0]
Italy
[1]
V40 3.60* 3.38 3.66
V41 4.07* 3.84 4.11
V42 3.20* 3.29 3.00
V43 2.46* 2.26 2.56
V45 2.85 2.90 2.91
V46 3.22* 3.38 3.03
V47 2.30* 2.18 2.50
V48 3.23* 3.35 3.03
V49 2.76 2.72 2.90
V51 3.22 3.27 3.20
V52 2.48* 2.76 2.45
V53 3.82 3.79 3.74
V54 2.39 2.30 2.47
V55 3.09 3.18 3.06
The sign * denotes a significant difference between the two scores. Table 5
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UK vs. Italy (organizational cases only)
Student’s t-tests comparing UK and Italian managerial perceptions of practice using only 
the organizational cases, (that is, without the business school questionnaires) originated a 
different set of results. Six items differed significantly at this level, (compared to 8 from 
the all the cases) These results did not confirm the evidence emerged from the national 
level of analysis. Two items, V42 and V48, which differed significantly at this level, were 
not confirmed at the organizational level of analysis. The results highlight that the 
perceptions of practice are not consistent between the units analyzed. Carrying out the 
analysis without the Business school sample has underlined the fact that each unit analyzed 
has characteristics of its own which tend to be blurred at the national level of analysis. If 
these differences on perceptions of practice are confirmed also at the Italian unit level of 
analysis (Unilit vs. Zanussi), it can be drawn that any research which would limit the study 
to the national level is likely to identify and describe results which mask relevant 
organizational differences. In other words, explaining the results at the national level is 
likely to involve factors such as culture, history, education, etc. If the analysis is carried 
out also at the organizational level, these explanatoring factors are no longer valid. Issues 
such as organizational culture, business history and product area, and so on would need to 
be considered. The table reporting the relevant data is on the next page.
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Perceptions O.Sample UK
[0]
Italy
[1]
V40 3.60* 3.38 3.72
V41 4.07* 3.89 4.18
V42 3.20 3.32 3.12
V43 2.46* 2.24 2.61
V45 2.85 2.89 2.83
V46 3.22 3.35 3.14
V47 2.30* 2.14 2.41
V48 3.23 3.33 3.17
V49 2.76* 2.62 2.88
V51 3.22 319 3.24
V52 2.48* 2.62 2.38
V53 3.82 3.74 3.86
V54 2.39 2.38 2.41
V55 3.09 3.19 3.03
The sign * denotes a significant difference between the two scores. Table 6
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Organizational Units
Student’s t-tests comparing individual Italian units instead produced results which 
identified a consistent pattern.
U nilit Zanussi
V41 2.6 3.1*
V43 2.9 3.3*
V46 2.9 3.4*
V48 3.0 3.3*
V51 2.4 2.7*
V52 3.0 3.4*
The Zanussi managers scored higher on six items, V41, V43, V46, V48, V51, V52 
41. Major decisions must always be cleared with superiors.
43. I am rarely consulted when superiors take important decisions in my area or 
department.
46. To be a successful manager in this company, it is important to be aware of and play 
company politics.
48. In this company each level of management has its own set of rewards and fringe 
benefits.
51 .Subordinates usually report only to their direct superior.
52. The manager-subordinate relationship in this company is a paternalistic one.
These results are different from those at the value level, where the six differences were
equally divided among the two organizations. These results indicate a higher level of
dissatisfaction perceived by the Zanussi managers, which is reflected in their portrayal of
the organization as being run on autocratic and clientelistic criteria. These results were
broadly confirmed by the interview process. This is perhaps the “core” of Italian
management as previously described. The perceptions of practice of one particular
company which was previously run with an autocratic management style. The Zanussi
results on perceptions of practice confirm the standard Italian managerial profile. The
culturalist thesis has finally been proven correct, albeit on quite different terms than
previously thought.
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Observations
The research has finally been able to identify the classic “Italian managerial profile”. 
However, it discovered it in the wrong place: at the perception of practice level on one 
Italian organization, Zanussi. Managerial values, the “cultural imprints”, as the culturalist 
would call them, are instead quite similar, or, at least, the differences are difficult to 
categorize. This finding is quite significant: it underlines the necessity for cross-national 
studies to focus the analysis on both values and perceptions of practice, or on similar 
concepts. This finding also requires new studies to look also at the organizational level of 
analysis. The differences of results between Unilt and Zanussi are an indicator of the 
importance of the organizational environment, a factor which had not been considered in 
the past.
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CHAPTER 6
In this chapter, analysis o f variance were employed to establish the role o f citizenship and 
company affiliation in the distribution o f the results. The second section will look at the 
results o f the qualitative analysis and integrate them with the quantitative data. Once again, 
the mixed results prevent any clear identification o f national managerial differences.
The previous chapters outlined the difficulties encountered when attempting generalizations 
about national managerial characteristics. Both national and company affiliation were 
factors which affected the results, and it was often difficult to distinguish the influence of 
either of these two criteria on the results. In the first section, 6.1, the following sets of 
tests, through the use of analysis of variance (ANOVAs) tried to establish the role of 
citizenship and company affiliation in the distribution of the results; whether nationality or 
membership in an organization explained a significant share in the variance in the answers 
by respondents on the 14 value and related perceptions of practice. The analyses were run 
on all cases (UK and Italy, for a total of six 6 units). In order to test the relative 
contribution to the variance in the data of the two criterion variables (Citizen and Company: 
controlling for Sex, Level, Age, Marital status, Education). ANOVAs were also performed 
on a set of sub-groups covering different groups of respondents on all six criteria. The sub­
groups included nationality (citizen, all six units), unit (company units), company type 
(Polycentric and Global) and national company (UK companies and Italian ones) The 
second section of the chapter (6.2), will look at the results of the qualitative analysis and 
integrate them with the quantitative ones.
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6.1 ANOVAs
The complete results of the one-way ANOVAs by Citizenship and Company are reported in 
Tables 1 and 2. For the questions on Values and perceptions country differences explain a 
similar variance to organization affiliation on most questions studied. On the value side, 
Citizenship is a significant predictor in 10 out of 14 questions. When the questions are 
analyzed by Company, 12 out of 14 items are significant The analysis at the perceptions of 
practice side was slightly different, since fewer, eight, items were significant by Citizen 
and nine by company. When the analyses are looked at as a whole, managers’ answers 
were not systematically different between values and practices questions from the cross­
national to the cross-organizational study.
The fact that the nationality of the respondents (and sometimes the other criterion variables, 
such as sex and level) affected the scores of the questions highly may not mean that a 
respondent’s answer is fully predictable from his or her nationality or any other critieria. A 
number of the ANOVAs with different sub-samples and other criteria may provide further 
clues.
The last set of analyses looked at data on National company UK (Unilever UK and 
Electrolux) and National company Italy (Unilever Italy and Zanussi) As it has been pointed 
out before, the two MNCs studied have been described as having a different structure. 
One, called Global, has a fairly uniform corporate culture and a similar structure across all 
of its operations. The other, Polycentric, is characterized by a rather weak corporate 
culture and great independence allocated to its foreign operations. The results, reported in 
Tables 4 and 5, indicate that company type (Cotype) compared to citizen results from same 
table is not an important factor in the distribution of the scores, and explain little variance
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in the scores at both Values and Perceptions of Practice level. At the value level Education 
and Ageband seem to account for some variance in the scores, and so does Level at the 
Perceptions of Practice level.
These results would also seem to challenge the idea that organizations (as far as this 
research was concerned), select, train and develop employees in order to create a set of 
managers very close to the corporate culture or the espoused theories of the organization 
itself.
What emerges again from this further analysis is that it is very difficult to conceptualize a 
set of managerial differences consistent at the various levels of analysis and also identify a 
clear Italian managerial profile. In this research in particular, it is difficult to quantify the 
degree of variance between country and organizational differences. The variance between 
scores at the Values and Perceptions level is such to deny any form of clustering or 
consistent comparison. One of the following observations is that when looking at the cross­
national studies, if the analyses look at individual organizational samples the degree of 
uniformity between the different sets of results might, as expected, be quite low. 
However, sticking to a general, national level can provide some relative straightforward 
clusterings. These clusters are relatively untested, that is they are the sum of a non-random 
sample of managers from different organizations. If possible, in future research it would 
be important to look also at company affiliation. It appears that national level conclusions 
mask a set of organizational differences which if taken individually, could help interpret the 
structure and the reliability of the national differences.
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ANOVA
bv Citizen 
VALUES
Citizen Sex Level Mastat Education Ageband R2
V15 *(ita) *(0) .109
V16 *(ita) .067
V17 *(ita) .142
V19 .019
V20 .019
V21 .057
V22 *(UK) .052
V23 *(UK) .190
V24 *(0) .057
V26 *(UK) .032
V27 *(ita) .160
V28 *(UK) .040
V30 *(ita) *(0) .070
V31 *(ita) *(0) .089
Perceptions
Citizen Sex Level Mastat Education Ageband R2
V40 .035
V41 *(ita) .089
V42 *(UK) *(3) .051
V43 *(ita) *(3) .063
V45 .011
V46 *(UK) *(2) .085
V47 *(ita) .074
V48 *(UK) *(0) .067
V49 .017
V51 .022
V52 *(UK) *(1) .063
V53 .031
V54 .019
V55 .018
Codes:
Citizen 1 UK 2 Ita
Level 1 senior m 2 middle m 3 junior m Mastat 1 married 2 No
Education 1 University 0 No university Ageband (18 to 30)=1 (31 to 40)=2 (41 to 50)=3 
(51 to 70)=4 
R2 Multiple R Square
Table 1
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ANOVA
bv Company 
VALUES
Company Sex Level Mastat Education Ageband R2
V15 * *(0) .147
V16 * *(3) .095
V17 * .155
V19 .045
V20 .040
V21 * .157
V22 * .066
V23 .193
V24 * *(0) .111
V26 .057
V27 * .182
V28 * .066
V30 *(0) .079
V31 *(ita) *(0) .110
Perceptions
Company Sex Level Mastat Education Aget
V40 * .050
V41 * .120
V42 * *(3) .099
V43 *(3) .066
V45 .026
V46 * *(3) *d) .191
V47 * *(0) .104
V48 * *(0) *(0) .099
V49 .038
V51 .041
V52 * *0) .106
V53 * .079
V54 * .052
V55 .026
Codes:
Company 1 to 6 (UnilUK, Elux, Zan, Unillt, Boc, Ash)
Level 1 senior m 2 middle m 3 junior m Mastat 1 married 2 No
Education 1 University 0 No university Ageband (18 to 30)= 1 (31 to 40)=2 (41 to 50)=3 
(51 to 70)=4 
R2 Multiple R Square
Table 2
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ANOVA
bv Cotvpe I Citizen 
VALUES
Cotype Citizen Sex Level Mastat Educ Agebd R 2
V15 * *(0) .127
V16 * * .084
V17 *(ita) .153
V19 .024
V20 .158
V21 * .135
V22 *(UK) .058
V23 *(UK) .058
V24 * *(0) .102
V26 *(UK) .039
V27 *(ita) .160
V28 *(UK) .043
V30 *(ita) *(0) .074
V31 *(ita) *(0) .092
PERCEPTIONS
Cotype Citizen Sex Level Mastat Educ AgebdR2 2
V40 *(ita) .045
V41 *(ita) .089
V42 *(UK) *(3) .060
V43 *(ita) .065
V45 *(3) .022
V46 .086
V47 *(ita) .090
V48 *(UK) *(0) .080
V49 .029
V51 .029
V52 * *(UK) *(1) .092
V53 .045
V54 * .037
V55 .023
Codes:
Citizen 1 UK 2 Ita
Cotype 1 Global (Unilever UK and Unilever Italy) 2 Polycentric (Electrolux and Zanussi) 
Level 1 senior m 2 middle m 3 junior m Mastat 1 married 2 No
Education 1 University 0 No university Ageband (18 to 30)= 1 (31 to 40)=2 (41 to 50)=3 
(51 to 70)=4
R2 Multiple R Square
Table 3
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ANOVA
bv National Company (UK)
VALUES
Nat.Company Sex Level M astat Educ Agebd R 2
V15 .082
V16 .085
V17 * .092
V19 * .125
V20 .067
V21 .122
V22 .069
V23 .039
V24 * .140
V26 .113
V27 * * .097
V28 * * .087
V30 .072
V31 * * * .149
PERCEPTIONS
Nat.Company Sex Level M astat Educ Agebd R 2
V40 * .055
V41 .042
V42 * * .129
V43 .066
V45 .035
V46 * * .275
V47 .065
V48 * .064
V49 .049
V51 .035
V52 * .144
V53 * * * * .223
V54 .059
V55 .052
Codes:
Citizen 1 UK 2 Ita
National Company UK Unilever UK and Electrolux 
Level 1 senior m 2 middle m 3 junior m Mastat 1 married 2 No
Education 1 University 0 No university Ageband (18 to 30)=1 (31 to 40)=2 (41 to 50)=3 
(51 to 70)=4 
R2 Multiple R Square
Table 4
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ANOVA
bv National Company (Italy)
VALUES
Nat.Com pany Sex Level Mastat Educ Agebd R 2
V15 * * .135
V16 * .135
V17 .049
V19 .028
V20 * .066
V21 * .222
V22 .028
V23 .091
V24 * * .101
V26 .025
V27 .078
V28 .047
V30 * .063
V31 .066
PERCEPTIONS
N at.Com pany Sex Level M astat Educ Agebd R 2
V40 * .055
V41 .042
V42 * * .358
V43 .066
V45 .051
V46 * * .145
V47 * .073
V48 * * * .146
V49 .043
V51 .052
V52 * .073
V53 * .086
V54 * .054
V55 .020
Codes:
Citizen 1 UK 2 Ita
National Company Italy Zanussi and Unilever Italy
Level 1 senior m 2 middle m 3 junior m Mastat 1 married 2 No
Education 1 University 0 No university Ageband (18 to 30)=1 (31 to 40)=2 (41 to 50)=3 
(51 to 70)=4 
R2 Multiple R Square
Table 5
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6.2 Organizational Structure
One of the current arguments on multinational companies is whether the pervasive effect of 
a strong multinational corporate culture would harmonize values and practices across most 
foreign units or if, in fact, each unit represented and entity on its own. As far as the 
companies involved in this research, their structure has been described as considerably 
different. One, organization in the study, Unilever, has been identified as Global and the 
other, Electrolux/Zanussi, as Polycentric.
One of the arguments surrounding these two types of organizations is whether internal 
consistency of policy and practice is easier to ensure in the Polycentric enterprise or in the 
Global one. Some [Evans, 1989] argue that consistency of policy and practice is easier to 
ensure in the Polycentric enterprise. Although not clearly specificed, this argument only 
makes sense if consistency of policy and practice is considered at the subsidiary, and not 
headquarters, level of analysis. A slim corporate staff has the limited role of ensuring 
executive succession and the cross-fertilization of experience. Divisional staff may have a 
coordination role, but real power lies in the hands of subsidiary line and staff executives. It 
is argued that inconsistencies arise if a strong-willed vice-president is appointed with a 
mission to coordinate tightly policies and practices throughout the subsidiaries. The 
message is likely to be ignored or defeated by local subsidiary managers, entailing 
disruptive political infighting. In fact, the situation could be easily rectified by placing two 
or three top executives from the head office in each of the subsidiaries. They will act as 
watchdogs, making sure that messages are well received and put into practice.
As far as selection and retention policies are concerned, Evans [1989] argues that they must 
be complemented by socialization and management development practices to build corporate 
as well as national loyalty. Many recruits will leave in the first years and those who stay 
must be nurtured to obtain pay-off from the investments made on them. Salaries, welfare,
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transfer policies must be tailored in order to develop individuals with ’firm specific’ rather 
than labour market competencies.
At the same time, once this process is set in motion, it will develop its own set of automated 
mechanisms which will allow it to function effectively without overloading the everyday 
operations of the subsidiaries while maintaining its efficiency.
The costs and benefits of these two adaptive strategies also differ. The Global firm gains in 
term of corporate integration, but the price is the heavy cost of selection and retention. The 
Polycentric company gains in terms of lower overhead costs (relatively little time and 
energy devoted to HRM, salaries linked more closely to local labour market rates), but it 
typically looses out in corporate integration.
What emerges from this research is somewhat contrasting. In Italy, the Global company 
(Unilever Italy), had little difficulty in retaining its managers, in fact, it had problems in 
encouraging them to leave. In Polycentric Italy (Zanussi), managerial turnover, especially 
in the first two years, was around 35 per cent
Managers in Unilever UK, on the other hand, were quite happy but still complained about 
pay and unfair promotion criteria. In Electrolux, the level of managerial satisfaction was 
quite high, notwithstanding the fact that a number of respondents to the questionnaire were 
laid off shortly after.
The questionnaire and interview data were collected over a period of six months. On the 
strength of this study, it was difficult to either confirm or deny the distinction between 
Global (Unilever) and Polycentric (Electrolux/Zanussi). The data were collected during a 
peculiar business cycle which was different from Italy to the UK. Issues such as 
managerial turnover, career satisfaction and corporate integration would be better addressed 
in a longitudinal study, which would look at the organisational structures more in detail.
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6.3 Interview Data
Overall, the qualitative analysis confirmed the main statistical findings. Ten managers were 
interviewed in each unit in order to discuss the questionnaire results and explore some 
issues further. The major themes emerging from the Italian research are summarized as 
follows:
• The level of managerial satisfaction was relatively high in Electrolux and Unilever Italy, 
and less so in Zanussi and Unilever UK. With the exception of Zanussi, the companies 
were perceived as being challenging and meritocratic places to work. At Zanussi a number 
of managers felt that the promotion criteria were far from ideal. However, working for 
both Italian companies was a very prestigious occupation, and on average managers agreed 
that it did not represent the average Italian company. In the UK instead, managers 
identified their company as one of many other similar ones throughout the country.
• In all the units the relationship between superiors and subordinates was still quite 
important; informal mentoring and supervision were often cited. Managers in Electrolux, 
however, did not consider the relationship to be a paternalistic one, and seemed to enjoy it. 
As far as career progression was concerned, the input of the direct superior was generally 
perceived as being vital.
• Like most Italian companies, symbols are very important. There was a feeling that to be 
successful one had to be competent but also able to portray the ’right image’. UK 
managers, on the other hand, were much less concerned with symbols or playing up to a 
particular image.
• Salary and position in Italy were considered as ‘mythical’ issues. Managers were not
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aware of their colleagues’ salaries or how they were graded. Much speculation followed 
and top management seemed reluctant to divulge the information. In the UK units, there 
was more openness as far as salaries and titles were concerned.
• Training and development activities were described as quite good in both Unilever 
national units. Electrolux and Zanussi managers instead consistently complained about the 
lack of formalized training and development opportunities. This is the result of a poor 
training programme at corporate level. While Unilever stresses the importance of training 
at both the national unit and international level, Electrolux leaves most of the training 
activities in the hands of the national units, without much corporate coordination.
• The degree of freedom from Headquarters was perceived to be similar across all units. 
Managers from Electrolux in particular stressed their independence and freedom of action. 
Their colleagues at Zanussi, while praising Headquarters for lack of interfering, constantly 
referred to the Swedes as ‘Barbarians’. This was such a recurrent theme that a top 
Swedish manager felt compelled to highlight the fact that the ‘Barbarians’ came originally 
from Finland, and not Sweden.
• The level of internationalization was found to be still relatively modest, with the 
exception of Unilever UK. A number of young managers both in the UK and Italy 
expressed the desire to be sent abroad for a working experience with the company. It was 
not clear, though, whether the foreign posting was sought after for its inner value or simply 
because it enhanced career progress. The major difference was that in both Unilever units 
working abroad was encouraged and almost expected. In Electrolux UK and Zanussi it 
was, instead, discouraged.
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Observations
When compared to previous evidence, in particular to the culturalist thesis of the last few 
years, the results of this research outline a number of comments. These comments are not 
meant to invalidate or discard previous evidence, but to state that there are many facets to 
international management research and that generalizations are quite difficult to make.
• Since Laurent’s research, the gap between UK and Italian managers has narrowed 
considerably. These results may not represent an ideal average sample, but nevertheless 
highlight some new important factors.
• Each unit displayed characteristics of its own, which were difficult to classify at a national 
level (Unilever UK + Zanussi / Electrolux + Unilever Italy)
• When the results were analyzed at the sub-unit (departmental) level of analysis, each sub 
unit provided different results.
•The theoretical classification of organizations between Global and Polycentric is difficult to 
sustain in this research. The two units comprising the Global organization, Unilever UK 
and Unilever Italy did not display an array of similar characteristics which would identify 
them as part of a Global organization. The same could be said as far as the two 
Polycentric units, Zanussi and Electrolux, are concerned. Organizational structure, at least 
on international lines, seems to bear little resemblance in this research’s answers.
At the same time, the results did not confirm the ‘culture-specific’ argument. Intra-nation 
differences were as significant as inter-national ones. Managers from Electrolux and 
Unilever UK shared a number of similarities but also displayed some important differences. 
In Italy, managers from Zanussi and Unilever UK, although both being Northern-based, 
foreign-owned companies, were less similar in their answers as otherwise expected from 
the ‘culture specific’ theories.
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CONCLUSIONS
Cross-cultural studies, by putting too much emphasis ont the cultural variable, have become 
vulnerable to the same criticisms as those leveled at the classical or “principles” schools of 
management. Years ago some researchers cautioned against “black box” management studies. 
Proponents of cultural explanations make this very mistake in their analysis. Only in their 
case, instead of the “black box” being labeled “management”, it is called “culture”- a concept 
which is often made to stand for many unspecified influences. In the “culturalist “ view, for 
example, cultural differences are often posited as a major difficulty encountered in managing 
employees from other countries. This research has suggested, however, that the problem 
could just as often result from automatic, stereotyped assumptions of differences on the part of 
individuals or management in their organizations. The role of company affiliation has proved 
to be a very important factor to explain identified managerial differences. Only the Zanussi 
managers in fact display some characteristics at the perceptions of practice level which resemble 
the classic Italian managerial profile. The use of a questionnaire with the distinction between 
values and perceptions of practice and the analysis of the data at the national, as well as at the 
organizational level of analysis, has also contributed to cast a shadow over the culturalist 
thesis. Some, like Pugh argue that mangerial behaviour is a function of such contextual 
variables as size, technology, and organizational climate; and that organizational effectiveness 
is a function of the task as well as of the societal environment. It is clear that, before drawing 
any conclusions on national managerial profiles, it is necessary to control for company 
affiliation. The ideal research sample must be made up of a cross section of national managers 
from small, as well as big firms; private and public; foreign and nationally owned; producing 
non durable and durable consumers goods, and so on. Since it is almost impossible to obtain 
such a heterogeneous research sample, another of the research conclusions is that national 
managerial profiles cannot be identified with a standard, traditional research approach. The 
Italian managerial profile described in the literature therefore must be questioned. This
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argument is a challenge to Human resource managers in the companies involved in this study. 
Managers in one of the companies argued that one of their problems is how to generate an 
understanding and appreciation of cultural differences. In order to tackle interculturalism, 
senior managers were put through a training programme a major component of which was an 
explanation of the Hofstede model for understanding the cultures of different nationalities. A 
diagnosis of the training need had been rigorously conducted and it was generally agreed that 
understanding of cultural differences was a significant need driven by the business strategy. 
Accordingly, looking at the national characteristics emerged from the research, it was possible 
to understand which nationalities got on with which and why, and it also helped highlight 
problems.
Today it is accepted that one of the major problems facing multinational corporations is the 
need to tailor management practices and styles to the business conditions and cultural milieus 
of those countries in which they employ nationals. Inability or unwillingness to do so is 
frequently cited as a primary cause of business difficulties internationally.
Successful approaches to the problem depend, of course, on access to reliable information 
about these nations. In addition to what can be observed and easily identified, concerned 
companies must inquire into what lies behind the observable: the norms, values, perceptions 
of the managers they employ.
Scholarly and trade publications are replete with characterizations of different nationalities, and 
there are today numerous experts on culture. As a result, we have been told that Frenchmen 
are very individualistic, Italians very status oriented, Englishmen in favour of delegation, 
Americans driven by money, Japanese always seeking consensus, and so on. These 
observations are both generalizations based on subjective, impressionistic experience as well 
as conclusions derived from statistical analysis. The quantitative evidence is often interpreted 
through the lenses of those a priori, impressionistic and subjective experiences.
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What emerges from this research is that the environment in which managers operate is a 
variable which must be looked at closely. The relationship between the individual and the 
environment has been studied by many. Schein [1956] looked at the process of organizational 
socialization. Before, Margaret Mead’s study in the early 40s of pubescent girls in Samoa 
convinced her that these ‘primitive peoples’ had a lesson for modem American youth. It was 
not innate physiological changes that made adolescents “difficult”, rather it was the civilization 
in which they grew up. Margaret Mead had been a student of America’s most influential 
anthropologist, Franz Boas, who had spearheaded the opposition to the school of eugenics 
associated with Francis Galton, and insisted on the primacy of culture as an explanation for 
“national characteristics”. As Mead herself explained, anthropological studies have shown that 
it isn’t race but the way in which people are brought up that makes them behave the way they 
do.
“Usually foreigners are described as being rather like ourselves but having a few funny 
customs, wearing different clothes, using odd expressions, eating some strange foods ... “ 
[1943, p.l] But, faithful to her training, Mead explained the weakness in this approach. It was 
the society in which they were raised that conditioned young people’s social responses This 
early, very important study on the role of society and culture on the individual seems to have 
influenced the ‘cultural contingency’ theory originated in the early 70s. However, these later 
management studies on the role of culture did not use culture as the starting point or the unit of 
analysis, but rather as an after-thought, all-embracing explanation of quantitative results. In 
other words, they have failed to conceptualize and broaden the concept of culture. Instead of 
looking at the principal components which made up, for example, French and German culture, 
it was assumed that these cultures were different, and that if managers ‘ scores on a number of 
items differed, then the rational behind it had to be that different cultures are reflected in 
managers’ responses. Developing Mead’s argument, one can identify the societal as well as the 
organizational culture. The university graduate is heavily influenced by the former, the 
experienced manager by the latter. Yet researchers have limited themselves to the study of
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national managerial profiles which collapse the societal and organizational cultures under the 
label of a vague ” national culture”. From an intuitive point of view the identified national 
managerial differences made sense and were readily accepted. Throughout the field research 
for this project, it emerged that both in the UK and Italy top managers and respondents’ views 
alike were encroached in their own ‘culture specific’ background. Hofstede’s work was 
considered the standard guide to most management development courses. Few, if any, 
bothered with his methodology, sample characteristics and time of research. Since his 
conclusions ‘made sense’ they were taken at face value, without much questioning. For 
example, personnel managers in Italy, especially at Unilever, were very sceptic about the 
Anglo-Saxon, quantitative approach to the evaluation of management development They 
regarded the whole personnel issue as very distant from any mechanistic process and instead 
were highly focused on feelings, symbols and so on, and this was a popular trend among 
Italian academics and managers alike. Those who were later exposed to the UK system of 
evaluation started to see its value; their views started to change and learned to respect this 
different approach. Similarly, UK managers, especially from Electrolux, were constantly 
surprised by the level of expertise and efficiency they experienced every time they visited the 
usually very modem corresponding Italian units. The unspoken assumption was that what 
they expected in Italy were chaotic management relations taking place in a backward 
environment. Managers both from the UK and Italy, when confronted with a different reality 
experienced a loss of confidence in their own stereotypes.
Managers as well as researchers are human beings, and thus not completely immune to 
stereotyped thinking about other nations and people. Stereotypes simplify the world and 
simplify one’s job. They provide automatic and simple explanations for complex problems. 
If, for example, there is difficulty in one Latin European country, the ready response might be, 
“Well, you know those Latins.” One should consider, for example, how World War II 
affected views of Germans, Japanese and Russians and how postwar and recent events
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succeeded remarkably in altering these concepts.
Cavalli Sforza in his latest research findings [1994], synthesizing 50 years of research on 
population genetics, found such a wide range of genetic variations in both African and non- 
African groups that it makes the notion of race meaningless. There are some superficial traits 
like skin colour and body build, they are striking, and we notice them.
That is what misleads us. It makes us think that races and people are very different. They are 
not, when we look under the skin. The term race may nevertheless have valid social meaning 
even if it isn’t biologically based. Most people would find life confusing if they couldn’t 
identify somehow with a group. Race, as well as culture, are such important parts of how we 
think about and navigate our lives, that they have acquired a potent and lasting meaning in our 
society.
This research elicited opinions on work-related values and perceptions of practices on items 
such as superior/subordinate relationships, career progression and decision-making. The 
results indicated that ‘those Latins’ (at least those Italians studied) may not be so different in 
their aspirations as ‘those British’. However, if people want to see a particular group in a 
certain way, that is the way they will see i t  They seem to confirm their preconceptions and 
tend to ignore contradictory evidence (perhaps even the evidence from this study).
In this respect, it would be interesting to determine how much of the difficulty experienced in 
managing employees in other countries is due not to cultural differences at all but, rather, to the 
automatic and psychologically self-serving assumption of differences that, in reality, may be 
minor or even nonexistent.
This research reinforces the need to put assumptions about people to the empirical test. 
Organizational policies cannot be more effective than the validity of the assumptions on which 
they are based. This need to test assumptions is particularly important in international 
organizations where accurate information is so difficult to obtain and accurate judgements are
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so heavily influenced by the preconceptions different nationalities have about each other.
The considerable similarities, or lack of stable differences found in the goals (work-related 
values and perceptions of practice) of employees in Italy and in the UK is also of importance. 
This finding has an important policy implication: since the goals of employees are not 
significantly different internationally, corporate policy decisions, to the extent that they are 
based on assumptions about employees goals, can also be international in scope.
It is not only Englishmen who want money, or Italians who want more autonomy or value 
status symbols, or Germans who want their work skills utilized and improved. A management 
whose policies and practices reflect these stereotypes (for example, providing few advancement 
opportunities in some countries or using certain countries as dumping grounds for routine, 
unchallenging work) should be prepared to suffer the consequences of managing a frustrated 
and uncommitted workforce whose apathy and anxieties it helped nurture.
Implications for management
Organization theory has always stressed that power, authority, influence, and leadership are 
complex psychological concepts that cannot be understood without analyzing the relationship 
between superior and subordinate. However, it is argued that competitive pressures will force 
in the long run more and more layers of management into roles other than the traditional 
supervisory ones. Layers of management will either disappear altogether, or else smaller 
numbers of managers will do different tasks at “headquarters.”
Hirshohron observes that ‘informated”operators in the new, networked organizations are 
subjected to new kinds and levels of anxiety, for the following reasons:
• they have much higher levels of responsibility;
• they work in organizations such as nuclear plants, automated refineries, or chemical plants 
that often have much greater danger associated in them: and
• the boundaries of their roles are much more ambiguous and fluid.
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Under the old system, line supervisors provided support when crises arose. The hierarchy 
functioned not only as coordination mechanism, but also as a psychological defense against 
anxiety. In this capacity, it served workers and managers alike, which may account for the 
difficulty of imagining work systems without hierarchy.
If such managerial roles disappear, the informated worker must find other sources of support 
or develop other psychological defences against anxiety. Such defences, as Hirschhom 
shows, may paradoxically undermine the very efficiencies the technology is designed to create. 
The worker will routinize and bureaucratize the job, undermining the flexibility designed into 
the system.
Tom Malone speculates that future organizations may well be networks in which hierarchy 
either disappears altogether or plays a far less important role than other forms of coordination 
and integration. Perhaps the organization of the future will be more like a giant, complex 
seesaw in which everyone must contribute to effective coordination; management as it exists 
today will be either invisible or nonexistent, according to this theory.
Schein argues that we are on the brink of an organizational revolution that will not simply cut 
out layers of management or reduce costs or force greater levels of worker participation. What 
may happen is that management as a traditionally conceived, hierarchical function will 
disappear altogether, to be replaced with concepts that we have not yet developed. 
Nonetheless, he argues that we have great difficulty even imagining, much less designing, non 
hierarchical or even less hierarchical systems.
The evidence from this research outlines how some of these changes may be already under 
way. The hierarchical relationship typical of many large European organizations is perceived by 
the managers themselves as less pervasive than it used to be. Managers from both the UK and 
Italy identify the relationship between superior and subordinate as based on mutual trust rather 
than on recognition and respect of power. This change is more significant in Italy, where strict
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hierarchical relationships were considered to be the norm in most organizations. If, as Schein 
argues, we are on the brink of an organizational revolution, the evidence gathered from this 
relatively small sample indicates that managers, as human beings, are prepared for this change. 
In fact, some of them may be the instigators of this revolution. Managerial aspirations seem to 
point in the same direction. UK and Italian managers want more freedom, consultation, 
responsibility and clear career paths. In some cases, such as Zanussi, their thinking is more 
advanced that the organization itself. If an organizational revolution is about to come, the 
managers from this study seem to be ready for it.
Italian management
This study has documented that the stereotypical image of Italian managers, at least in the 
companies analyzed, does not exist. A micro analysis of values and perceptions of practice 
found some of these Italian managerial characteristics at the perceptions of practice level of 
Zanussi managers. These results confirm the need to look at the organizational structure as one 
of the main contributions to the previously identified “Italian management profile”. Belonging 
to one organization or the other, as far as the Italian organizations were involved, seemed to be 
quite relevant. The research hypothesis that the Italian managerial profile does not contain items 
such as autocracy, clientelism and paternalism has also been confirmed.
I has been recognized that Italian managers have now acquired a sound modem approach to 
business management Italian industry has often succeeded more on a foundation of informal 
rather than formal education and training. Today the ability to upgrade existing industries will 
require a stronger and better trained human resource foundation, and industries themselves will 
have to share the burden of education alongside the government. The introduction of better 
trained managers, modern information technology and better control will allow Italian 
companies to remain competitive. The lack of a formal management structure has often 
prevented large Italian companies from growing organically. When these same companies 
have strained from their core businesses, they have faced severe difficulties. Yet they have, so
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far, operated primarily in a sheltered environment, protected by import quotas and an 
interventionist government. They have now to make a second leap forward and internationalize 
themselves, work and live abroad, soak up the experiences and return to their companies with 
new ideas and perspectives. Hopefully, this research has shown that there are no clear cultural 
barriers to their own development. What they perceive of UK managers and industry in 
particular is only a confirmation of world views and stereotypes which have little place in any 
successful business. One manager described this factor as ‘the fear of the unknown’. This 
research highlights that the unknown is nothing to fear of. Managers, whether from the UK or 
Italy, share a similar set of values or goals; the organizations they work for may alter their 
perceptions of practice on some issues, but managers are now expected to go beyond these 
superficial stereotypes and learn to deal with different national managers on an equal level. 
This research has demonstrated that it is very difficult to distinguish national managerial 
characteristics. When the typology and the level of analysis are studied in detail, it appears that 
it is very difficult to conceptualize national managerial characteristics. This in turn, would 
indicate that managers can go beyond national stereotypes and turn this new understanding to 
their own advantage.
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APPENDIX
LAURENT QUESTIONS
Organizations as Political Systems
UK
1. Through their professional activity,
managers play an important political role in
society. agree 41%
8. Most managers seem to be more motivated 
by obtaining power than by achieving objectives.
agree 33%
2. Most managers have a clear notion 
of what we call organizational 
structure.
average agreement/ 
disagreement
disagreel8%
30%
This Data 
Italy Uniluk Elux Zan
67% 48% 36% 63%
47% 42% 26% 41%
22% 25% 12% 22%
45%
Table 1
Organizations as Authority Systems
6. The main reason for having a 
hierarchical structure is so that everyone 
knows who has authority over 
whom.
This Data
UK Italy Uniluk Elux Zan 
agree 34% 34% 35% 34% 34%
12. Today there seems to be an authority 
crisis in organizations.
3. The manager of tomorrow will be, 
in the main, a negotiator.
average agreement/ 
disagreement
agree 18% 29% 14% 23% 31%
agree 61% 61% 
38% 41%
67% 56% 57%
Unilit
71%
51%
22%
Unilit
35%
23%
63%
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Organizations as Role Formalization System
UK Italy Uniluk Elux Zan
11. When the respective roles of the members 
of a department become complex, detailed job 
descriptions are a useful way of clarifying.
agree 56%
7. The more complex a department’s 
activities, the more important it is for 
each individual’s functions to be 
well-defined.
agree 83%
13. Most managers would achieve better 
results if their roles were less precisely 
defined.
disagree 61%
average agreement/ 66 %
disagreement
72%
58%
49%
57%
58% 55%
76% 89% 71%
59% 64% 59%
Organizations as Hierarchical Relationship System
Table 3
UK Italy
10. Most organizations would be better off agree 33% 60%
if conflict could be eliminated forever.
This Data
Uniluk Elux Zan
14% 49% 66%
5. It is important for a manager to have 
at hand precise answers to most of the 
questions that subordinates may raise 
about their work.
agree 52% 77% 40% 63% 76%
9. In order to get efficient work 
relationships, it is often necessary 
to bypass the hierarchical line. disagree 20% 27% 17% 25% 30%
4. An organizational structure in which 
certain subordinates have two direct bosses agree 76% 
should be avoided at all costs.
59% 68% 85% 70%
average agreement/ 
disagreement
45 55'
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Unilit
66%
46%
40%
Unilit
55%
77%
24%
48%
Hofstede’s Test
A) The descriptions below apply to four different types of managers. First, please read through these 
descriptions:
Manager I
Usually makes his/her decisions promptly and communicates them to his/her subordinates clearly and firmly 
Expects them to carry out the decisions loyally and without raising difficulties.
Manager II
Usually makes his/her decisions promptly, but, before going ahead, tries to explain them fully to his/her 
subordinates. Gives them the reasons for the decisions and answers whatever questions they may have.
Manager III
Usually consults with his/her subordinates before he/she reaches his/her decisions. Listens to their advice, 
considers it, and then announces his/her decisions. He/she then expects all to work loyally to implement it 
whether or not it is in accordance with the advice they gave.
Manager IV
Usually calls a meeting of his/her subordinates when there is an important decision to be made. Puts the 
problem before the group and then invites discussion. Accepts the majority viewpoint as the decision.
T.Sample UK Italy UnilUK Elux Zan UnillT
34. Now, for the above types of manager, 
please circle the one which you would 
prefer to work under
2.9 2.9 2.9 3.0 2.9 3.0 2.9
35. And to which one of the above four 
types of managers would you say your 
own superior most closely corresponds?
2.6 2.6 2.6 2.4 2.8 2.5 2.7
36. To which type do managers usually 
correspond in your company? 2.4 2.2 2.6 2.1 2.5* 2.5 2.4*
37. To which type do you think you 
correspond?
2.8 2.8 2.8 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.8
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Schein’sTest
HOW IMPORTANT DECISIONS SHOULD BETAKEN IN YOUR ORGANIZATION ( select 3 ITEMS1
Uniluk Elux Zan Unilit
It has always been done 2% 9% 1% 0%
this way
This is the right way 61% 72% 37% 49%
to do it.
Our managing director wants 18% 20% 1% 7%
to do it this way
We take this kind of decision 13% 13% 37% 18%
to the marketing committee 
and do what they decide
We thrashed it out in three 
different committees,tested it
on the sales force, and if they 36% 40% 77% 64%
think the idea is still 
sound, so we will do it.
Let’s try and see 52% 25% 20% 24%
Our research shows that this
is the way to do it 84% 87% 86% 81%
Other 22% 20% 9% 13%
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HOW IMPORTANT DECISIONS ARE TAKEN IN YOUR ORGANIZATION ( select 3 ITEMS)
It has always been done 
this way
This is the right way 
to do it
Our managing director wants 
to do it this way
We take this kind of decision 
to the marketing committee 
and do what they decide
We thrashed it out in three 
different committees,tested it 
on the sales force, and if they 
think the idea is still 
sound, so we will do it.
Let’s try and see
Our research shows that this 
is the way to do it
Other
Uniluk Elux Zan Unilit
61% 39% 43% 37%
39% 55% 48% 35%
63% 62% 59% 51%
31% 14% 24% 21%
24% 18% 20% 34%
22% 53% 36% 16%
41% 32% 35% 65%
9% 16% 9% 3%
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SHOULD DETERMINE CAREER SUCCESS ( select 3 items)
Uniluk Elux Zanussi Unili
1.Power of
Analysis 40% 23% 60% 55%
2.Political
Analysis 2% 0% 13% 7%
3.Connections 0% 0% 2% 2%
4.Loyalty 0% 9% 4% 1%
5. Deference 0% 0% 0% 0%
6.Imagination 25% 23% 14% 20%
7.Business sense 66% 63% 9% 12%
8.Delegation 10% 7% 32% 29%
9.Personality 12% 10% 14% 34%
lO.Sense of Reality 8% 23% 16% 13%
11. Achievements 72% 69% 76% 67%
12.Communications 53% 47% 40% 44%
13.Courage 0% 7% 8% 6%
14.0ther 10% 12% 9% 3%
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DETERMINES CAREER SUCCESS ( select 3 items)
Uniluk
1.Power of
Analysis 14%
2.Political
Analysis 21%
3.Connections 42%
4.Loyalty 14%
5. Deference 8%
6.Imagination 4%
7.Business sense 29%
8.Delegation 8%
9.Personality 12%
lO.Sense of Reality 2%
11. Achievements 61%
12.Communications 36%
13.Courage 0%
14,Other 8%
Elux Zanussi Unilit
17% 30% 39%
7% 30% 34%
15% 30% 10%
24% 16% 13%
5% 9% 6%
7% 8% 6%
37% 13% 10%
3% 13% 16%
10% 14% 34%
13% 13% 8%
83% 70% 55%
22% 30% 31%
1% 5% 3%
11% 6% 5%
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Career Progression
60.How satisfied are you with your career progress to date in your company?
UK Italy UnilUK Elux Zanussi UnillT
5.Very satisfied 11% 8% 14% 9% 9% 7%
4.Satisfied 65% 54% 66% 65% 55% 53%
3.Undecided 11% 17% 12% 10% 13% 20%
2.Dissatisfied 10% 17% 6% 14% 18% 15%
1 .Very dissatisfied 0% 2% 0% 0% 2% 2%
61.How would you rate your career progression to date in your company compared with
other people you know who joined at the same time as you?
UK Italy UnilUK Elux Zanussi UnillT
5.Much better 13% 9% 6% 18% 8% 10%
4.Somewhat better 47% 29% 55% 39%41% 17%
3.About the Same 33% 50% 27% 37% 41% 58%
2.Somewhat worse 7% 11% 10% 3% 8% 13%
l.Much worse 0% 0%
63. Are there any factors which you can think have hindered your career progression in your compan
UK Italy UnilUK Elux Zanussi UnillT
YES 52% 46% 61% 44% 45% 48%
NO 47% 53% 38% 55% 54% 51%
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T. Sample UK
[0] u f
Uniluk
(l)
Elux
(2)
Zan
(3)
Unilit
(4)
Bocconi Ashridge 
(5) (6)
V14 3.25 3.21 3.28 3.21 3.35 3.08 3.51 Z,A 3.23 3.02 V14
V15 1.79 1.60 1.92* 1.46 1.69 1.78 K 1.84 K 2.16 all 5 1.63 V15
V16 3.06 2.91 3.16* 3.08 2.94 3.13 A 3.16 A 3.19 A 2.68 V16
V17 3.47 3.06 3.75* 3.12 3.12 3.73 K,E,A 3.88 K,E,A 3.62 K,E,A 2.90 V17
V18 2.55 2.69* 2.45 3.00 I,E,B 2.44 2.72 I,B 2.35 2.28 2.68 V18
V19 3.68 3.60 3.73 3.63 3.76 A 3.72 3.63 3.86 A 3.34 V19
V20 3.51 3.61 3.44 3.51 3.69 Z 3.23 3.57 Z 3.50 3.60 V20
V21 2.94 2.87 2.99 2.51 3.07 K ,1 3.01 K,I 2.46 3.59 all 5 3.02 K,I V21
V22 1.60 1.74* 1.51 1.95 E,Z,I,B 1.60 1.47 1.51 1.55 1.68 V22
V23 1.87 2.26* 1.61 2.25 Z,I,B 2.25 Z,I,B 1.57 1.72 1.51 2.29 Z,I,B V23
V24 2.29 2.13 2.40* 1.89 2.20 K 2.26*K 2.21*K 2.77 K,E,Z,I 2.34 K V24
V25 1.85 1.81 1.88 1.63 1.94 1.82 1.81 2.02 K 1.82 V25
V26 1.88 2.00 1.80 1.70 2.28 K ,I,Z,B 1.82 1.84 1.74 1.95 V26
V27 3.54 3.13 3.81* 3.12 3.32 A 3.68 K,E,A 3.79 K,E,A 3.96 K,E,Z,A 2,90 V27
V28 2.36 2.21 2.45* 2.21 2.39 A 2.46 A 2.30 2.62 K,A 1.97 V28
V29 2.69 2.81 2.60 2.78 2.62 2.44 2.77*Z 2.59 3.12 E,Z,B V29
V30 2.67 2.41 2.83* 2.42 2.48 2.76 A 2.82K,E,A 2.94 K,E,A 2.31 V30
V31 2.00 1.77 2.15* 1.76 1.89 2.12 K,A 2.00 A 2.37 K,E,I,A 1.63 V31
Codes: K=Uniluk(Unilever Uk) E=Elux(Electrolux) Z=Zan(Zanussi) I=Unilit(Unilever Italy) B=Bocconi A=Ashridge
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values T.Sample UK Italy Uniluk Elux Zan Unilit Bocconi Ashridge
[0] [11 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V71 2.94 2.93 2.94 3.00 2.90 3.01 2.94 2.86 2.90
V72 2.65 2.61 2.67 2.42 2.89 2.53 2.72 2.79 2.45
V73 2.49 2.29 2.61* 2.14 2.50 2.54 2.40 2.95 K,I,A 2.19
V74 2.83 2.82 2.84 2.87 2.79 2.89 2.89 2.73 2.80
Codes: K=Uniluk(Unilever Uk) E=Elux(Electrolux) Z=Zan(Zanussi) I=Unilit(Unilever Italy) B=Bocconi A=Ashridge
V71
V72
V73
V74
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PERCEPTIONS
All Sample UK Italy UniluK Elux
V75 2.96 3.18* 2.82 3.12 I,Z 3.09 I,B
V76 3.02 2.83 3.11* 2.74 2.83
V77 3.60 3.38 3.66* 3.27 3.47
V78 4.07 3.84 4.11* 4.10 A,E 3.70
V79 3.20 3.29* 3.00 3.55 E,I,B 3.12 B
V80 2.46 2.26 2.56* 2.27 2.21
V81 2.64 2.61 2.68 2.61 2.37
V82 2.85 2.90 2.91 2.85 2.92
V83 3.22 3.38* 3.03 3.89 all 5 2.89
V84 2.30 2.18 2.50* 2.06 2.21
V85 3.23 3.35* 3.03 3.42 I,B 3.25 B
V86 2.76 2.72 2.90 2.68 2.58
V87 2.33 2.00 2.50* 1.95 1.90
Zanussi Unilit Bocconi Ashridge
3.16 I,B 2.60 2.71 3.39 I,B V75
3.33 K,E,A 3.05 3.19 K,E 2.92 V76
3.78 K ,E,A 3.67 k 3.50 3.37 V77
4.29 E,A 4.07 E,A 4.23 E,A 3.73 V78
3.33 I,B 2.93 2.71 3.21B V79
2.49 2.72k, E, a 2.46 2.31 V80
2.78 E 2.74 E 2.49 2.92 E V81
2.97 2.70 3.091 2.95 V82
3.40 E,I,B 2.91 2.76 3.47 E,I,B V83
2.32 K 2.50 E,K 2.70 K,E,Z,A 2.26 V84
3.36 l,B 3.00 2.69 3.41 B V85
2.94 E 2.82 2.96 E 2.95 V86
2.76 a!15 2.43 K,E 2.31 K,E 2.17 V87
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All Sample UK Italy UniluK Elux Zanussi Unilit Bocconi Ashridge
V88 3.22 3.27 3.20 3.13 3.25 3.42 I,B 3.07 3.10 3.461 V88
V89 2.48 2.76* 2.45 2.78 z,l 2.49 2.42 2.34 2.60 3.09e,Z,i ,B V89
V90 3.82 3.79 3.74 3.97 E,B 3.54 3.84 E,B 3.89 E,B 3.46 3.92 E,B V90
V91 2.39 2.30 2.47 2.27 2.47 2.56 A 2.27 2.60 A 2.12 V91
V92 3.09 3.18 3.06 3.31 3.09 3.00 3.06 3.14 3.14 V92
V93 3.06 3.19 2.95 3.29 B 3.00 3.06 2.98 2.78 3.34 B V93
V94 2.95 3.26* 2.89 3.191 3.201 3.161 2.44 3.15*1 3.42 I V94
V95 2.89 2.62 2.99* 2.59 2.63 3.32 all5 2.81 2.84 2.65 V95
V113 3.60 3.74 3.59 3.89Z.I 3.69 3.50 3.45 3.86z,l 3.65 vn:
V114 3.48 3.80* 3.45 3.571 3.73 I 3.50 3.25 365 I,B 4.17 V lb
Codes: K=Uniluk(Unilever Uk) E=Elux(Electrolux) Z=Zan(Zanussi) I=Unilit(Unilever Italy) B=Bocconi A=Ashridge
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Personal Data on the respondents
COMPANY SEX 
M F 1
LEVEL
2 3
MASTAT 
M S
TENURE
1
SUBJECT
2 3 4 5
l.UNIUK 86.7 13.3 4 .4 80 15.6 60 35 .6 8 years 4 .8 45.2 16.7 4 .8 28 .6
Age 30.0 39 6 3 37 7 29 18 2 19 7 2 12
2.ELUX 83.6 16.4 40 47.3 12.7 87.3 9.1 9.1 6 .8 54.5 6.8 22.7
Age 39.6 46 9 22 26 7 48 7 10 years 4 3 24 3 10
3.ZANUSSI 94.4 5 .6 59 .7 16.7 23 .6 84.5 15.5 16.1 61.3 22 .6
Age 43.2 68 4 43 12 17 60 11 15 years 5 19 7
4.UNILIT 82.9 17.1 25.4 39 .4 35 .2 58.2 41.8 10 years 8 .5 16.9 8 .5 10.2 55.9
Age 35.3 58168 12 18 30 26 40 30 5 10 5 6 33
5.BOCCONI 92.2 7 .8 62.7 26 .9 7 .5 77.6 14.9 11 years 4 .5 6 .0 10.4 6 .0 22.4
Age 42.3 59 3 42 18 5 52 10 3 4 7 4 15
6.ASHRIDGE 82 .9 17.1 58.5 39 2 .4 85.4 14.6 9 years 2 .4 9 .8 31 .7 19.5 9 .8
Age 40.0 34 7 24 16 1 35 6 1 4 13 8 4
TOTAL 87.5 12.5 42.9 39 .3 17.8 23.7 76.3 11 years 5 .5 11 21.1 6 .3 22.7
Age 38.8 30 44 152 139 63 82 264 20 40 77 23 , 83
Tenure= years with the company
Subject= 1 arts, 2 natscience,3 engineering^ social science, 5 business
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